Endurance Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. L. Pellinen Constr.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:18-cv-02154-RBD-GJK

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company appeals the entry of summary judgment against it in its action seeking a declaration of rights and liabilities under a commercial liability insurance policy that it issued to L. Pellinen Construction, Inc. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that the policy covered appellees Mattamy Orlando, LLC and Mattamy Florida, LLC as additional insureds and that the policy exclusions relied upon by Endurance did not apply. We therefore affirm.

I.

In December 2016, while working on the roof trusses for a new home in Kissimmee, Florida, Esdras Ambrocio fell and landed on the concrete slab some 15-20 feet below. Ambrocio was seriously injured and incurred significant expenses for medical treatment and life care.

After paying hundreds of thousands of dollars for those continuing expenses, the workers' compensation carrier for

Ambrocio's employer filed a personal-injury lawsuit in his name against several entities involved in the construction of the home. Those entities included (among others) L. Pellinen Construction, Inc., the residential construction company that had subcontracted with Ambrocio's employer to help with framing the house; Mat-tamy Florida, LLC, the owner of the lot where the house was being built, as well as most or all of the other lots in the subdivision; and Mattamy Orlando, LLC, an affiliate of Mattamy Florida that had hired Pellinen to do framing and sheathing work on the house.

Pellinen was insured under a commercial general liability policy issued by Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company. The policy required Endurance to defend and indemnify Pellinen for covered bodily-injury claims, subject to certain exclusions. It also extended coverage to "additional insureds" for liability arising from Pellinen's work for the additional insureds or from the additional insureds' acts or omissions in connection with their "general supervision" of Pellinen's work, if such coverage was required by written contract, and subject to the same exclusions.

Mattamy Florida and Mattamy Orlando tendered their defense in Ambrocio's lawsuit to Endurance, claiming that they were additional insureds under Pellinen's policy by virtue of a written agreement with Pellinen. Endurance refused to defend the Mattamy entities, asserting that the policy did not provide coverage for Ambrocio's lawsuit because three policy exclusions applied: a Workers' Compensation exclusion, an "Employer's Liability" exclusion, and a "Multi-Unit Construction Project" exclusion.

Endurance raised the same three exclusions in a declaratory judgment action it filed in federal court, seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Pellinen or the Mattamy entities in Ambrocio's personal injury lawsuit. The parties in the declaratory judgment action filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court ultimately granted the Mattamy defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Endurance's motion in relevant part, finding that Mattamy Florida and Mattamy Orlando were "additional insureds" under the policy and that the exclusions raised by Endurance did not apply to them.^[1] Endurance now appeals.

II.

We review a district court's rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party on each motion. Chavez v. Mercantil Commercebank, N.A., 701 F.3d 896, 899 (11th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

We also review a district court's interpretation of a contract, including an insurance policy, de novo. Tobin v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005).

III.

First, we consider Endurance's arguments that the district court erred in finding that Mattamy Florida and Mattamy Orlando were entitled to coverage as "additional insureds" under the policy. We then consider whether the exclusions raised by Endurance relieved it of the obligation to defend the Mattamy defendants against the personal injury action brought by Ambrocio. None of Endurance's arguments are persuasive; we affirm the district court's judgment in favor of the Mattamy defendants.

A.

Endurance contends that the district court exceeded its authority by declaring that Mattamy Florida and Mattamy Orlando were entitled to coverage as additional insureds under the policy issued to Pellinen, arguing that this issue was beyond the scope of its declaratory judgment action. We disagree.

The question of the Mattamy defendants' insured status was squarely before the district court from the time that Endurance named them as defendants in the declaratory judgment action. In its complaint, Endurance asked the district court to declare whether the Pellinen policy provided coverage to the Mattamy defendants for Ambrocio's personal injury claim. Endurance alleged a "bona fide, actual, present, and practical need for a declaration of

the parties' rights and duties, if any, under the Endurance Policy issued to Pellinen," and it sought a judgment declaring that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Mattamy defendants due to specified exclusions in the policy. In their answer to the complaint, the Mattamy defendants asserted as an affirmative defense that they were entitled to a defense and indemnity in the personal injury action because they were additional insureds under the policy.

The parties also raised the question of the Mattamy defendants' insured status in their cross-motions for summary judgment, each relying in part on the "Additional Insured Endorsement" in the policy. In its motion, Endurance explained that the exclusions it relied on barred coverage for the Mattamy defendants "[p]ursuant to the terms of the Endurance Policy's Additional Insured Endorsement"; the Mattamy defendants asserted that the same endorsement entitled them to coverage under the policy. The parties having raised the question of the Mattamy defendants' status as additional insureds in their pleadings and in their motions for summary judgment, the district court did not err in addressing it.

B.

Endurance also argues that the district court erred in finding that the Mattamy defendants were entitled to a defense in the personal injury action under the policy's additional insured endorsement because (1) the policy provided liability coverage for additional insureds only in connection with their supervision of Pellinen's work, which was not at issue in the personal injury action; and (2) a question of fact remained as to whether the Mattamy

defendants' written agreement with Pellinen was in effect at the time of Ambrocio's accident. Again, we disagree.

The additional insured endorsement in the policy provides that any "entity required by written contract . . . to be named as an insured is an insured but only with respect to liability arising out of" (as relevant here) "'your work' for the additional insured, or acts or omissions of the additional insured, in connection with their general supervision of 'your work.'" The policy states that "you" or "your" refers to the named insured-Pellinen-and defines "your work" to mean "(1) [w]ork or operations performed by you or on your behalf; and (2) [m]aterials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work or operations."

Ambrocio's complaint alleged that the Mattamy defendants were the owners and developers of the property, that Pellinen acted as the general contractor, that both the Mattamy entities and Pellinen were involved in conducting and overseeing the construction and framing of the home, and that the Mattamy defendants were also involved in the purchase and storage of the trusses that allegedly failed and caused Ambrocio's accident. The complaint further alleged that Pellinen hired Ambrocio's employer to assist with the construction and framing of the home, and that both the Mattamy defendants and Pellinen were liable for, among other things, failing to inspect and properly store the trusses that allegedly broke and caused Ambrocio's fall, failing to provide a safe workplace, and "failing to properly supervise the work."

These allegations, though vague, are sufficient to bring Ambrocio's lawsuit within the coverage provided by the policy for liability arising from the Mattamy defendants' "general supervision" of work done by Pellinen or on its behalf, or of materials furnished in connection with such work. Under Florida law, "if the complaint, fairly read, contains any allegations which could fall within the scope of coverage, the insurer is obliged to defend the entire action," even if the complaint leaves some doubt as to the nature or validity of the harms alleged, or includes allegations that fall outside the scope of coverage.^[2] ...