Engel v. Missouri

JOSEPH MICHAEL DEVON ENGEL, Plaintiff, v. STATE, MISSOURI, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:20-cv-01906 SRC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

January 21, 2021

Memorandum and Order

This matter is before the Court upon review of a civil complaint filed by Joseph Michael Devon Engel (registration no. 1069055), an inmate at Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center ("ERDCC"). For the reasons explained below, Engel will be given leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and this action will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

When Engel initiated this action, he did not file a separate motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Engel has filed over one hundred civil rights cases in this Court since September 2020. In many of these cases, Engel did not include a separate motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. Rather, within in the complaint, he states "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true [and] correct. I am [at] ERDCC. I only get $5.00 dollars [per] month [and] can't get no more account statements[.]" Doc. 1. Liberally construed, Engel can be understood to ask the Court to grant him leave to commence this action without prepayment of the required filing fee, and he can also be understood to aver that he cannot provide a certified copy of his inmate account statement.

Accordingly, the Court grants Engel leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action, and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount "that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner's finances."). Any claim that Engel is unable to pay $1.00 must be supported by a certified copy of his inmate account statement that details his inmate account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if, inter alia, it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Dismissals on this ground should only be ordered when legal theories are "indisputably meritless," or when the claims rely on factual allegations that are "clearly baseless." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). "Clearly baseless" factual allegations include those that are "fanciful," "fantastic," and "delusional." Id. at 32-33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327). "As those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." Id. at 33.

An action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging litigants rather than vindicating a cognizable right. Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999), Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd 826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1987). An action is also malicious if it is part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious lawsuits, or contains disrespectful or abusive language. In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). When determining whether an action is malicious, the Court need not look only to the complaint before it but may also look to the plaintiff's other litigious conduct. Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996).

To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009). These include "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51. This is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the "mere possibility of misconduct." Id. The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 1951.

The Complaint

The instant complaint is one of numerous civil rights complaints that Engel has recently filed in this Court. Engel, who identifies himself as a sovereign citizen, is a self-represented litigant currently incarcerated at ERDCC in Bonne Terre, Missouri. As acknowledged above, the instant complaint is one of more than 100 civil rights actions Engel has recently filed in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Engel prepared his handwritten complaint on two sheets of notebook paper. Named as defendants are the following: the State of Missouri; the United States of America; two unnamed Missouri Senators; an unnamed Missouri House of Representative; the Assistant Attorney General; the Attorney General; the Missouri Department of Corrections ("MDOC"); ERDCC; and Corizon.

Engel's allegations are stated as follows:

I am suing all these Officials and Individual[s] over my insides feel like on fire, sweats, uncontrol[lla]ble shakes, shit and breath smells like septic tank, blood, in shit, puke, can't hold food down, clear foam liquid in shit, puke, vision in and out, sever[e] pain[.] [T]hey all [] refuse to help[.] Medical does nothing at all, staff does nothing. I am a sourvin [sic] citiz[e]n[.] I have a family I need help I had one phone call 2 weeks and one [illegible] shower. I need medical attention for real this is not good[.]

Doc. 1 at 1.

Engel identifies his injuries as "Freedom, [illegible] life, Health, [illegible] Mental Mind Raping." ECF No. 1 at 1-2. For relief, Engel seeks separate amounts from each defendant spanning from "100 Trillion" to "200,000,000,000 Trillion" dollars. Engel also seeks "10,000,000 stocks" in "oil, coal, lead, zinc, precious metals, gold, silver, diamonds, plat[in]um, titanium, steel, Amorn [sic], UE, Top World Banks, Top World Curren[c]y, Top USA Banks" and various corporate stores, including Home Depot and Wal-Mart. Doc. 1 at 2.

Discussion

For the reasons discussed below, the Court has determined Engel has not stated a claim against any of the named defendants. As such, this action will be dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A. Defendants State of Missouri, ERDCC and MDOC

Engel's complaint is legally frivolous against the State of Missouri; ERDCC (a prison within the Department of Corrections); and MDOC (a department of the State of Missouri) because a state and entities of the state cannot be sued under § 1983 and because the State of Missouri is immune from suit.

"Section 1983 provides for an action against a 'person' for a violation, under color of law, of another's civil rights." McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1154 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[§] 1983 provides a cause of action against persons only"). However, "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are 'persons' under § 1983." Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017) (stating that a "State is not a person under § 1983"); Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that "a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983"). A claim against state entities, such as the MDOC and the ERDCC, is the same as asserting a claim against the State of Missouri. Because Engel is missing an essential element under § 1983, his claims against the State of Missouri, the MDOC, and the ERDCC must be dismissed.

Moreover, "[s]overeign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent." Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). The Eleventh Amendment has been held to confer immunity on an un-consenting state from lawsuits brought in federal court by a state's own citizens or the citizens of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); see also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 2018) ("The Eleventh Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal court."); Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The Eleventh Amendment bars private parties from suing a state in federal court."); and Egerdahl v. Hibbing...