Englade v. La. Dep't of Corr.

340 So.3d 952

Jennifer ENGLADE

v.LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

2021 CA 0132

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Judgment Rendered: DECEMBER 30, 2021

Jennifer Englade, Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women, St. Gabriel, Louisiana, Plaintiff/Appellee, In Proper Person

Debra A. Rutledge, Deputy General Counsel, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, Department of Public Safety & Corrections

BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT, JJ.

McCLENDON, J.

The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (the Department) classified the defendant's vehicular homicide offenses as crimes of violence for purposes of good time eligibility. The defendant challenged the Department's classification in Administrative Remedy Procedure No. LCIW-2018-020. The trial court reversed the Department's classification, ordered the Department to calculate the defendant's sentences as non-violent offenses for purposes of good time eligibility, and further ordered the Department to pay court costs to the defendant. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jennifer Englade is an offender in the legal custody of the Department. On May 26, 2013, Englade committed three counts of vehicular homicide, one count of third degree feticide, and one count of first degree vehicular negligent injuring. Englade entered a guilty plea as to all charges on September 2, 2014. On September 25, 2014, she was sentenced to thirty years at hard labor as to the three counts of vehicular homicide, with five years to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; five years at hard labor as to the count of third degree feticide; and five years at hard labor as to the count of first degree vehicular negligent injuring. The trial court ordered all sentences to run concurrently.¹

The Department classified Englade's vehicular homicide offenses as crimes of violence. Accordingly, the Department calculated her "good time" at the reduced rate applicable to offenders convicted of violent crimes. Englade challenged the Department's classification of her offenses as crimes of violence in Administrative Remedy Procedure (ARP) No. LCIW-2018-020. The Department denied Englade's request for relief at the first and second steps on the basis that "The Louisiana Supreme Court in [ State v. Oliphant , 2012-1176 (La. 3/19/13), 113 So.3d 165 ] declared Vehicular Homicide as a crime of violence."

Subsequently, Englade filed a petition for judicial review of the Department's final decision under the Louisiana Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure Act (CARP), LSA-R.S. 15:1171, et seq. Englade argued that under LSA-R.S. 14:32.1, vehicular homicide is only a crime of violence when the offender's BAC at the time of the offense exceeds 0.20%, and her BAC was 0.15%. Englade concluded that the Department erred in classifying her convictions as crimes of violence for purposes of calculating her good time eligibility.

The Commissioner of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court (19^th JDC) issued a report recommending the reversal of the Department's decision and the grant of Englade's request for relief. The trial court executed a judgment on November 23, 2020, adopting the Commissioner's report as its reasons and reversing the Department's decision. The November 23, 2020 judgment ordered the Department to calculate Englade's vehicular homicide sentences as non-violent offenses for purposes of good time eligibility and to pay court costs to Englade. From this judgment, the Department appeals.

RULE TO SHOW CAUSE

On April 27, 2021, this Court issued a Rule to Show Cause Order, ex proprio motu, as to why this appeal should not be dismissed, because the November 23, 2020 judgment contains the typewritten name of one judge, but the signature of another. Citing LSA-C.C.P. art. 1911, this Court ordered the parties to show cause by briefs whether the appeal should or should not be dismissed. The Rule to Show Cause Order was referred to the panel to which this appeal is assigned. Accordingly, we address it herein.

An appellate court cannot determine the merits of an appeal unless appellate jurisdiction is properly invoked by a valid final judgment. Matter of Succession of Weber , 2018-1337 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/29/19), 276 So.3d 1021, 1026. For a judgment to be a final judgment, it must contain appropriate decretal language naming the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. Simon v. Ferguson , 2018-0826 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/28/19), 274 So.3d 10, 13-14. In this matter, the November 23, 2020 judgment contains appropriate decretal language, as it identifies Englade as the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the Department as the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the classification of Englade's vehicular homicide convictions as non-violent offenses as the relief that was granted.

However, in addition to the requirement that a final judgment contain appropriate decretal language, Article 1911(A) states, in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise provided by law, every final judgment shall contain the typewritten or printed name of the judge and be signed by the judge. Any judgment that does not contain the typewritten or printed name of the judge shall not be invalidated for that reason.

The Article 1911(A) requirement that a final judgment be signed "by the judge" has been interpreted to mean that the judge before whom the case was tried must sign the judgment. In re M.L.M. , 2019-1030 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/23/20), 300 So.3d 902, 905. A judgment signed by a judge, other than the judge who presided over the hearing, is invalid and fatally defective. Such a judgment does not constitute a final judgment over which this Court can exercise appellate jurisdiction. Id. , 300 So.3d at 905-906.

As noted above, the November 23, 2020 judgment at issue in this matter contains the typewritten name of one judge – specifically, Judge Richard "Chip" Moore – but was signed by another – Judge Nadine M. Ramsey. Thus, it is not clear from the face of the judgment whether the judge before whom the case was tried was the same judge who signed the judgment. The Department's brief in response to the Rule to Show Cause explained that Judge Moore was hospitalized as a result of COVID-19 on or about July 3, 2020, and remained out of the office until January 2021. Consequently, the supreme court issued an order assigning Retired Judge Nadine M. Ramsey as judge pro tempore ,² effective November 4, 2020, through November 30, 2020, and "subject to the completion of any unfinished business."

Once properly appointed, an ad hoc or pro tempore judge is vested with the same powers and authority as the elected judges of the same court. Strahan , 916 So.2d at 211 ; see, e.g., Doiron v. S. Silica of Louisiana , 613 So.2d 1064, 1066 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/1993), writ denied, 619 So.2d 546 (La. 1993). In this matter, Judge Ramsey's pro tempore appointment began on November 4, 2020. Thus, Judge Ramsey had full authority to preside over the adjudication of Englade's petition for judicial review and to execute the November 23, 2020 judgment at issue. See Prejean v. McMillan , 2018-0919 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/28/19), 274 So.3d 575, 577 n.4, and Strahan , 916 So.2d at 211 ; see also LSA-R.S. 13:4209. Moreover, under LSA-R.S. 15:1177(A)(5), Englade's petition for review was mandated to "be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record," and the November 23, 2020 judgment specifically states that Judge Ramsey conducted a careful de novo review of the entire record before adopting the Commissioner's Report as reasons and executing the judgment. Thus, the record reflects that Judge Ramsey was both the judge before whom the matter was tried and the judge who executed the judgment at issue.

Regarding the Article 1911 requirement that a final judgment contain the typewritten or printed name of the judge, we note that this Court recently stated:

The plain language of La. C.C.P. art. 1911(A) thus requires the inclusion of the typewritten or printed name of the judge in a final judgment, and simultaneously precludes invalidation of the judgment on the basis that the typewritten or printed name of the judge is absent.

Chandler v. Cajun Ready Mix Concrete , 2019-1650 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/7/21), 328 So.3d 1189, 1192–93. In Chandler , this Court considered a judgment on appeal that contained decretal language but did not contain the typewritten or printed name of the trial court judge. Finding that the absence of the trial court judge's typewritten or printed name alone did not invalidate the judgment, we maintained the appeal. Id.

As discussed above, the November 23, 2020 judgment at issue contains appropriate decretal language and was properly signed by the judge before whom the matter was tried as required by Article 1911. Having found in Chandler that the complete absence of the signatory judge's typewritten or printed name did not invalidate an otherwise valid final judgment, we reason by analogy that under these circumstances, wherein it is plain and undisputed that the signatory judge was the same judge who presided over the trial of the matter while serving pro tempore for the judge whose typewritten name was included, the presence of the typewritten name of a judge other than the signatory judge does not invalidate an otherwise valid final judgment. See Id. Accordingly, we maintain the appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Enacted in 1985, CARP authorized the Department to adopt and implement an administrative remedy procedure for receiving, hearing, and disposing of any and all inmate complaints and grievances. LSA-R.S. 15:1171 -72; Pope v. State , 99-2559 (La. 6/29/01), 792 So.2d 713, 715. As provided in CARP, an offender aggrieved by an adverse decision rendered pursuant to any administrative remedy procedure can institute proceedings for judicial review by filing...