England v. City of Plymouth

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DAVID WAYNE ENGLAND, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PLYMOUTH, MATTHEW EMENHISER, DAVID BACON, Defendants.

No. 3:20-CV-759 JD

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division

November 23, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

JON E DEGUILIO CHIEF JUDGE

David England is a former resident of Plymouth, Indiana. In 2018 Mr. England was arrested by Officer Matthew Emenhiser of the Plymouth Police Department in front of his home pursuant to two arrest warrants. Accounts of the arrest vary, but the parties agree that Officer Emenhiser tased Mr. England when he attempted to enter his home after indicating he intended to look for paperwork relevant to his arrest. After being tased, Mr. England was arrested and transported to the hospital. Subsequently, Mr. England has struggled with medical difficulties allegedly acerbated by the tasing.

As a result, Mr. England filed this suit alleging excessive force battery, negligence, libel, slander, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and possibly false arrest. Mr. England brings these claims against Officer Emenhiser in his individual and official capacities and Plymouth Police Chief David Bacon in his individual and official capacities.^[1]Mr. England also brings claims under the doctrine of respondeat superior against both Chief Bacon and the City of Plymouth for his state law tort claims. In response, Defendants Officer Emenhiser, Chief Bacon, and the City of Plymouth have jointly moved for summary judgment on Mr. England's claims, advancing nine arguments.

The Court denies summary judgment on Mr. England's excessive force claim against Officer Emenhiser in his individual capacity, finding a material issue of fact exists. The Court also denies summary judgment on Mr. England's state law battery claim, noting it rises and falls with his excessive force claim under Indiana law and that it may only be brought against the City of Plymouth under Indiana Code § 34-13-3-5(b). The Court grants summary judgment on Mr. England's negligence, libel, slander, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false arrest claims, finding Mr. England failed to adequately defend the claims in his response brief and consequently has waived and abandoned them. The Court also grants summary judgment on all claims against Chief Bacon, finding that Mr. England failed to plead facts necessary to allege liability for Officer Emenhiser's actions. Finally, the Court strikes Mr. England's respondeat superior allegations against the City of Plymouth as duplicative of his battery claim and against Chief Bacon as precluded as a matter of law.

A. Factual Background

On August 17, 2018, Mr. England was arrested outside his home pursuant to two arrest warrants for failure to appear at a fines and costs hearing. The hearing was related to Mr. England's prior misdemeanor convictions for battery against an officer in 2013 and check deception in 2011. The events, thought hotly contested, unfolded as follows. On August 17, 2018, Mr. England was standing outside his home at the intersection of his driveway and the sidewalk after a doctor's appointment. He was unarmed. He noticed Officer Emenhiser drive by in a fully marked police car. Officer Emenhiser had noted there was a warrant for Mr. England's arrest prior to his shift and planned to serve it that day. Officer Emenhiser was familiar with Mr. England and the property because he had responded to domestic disturbances at the property several years before. Seeing Mr. England, Officer Emenhiser decided to execute the warrant. He turned the vehicle around and stopped in front of Mr. England's house. Officer Emenhiser emerged from his vehicle dressed in full uniform with badge and standard equipment. From here, the factual narratives diverge.

Mr. England claims that Officer Emenhiser noted that Mr. England “looked different” from the last time they had seen each other and asked him, “Do you have warrants?” Mr. England backed away several steps and told Officer Emenhiser he would look for his warrant paperwork inside his house and return. Mr. England alleges he quickly walked toward the house. According to Mr. England, he was not explicitly told he was under arrest and was not told to stop or warned that he would be tased. Mr. England also alleges he walked quickly but did not run. As Mr. England reached the house, Officer Emenhiser tased him for an indeterminable amount of time. Mr. England fell to the ground and Officer Emenhiser told him to “stop resisting.” He was arrested and taken to the hospital. Mr. England has alleged his existing cardiac issues worsened after the tasing, ultimately resulting in the implantation of a pacemaker in October 2018.

Officer Emenhiser does not share this version of events. Officer Emenhiser claims that upon exiting the car, he asked Mr. England if his name was David. He then told Mr. England to put his hands behind his back. Mr. England began to back away and mentioned checking some paperwork inside his house. Officer Emenhiser then told him, “We're not going to do that right now. You need to put your hands behind your back. You're under arrest.” Mr. England turned his back and walked towards the residence. Officer Emenhiser alleges he then repeatedly told Mr. England to stop and began to follow him. As Mr. England reached the house, Officer Emenhiser yelled that Mr. England must stop or he would be tased; upon hearing this warning, Mr. England began to run. When Mr. England reached the door, Officer Emenhiser deployed the taser once for five seconds, striking Mr. England. Officer Emenhiser then handcuffed and arrested Mr. England.

No third-party witnesses are available to testify to the aforementioned events. The log for the taser used by Officer Emenhiser that day indicates the taser was triggered once during the relevant time period for one five-second cycle.

B. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party presents no genuine issue of material fact, such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, all disputed issues of fact are to be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Summary judgment cannot be used to resolve swearing contests between litigants,” especially where the parties “present two vastly different stories.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003). The non-moving party need only “come forward with evidence demonstrating that there is a pending dispute of material fact; courts must resist the temptation to require the non-movant to match the moving party witness for witness, as such evidence requirements belie an improper credibility determination.” Id. at 770-71. As the excessive force reasonableness inquiry “nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom, [] summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th Cir. 2005).

C. Standards for Excessive Force and Qualified Immunity

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[C]laims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness' standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). This inquiry involves “a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. This analysis “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.

The “‘reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. The “‘reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). There are two prongs to the qualified immunity inquiry: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the victim, show that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of injury. Payne, 337 F.3d at 775. Courts look to the “objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244. “That is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Becker v. Elfriech, 821 F.3d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 2016). The unlawfulness is apparent where the right is well-established and defined at some...