Enoch v. Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff's Office

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VANESSA ENOCH; AVERY CORBIN, Plaintiffs-Appellees (22-3946)/Cross-Appellants (22-3959), v. HAMILTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; BRIAN HOGAN and GENE NOBLES, Badge No. 1266, Deputy Sheriffs, Defendants-Appellees (22-3959),CHARMAINE MCGUFFEY, Hamilton County Sheriff, Defendant-Appellant (22-3946)/Cross-Appellee (22-3959).

Nos. 22-3946, 22-3959

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

July 31, 2024

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Before: SUHRHEINRICH, BUSH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge.

Vanessa Enoch and Avery Corbin were arrested for recording in the hallway of a courthouse in Hamilton County, Ohio. They filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as various state-law claims. We previously granted qualified immunity to the defendants on the plaintiffs' federal-law claims, and dismissed their appeal with respect to any official capacity claims for lack of jurisdiction. On remand the district court dismissed all but one of the remaining claims, but held that the plaintiffs' speech-based retaliation claims could proceed to trial. Ultimately, a jury awarded judgment in favor of Enoch. The defendants appeal several of the district court's rulings at trial and its award of attorney's fees to Enoch's counsel. Because the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we reverse.

I.

A. Factual Background

Enoch and Corbin visited the Hamilton County courthouse on June 25, 2014 to attend a pretrial hearing in the criminal prosecution of Hamilton County Juvenile Judge Tracie Hunter. Enoch attended the hearing to gather information for an article she was writing about Judge Hunter's trial. Corbin had worked with Judge Hunter for several years, including as her bailiff during her tenure as a judge, and he served as a witness at the criminal proceeding. Corbin exited the courtroom after the hearing and followed courthouse reporter Kimball Perry, taking pictures of Perry with an iPad. Enoch entered the courtroom hallway around the same time and trailed behind Corbin and Perry. She started taking pictures of Hunter, Hunter's attorney, and "everybody just coming out of the courtroom and standing outside the door" with her iPad. Enoch Test., R. 191, PageID 3112.

Sheriff's Deputy Brian Hogan approached Enoch and told her to stop taking pictures. Hogan told Deputy Gene Nobles that Enoch was using her iPad in the hallway, and Nobles asked Enoch to open the iPad to show him any recordings. Enoch initially refused, but she did as Nobles asked after he told her that she would be arrested if she did not comply. But when Nobles asked Enoch to provide her name and photo identification, she again refused to cooperate.

Hogan informed Enoch and Corbin that they were prohibited from using recording devices in the hallway under Hamilton County Local Rule 33. Under the then-existing Rule 33, parties could not record "in any courtroom or hearing room, jury room, judge's chambers or ancillary area (to be determined in the sole discretion of the Court) without the express permission of the Court."

Hamilton Cnty. Common Pleas Ct. R. 33(D)(6). "Judge Nadel, who presided at the Hunter proceedings, never entered an order defining the hallways as ancillary areas under Rule 33, in which recording was prohibited." Stipulations, R. 191, PageID 3077. Although no formal order was in place, Hogan and Nobles testified that they believed their actions were consistent with the policy of the Sheriff's Department. According to Hogan's understanding of Local Rule 33, individuals "who did not have express permission of a judge were not permitted to film or record anywhere in the courthouse." Hogan Test., R. 192, PageID 3366.

Enoch was arrested for using her iPad, and she was held in custody for approximately ninety minutes. She and Corbin were charged with disorderly conduct under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2917.11, and Enoch was charged with failing to identify herself to law enforcement under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.29. Their charges were subsequently dismissed.

Enoch and Corbin filed this action in 2016, asserting claims against Hogan, Nobles, and Sheriff Jim Neil in their individual and official capacities, as well as against Hamilton County.^[1]They alleged that the defendants violated their rights under the First and Fourth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, they claimed that their arrest violated their rights to free speech (Count 1); that it was an unreasonable search and seizure (Count II) and unlawful detention (Count III); that Hogan and Nobles used excessive force when arresting them (Count IV); that they were subjected to a malicious prosecution (Count V); and that the defendants' actions violated state law. They also claimed that the County "expressly or tacitly approved, endorsed and ratified" Hogan and Nobles's conduct within the meaning of Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), by failing to properly investigate or discipline the deputies. Amended Compl., R. 38, PageID 180.

B. Enoch I

The district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) with respect to the plaintiffs' excessive force claim (Count IV), but denied the motion as to their remaining federal-law claims. This court affirmed. Enoch v. Hogan, 728 Fed.Appx. 448, 449 (6th Cir. 2018) (Enoch I). We held that Hogan and Nobles were not entitled to qualified immunity based on the allegations in the pleadings because, although the deputies claimed their actions were justified under Rule 33, the text of the Rule does not expressly state that recording is prohibited in courtroom hallways. Id. at 454. After "accept[ing] Enoch and Corbin's allegation that they had violated no rule or law," the panel held that the plaintiffs had alleged that the deputies' actions violated their clearly established rights under the First Amendment by "punish[ing] them for gathering news about matters of public importance." Id. at 456.

C. Enoch II

On remand and following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In relevant part, the district court denied the defendants' motion in full, and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their First Amendment, Fourth Amendment wrongful-arrest, and Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims. The district court also denied summary judgment to the defendants on the official capacity claim, explaining that "[t]here are genuine issues of fact as to the existence of a County policy that allegedly led to the arrests of plaintiffs for using their electronic recording devices in the Courthouse hallways." Order on Mots. for Summ. J., R. 101, PageID 1954.

We affirmed the district court's ruling in part, and reversed in part. Enoch v. Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 818 Fed.Appx. 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2020) (Enoch II). We held that Hogan and Nobles were entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims because Enoch and Corbin's arrests were supported by probable cause. Id. at 404. Hogan and Nobles could not have "knowingly violate[d] the law" when they arrested Enoch and Corbin because the deputies reasonably believed that the plaintiffs violated Rule 33. Id. (citing Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 947 (6th Cir. 2020)). And even if the text of Local Rule 33 did not expressly define courtroom hallways as ancillary areas where recording was prohibited, "the unrebutted evidence shows that the common practice in the Hamilton County courthouse was to treat" hallways as ancillary areas. Id.

We also found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim. We recognized that Rule 33 was itself a reasonable, viewpoint neutral regulation that did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 405 ("No one denies that Rule 33(D)(6) is a reasonable restriction on speech."). As for the plaintiffs' claim that they were singled out for arrest because of their speech, we held that at the time of the arrest, "it was not clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause . . . could violate the First Amendment." Id. at 406 (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 556 U.S. 658, 663 (2012)). We noted that under Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019), a plaintiff could show retaliation with "objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been." Id. (quoting Nieves, 587 U.S. at 407). However, because Nieves was decided after Enoch and Corbin's arrest, its exception to the probable cause requirement was not clearly established for qualified immunity purposes. Id.

We lastly held that we lacked jurisdiction over any official capacity claims because resolution of those claims was not "inextricably intertwined" with our qualified immunity analysis. Id. at 407. We accordingly dismissed the Sheriff-Appellants' "interlocutory appeal as it pertains to claims against them in their official capacities," and we remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 407.

D. Post-Enoch II Proceedings

The defendants moved for summary judgment on remand. They argued that the plaintiffs' remaining official capacity claim-the ratification claim-failed because the Enoch II court held that Enoch and Corbin did not suffer any constitutional injury. They also argued that any official capacity claims failed because the plaintiffs did not satisfy the Nieves exception. The district court disagreed holding that "[t]here are genuine...