Enoch v. Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff's Office

VANESSA ENOCH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HAMILTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-661

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

June 1, 2021

Litkovitz, M.J.

ORDER

Plaintiffs Vanessa Enoch and Avery Corbin bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of their civil rights and for alleged tort violations under Ohio common law. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and civil damages. The claims arise out of plaintiffs' warrantless arrests and searches and seizures of their electronic recording devices by defendants in the hallways of the Hamilton County, Ohio Courthouse. Defendants are the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office; Hamilton County Sheriff Jim Neil in his official capacity only; and Hamilton County Deputy Sheriffs Hogan and Nobles ("deputies") in their official and individual capacities. The matter is before the Court on (1) "County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Remaining Claims" (Doc. 112), plaintiffs' response in opposition (Doc. 115), and defendants' reply in support of their motion (Doc. 118).

I. Factual background

The factual background in the case was summarized by the Sixth Circuit and will be restated here:

In 2014, Enoch and Corbin visited the county courthouse in Hamilton County, Ohio to attend a pretrial hearing in the criminal prosecution of Tracie Hunter, a local juvenile court judge. Corbin was a bailiff for Judge Hunter before she was removed from the bench. Enoch was in court that day conducting a case study of the prosecution of Judge Hunter. At the conclusion of the day's proceedings, Enoch and Corbin exited the courtroom and, using their iPads, began taking videos and photos in the hallway.

Enoch and Corbin stood with others congregated outside the courtroom. When Kimball Perry, a reporter for the Cincinnati Enquirer, exited the courtroom, Corbin pointed the iPad towards Perry. As Perry walked down the hallway and turned down a different hallway, Corbin followed, taking pictures of and video recording the reporter. Perry then called out to the Deputies—here, acting as court security officers—that Corbin was taking pictures in the hallway. All the while, Enoch was also taking pictures on her iPad. The Deputies responded to the commotion. Deputy Hogan ordered Corbin and Enoch to stop recording and to turn off their devices, insisting that a local court rule prohibited photography or video recording anywhere in the courthouse. The Deputies also demanded that Corbin and Enoch provide photo identification. After Corbin did so, he argued with the Deputies that he was permitted to take pictures and record videos in the hallway because the judge only prohibited photography inside the courtroom, not in the hallways.

While the Deputies were discussing Corbin's conduct that had led to the commotion, Corbin took out his iPad again to take a picture of the courtroom door. On the door was posted a notice stating that "use of cell phones, pagers, cameras, electronic devices are prohibited without permission of the Court." R. 84-11 at PageID 1236.

Local Rule 33(D)(6) prohibits recording "in any courtroom or hearing room, jury room, judge's chambers or ancillary area (to be determined in the sole discretion of the Court) without the express permission of the Court." Hamilton Cty. Common Pleas Court R. 33(D)(6). Judge Nadel, who presided at the Hunter trial, gave an instruction in his courtroom pursuant to Rule 33(D)(6), but did not reference "hallways" in those instructions. However, when deposed in this case, Judge Nadel testified that he understood that "the hallway" was an "adjacent area[ ]" that was "ancillary to the courtroom" and that he thought that this understanding was implicit in his order. Neither Hogan nor Nobles had seen an order from Judge Nadel defining "ancillary areas" to include the hallways of the courthouse.

The Deputies charged both Corbin and Enoch for disorderly conduct under Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.11. Enoch also was charged with failure to disclose information under Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.29, on the basis that she had refused to identify herself. The Deputies later testified that they arrested the pair for taking photographs in violation of Local Rule 33(D)(6). All charges were subsequently dismissed.

Enoch and Corbin filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First and Fourth Amendment claims and pendent state-law claims against Deputies Hogan and Nobles, the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office, and County Sheriff Jim Neil, along with four other employees of the Sheriff's Office who have since been dismissed. As part of their claims, Enoch and Corbin maintained that they were singled out and arrested because they were African American. Although several other individuals—most of them white—were using cameras and other recording devicesin the hallways, they were not prohibited from doing so by the Deputies, and none of them were arrested.

Enoch v. Hamilton Cty. Sheriff's Off., 818 F. App'x 398, 400-01 (6th Cir. 2020) (footnote omitted).

II. Procedural background

This case has a long procedural history and is before this Court after two appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and two remands. The operative complaint is an amended complaint filed on January 6, 2017. (Doc. 38). This Court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, in part, on plaintiffs' claims against defendant Neil in his individual capacity and plaintiffs' claims against all defendants based on excessive use of force (Count IV), malicious prosecution under state law (Count VII), false imprisonment and false arrest under state law (Count IX), and assault and battery under state law (Count XI). (Doc. 61; Enoch v. Hamilton County Sheriff's Off., No. 1:16-cv-661, 2017 WL 2210515 (S.D. Ohio May 5, 2017), aff'd and remanded sub nom. Enoch v. Hogan, 728 F. App'x 448 (6th Cir. 2018). This Court denied defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs' remaining claims, including (1) plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against defendant Neil in his official capacity and against the deputies in their individual capacity alleging a violation of free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Count I), unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment (Count II), false arrest/unlawful detention/false imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment (Count III), and malicious prosecution under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count V); (2) plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against defendant Neil in his official capacity based on "ratification" under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count VI); and (3) plaintiffs' state law claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII) and invasion of privacy (Count X). (Id.). This Court found that defendants Hoganand Nobles were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability in their individual capacity on these claims.

A. Enoch I

Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal on the issue of qualified immunity on May 31, 2017. (Doc. 64). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's order on appeal in a decision issued on March 23, 2018. Enoch v. Hogan, 728 F. App'x 448 (6th Cir. 2018) (Enoch I). The Sixth Circuit first found that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity with regard to plaintiffs' claims of Fourth Amendment violations based on unreasonable search and seizure, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. Id. at 455. The deputies raised only one defense to these claims on appeal - that they were enforcing Local Rule 33(D)(6) of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, which prohibits recording in the courthouse hallway without prior permission - and the Sixth Circuit found there was a factual issue as to whether the Rule prohibited the conduct that was the basis for plaintiffs' arrests.¹ Id. at 453-54. Further, becauseplaintiffs had alleged facts indicating defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and prosecute plaintiffs, and because it was clearly established that arrest and prosecution without probable cause are unconstitutional, the Sixth Circuit found plaintiffs had plausibly alleged violations of their clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 454-55.

Second, the Sixth Circuit determined that plaintiffs had stated a plausible claim for a violation of their clearly established First Amendment rights. Id. at 455-57. Accepting for purposes of the motion plaintiffs' allegations that they had violated no rule or law, the Sixth Circuit found that to "constitutionally prevent [plaintiffs] from or punish them for gathering news about matters of public importance" violated their clearly established constitutional rights. Id. at 456. The Court found that it had been clearly established for some time that:

[T]he First Amendment protects the rights of both the media and the general public to attend and share information about the conduct of trials, "where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place." Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980). The Court linked the right of access to another fundamental First Amendment right, explaining that "[t]he explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily." Id. at 576-77. The same logic necessitates finding a constitutional violation in this case, where Enoch and Corbin's access to a press conference held immediately after a hearing was foreclosed on the basis of their race.

Id. The Sixth Circuit also found it has long been established that while a state or instrumentality may regulate the use of its public facilities, "state officials may not enforce rules or regulations that implicate First Amendment rights in a racially discriminatory manner." Id. (citing Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966))...