Eppes v. State

1

Dwight Adrian Eppes v. State of Maryland

No. 1041-2021

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

October 28, 2022

Circuit Court for Harford County Case No. C-12-CR-20-000219

Arthur, Friedman, Zarnoch, Robert A. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION ^[*]

ARTHUR, J.

The State indicted Dwight Adrian Eppes, in the Circuit Court for Harford County, on charges related to the possession of a firearm. After the circuit court denied his motion to suppress the firearm and a statement that he made to the arresting officer, Eppes entered a plea of not guilty. The case proceeded on an agreed statement of facts. The court convicted Eppes of one count of possessing a regulated firearm after being convicted of a crime of violence.

The court sentenced Eppes to 15 years of imprisonment, but suspended all but five years and gave him credit for 564 days of time served. In addition, the court imposed three years of supervised probation.

On appeal, Eppes presents one question for review, which we quote verbatim: "Did the circuit court err in denying the motion to suppress evidence?"

For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we conclude that the circuit court erred when it denied Eppes's motion to suppress.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress on May 10, 2020. At the hearing, the State called Deputy Robert Witt, of the Harford County Sheriff's Office. On the date of the hearing, Deputy Witt had been employed by the Sheriff's Office for three years.

The deputy testified that at around 11:40 p.m. on Friday February 14, 2020, he was driving down the 1800 block of Edgewater Drive, near the Lakeview Apartments, in Edgewood. When asked to describe that neighborhood, Deputy Witt responded that it was a "high crime, high drug area." He had received multiple calls for service "for gang[-]related" conduct. The area has had "multiple shootings," including "drive-by shootings," some of which have been "fatal." "A lot of our top[-]tier offenders like to hang out at those apartments," the deputy testified. "[W]hen it comes to crime," he said, Edgewater Drive "is probably one of the more busier areas within Edgewood."

Deputy Witt testified that he had made "five handgun arrests in the Edgewood area." He had made "too many [arrests] to count" for controlled dangerous substances. He had seized heroin, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana. He had never been accepted, however, as an expert in drug crimes or investigations.

As Deputy Witt passed the Lakeview Apartments in his marked patrol car that evening, he observed a car that was parked and running. One person was leaning into the right, front passenger window of the car, apparently speaking to the driver. His head, shoulders, and forearms were inside the car. Another person was standing behind and to the left of the person who was leaning into the car. Based on his experiences, the deputy suspected that he might be witnessing a drug transaction - that the person who was leaning into the car, was "retrieving the money" and that the other person was acting as a lookout. The deputy did not observe a hand-to-hand exchange.

The deputy turned around at the next intersection and drove back towards the parked car. As he passed the car, its engine was still running, but the people outside of the car "were no longer there." The deputy "determined" that they had "probably" gotten "inside the car."

The deputy turned around again and headed back to the apartment complex, where the car was parked, headfirst, in a parking space. As he approached the car, the deputy activated a floodlight, which he described as a "gianormous light bar," to "illuminate the car" and to allow him to "see any occupants inside of it." As he continued to approach the car, he was able to see that four people were inside.

The deputy stopped his patrol car, positioning it (in his words) to "[p]artially" block the parked car. His left front wheel was directly behind the rear license plate of the parked car. "If they turned their wheel all the way hard to the right, they would be able to clear my front end," he testified. His floodlight was still trained on the car. He insisted, however, that the occupants were free to leave. The deputy agreed that he did not have probable cause to conclude that a crime was being committed, but he asserted that he had reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.

The deputy got out of his patrol car, called out on his radio that he was about to approach a car with four occupants, and walked towards the passenger side of the car. He knocked on the back, right passenger window. A passenger rolled down the window. The deputy immediately smelled the odor of marijuana. He asked the occupants for identification and informed them that he was going to search the car.

The deputy ordered the occupants out of the car and searched it. Under the passenger seat, where Eppes had been sitting, the deputy saw a fanny pack. When he picked up the fanny pack, the deputy noticed that it was heavy. He suspected that it might contain a firearm. He opened the fanny pack and found a revolver. He went to arrest Eppes, because the weapon had been within his reach and grasp. As the deputy placed him under arrest, Eppes said, "I just got out of jail for gun charges."

In his search of the car, the deputy also found the butt of a marijuana cigarette. He issued a civil citation to one of the occupants.

In argument before the circuit court, the State conceded that this was a "close" case. The State began by arguing that the deputy did not seize the car and its occupants, because he "didn't fully" block them in and because Eppes did not testify (and thus did not testify that he felt unfree to leave).^[1] In the State's view, the deputy acquired probable cause to search the car when as smelled the odor of marijuana, after one of the passengers opened a window. The State also argued, incorrectly, that even if the search were illegal, Eppes, as a passenger, had no standing to object to it.^[2] In one brief sentence, the State advanced a factually undeveloped argument to the effect that "there was some reasonable articulable suspicion" that permitted the deputy to detain the car and its occupants. Finally, the State returned to its principal argument, which was that no seizure had occurred before the passenger opened the window, released the marijuana fumes, and gave the officer probable cause to search the car.

The court denied the motion to suppress. It began, correctly, by rejecting the State's contention that the deputy had not seized the car. It reasoned, however, that the deputy had reasonable articulable suspicion to effectuate the seizure. It observed that the seizure occurred "at 11:30 at night" "in a high crime area" that was known for "violent offenses" and "drug dealing." Recognizing that some conduct might appear innocent to a layperson but not to a trained law enforcement officer, the court cited the deputy's observation of one person leaning into a parked car and another standing beside him. The court credited the deputy's testimony that this conduct often indicates that a drug transaction is taking place. Consequently, the court concluded that the deputy had "ample justification" to prevent the car and the passengers from leaving, as he did.

The court went on to reason that, once the deputy had properly prevented the car and passengers from leaving, he acquired probable cause to search it when he smelled the odor of marijuana wafting from the window that a passenger opened at his request. Hence, the court denied the motion to suppress the gun that the deputy found. The court did not expressly address the motion to suppress Eppes's subsequent statement to the deputy, but its reasoning implies that it denied or would have denied that motion as well.^[3] After his conviction, Eppes noted this timely appeal. His sole challenge involves the denial of the motion to suppress.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Our review of a circuit court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment is limited to the information contained in the record of the suppression hearing." Trott v. State, 473 Md. 245, 253-54 (2021) (citing Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311, 319 (2019)). "'[W]e view the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed on the motion.'" Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 362 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 504 (2009)). "'[A]n appellate court reviews for clear error the trial court's findings of fact, and reviews without deference the trial court's application of the law to its findings of fact.'" Varriale v. State, 444 Md. 400, 410 (2015) (quoting Hailes v. State, 442 Md. 488, 499 (2015)).

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part, that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" Ordinarily, evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in a state criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961). This "exclusionary rule" excludes evidence obtained as a direct result of an unreasonable search or seizure, as well as evidence that is the indirect product of the violation. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).

Warrantless searches are "'presumptively unreasonable'" (see, e.g., Briscoe v. State, 422 Md. 384, 395-96 (2012), quoting Henderson v. State 416 Md. 125, 148 (2010)), and that presumption is "subject only to a few specifically...