Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. JBS USA, LLC

481 F.Supp.3d 1204

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff,andIraq Abade, et al., Plaintiffs-Intervenors,andMaryan Abdulle, et al., Plaintiffs-Intervenors,

v.JBS USA, LLC, d/b/a JBS Swift & Company, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 10-cv-02103-PAB-KLM

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed August 25, 2020

Justin Mulaire, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chicago, IL, Karl R. Tetzlaff, Lauren Golden Jaeckel, Michael Holm Imdieke, Nathan Dean Foster, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Brooke A. Colaizzi, Heather Fox Vickles, Kelly K. Robinson, Matthew M. Morrison, Raymond Myles Deeny, Sherman & Howard LLC, Denver, CO, for Defendant.

ORDER

PHILIP A. BRIMMER, Chief United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on defendant JBS USA, LLC d/b/a JBS Swift & Company ("JBS" or "defendant")’s motions for judgment on the pleadings [Docket Nos. 660, 662, 663, and 664] and defendant's motions for partial judgment on the pleadings [Docket Nos. 661 and 665]. The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission ("EEOC") responded to defendant's first motion, which is directed toward the EEOC's complaint, see Docket No. 670, and plaintiffs-intervenors ("intervenors") responded to the remaining five motions. Docket No. 671. Defendant replied. See Docket Nos. 680 and 681.

I. BACKGROUND

The EEOC initiated this lawsuit against defendant on August 30, 2010, alleging unlawful employment practices on the basis of race, national origin, and religion, as well as raising claims of retaliation. Docket No. 1 at 1-2. Since the filing of the EEOC complaint, five groups of intervenors have filed complaints in intervention. At present, the operative intervenor complaints can be found at Docket No. 61 (filed by the "Abade intervenors"), Docket No. 132 (filed by the "Asad Abdi intervenors"), Docket No. 236 (filed by the "Nafiso Abdi intervenors"), Docket No. 263 (filed by the "Adan intervenors"), and Docket No. 504 (filed by the "Abdulle intervenors").¹ All intervenors raise substantially similar allegations, which closely mirror the EEOC's claims; specifically, intervenors allege that defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices when it discriminated against intervenors based on their race, national origin, color, or religion, subjected intervenors to harassment based on their race, national origin, color, or religion, failed to accommodate intervenors’ religious practices, and retaliated against intervenors for engaging in protected activities. See, e.g. , Docket No. 61 at 1-2.

On August 8, 2011, the Court issued an order bifurcating the case. Docket No. 116. Phase I of the trial was to address three issues: (1) whether defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawfully denying Muslim employees reasonable religious accommodations to pray and break their Ramadan fast from December 2007 through July 2011; (2) whether defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of disciplining employees on the basis of their race, national origin, or religion during Ramadan 2008; and (3) whether defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of retaliating against a group of Black, Muslim, Somali employees for engaging in protected activity in opposition to discrimination during Ramadan 2008. Id. The Court presided over a 16-day trial for Phase I from August 7 to August 31, 2017. Docket Nos. 577-592.

On September 24, 2018, the Court issued its Phase I Findings. Docket No. 620. It found that (1) while defendant had denied Muslim employees a reasonable religious accommodation to pray during Ramadan (other than in 2009 and 2010), the EEOC had not made a requisite showing that any employees suffered a materially adverse employment action as a result of defendant's policy denying unscheduled prayer breaks, id. at 82; (2) the EEOC had failed to prove that defendant's disciplinary actions during Ramadan 2008 were motivated by a discriminatory animus, id. at 90; and (3) the EEOC had failed to demonstrate that defendant's discipline of employees during Ramadan 2008 was for a retaliatory purpose rather for engaging in a work stoppage. Id. at 95. The Court dismissed the EEOC's Phase I pattern or practice claims. Id. The Court denied the EEOC's motion for reconsideration or for certification of appeal on September 30, 2019. Docket No. 653. The Phase II trial, which is set to address the remaining individual claims, Docket No. 116 at 16, has not yet been scheduled.

On February 14, 2020, defendant filed six motions for full or partial judgment on the pleadings. Docket Nos. 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665. Defendant argues that many of the EEOC's and intervenors’ claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See, e.g. , Docket No. 662 at 2 ("This Rule 12(c) Motion ... seeks dismissal of claims asserted by the Asad Abdi Intervenors" because "none of the Asad Abdi Intervenors have stated plausible claims for relief."). Generally, defendant argues that the EEOC's and intervenors’ claims should be dismissed for failure to plead individualized allegations as to each aggrieved party. See, e.g., id. at 6. The EEOC and intervenors oppose defendant's motions. Docket No. 670; Docket No. 671.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court reviews a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) much as it does a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Adams v. Jones , 577 F. App'x 778, 781-82 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) ("We review a district court's grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo, using the same standard that applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.") (quoting Park Univ. Enters., Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, PA , 442 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006) ). The Court must "accept all facts pleaded by the non-moving party as true and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the same." Id. at 782. To prevail, the moving party must show that "no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip. , 207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000). A party may raise arguments that could be made in a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) in a motion under Rule 12(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must allege enough factual matter that, taken as true, makes the plaintiff's "claim to relief ... plausible on its face." Khalik v. United Air Lines , 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not shown–that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration marks omitted); see also Khalik , 671 F.3d at 1190 ("A plaintiff must nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss." (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 )). If a complaint's allegations are "so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent," then plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim. Khalik , 671 F.3d at 1191 (quotations omitted). Thus, even though modern rules of pleading are somewhat forgiving, "a complaint still must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Bryson v. Gonzales , 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) (alteration marks omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, the EEOC and intervenors argue that defendant's motions are untimely and an improper vehicle to further defendant's arguments. Docket No. 670 at 5; Docket No. 671 at 6. In the alternative, they argue that their claims are sufficiently pled, Docket No. 670 at 14; Docket No. 671 at 7, and state that, shoul d the Court find their complaints deficient, they should be granted leave to amend. Docket No. 670 at 22; Docket No. 671 at 12.

A. The Propriety of a Rule 12(c) Motion

The EEOC and intervenors argue that defendant's motions should be denied because they were filed "[o]ver eight years after the close of the pleadings and over six years after the dispositive motions deadline." Docket No. 670 at 5.² Defendant disagrees, asserting that the Rule 12(c) motions are timely because "[t]he Court has not yet entered any scheduling orders for Phase II, no discovery has occurred during Phase II, and ... no [Phase II] trials have been set." Docket No. 680 at 2.

"After the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Ordinarily, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be made promptly after the close of the pleadings."

5C Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1367 (3d ed.). A district court has discretion to deny a Rule 12(c) motion if a party engages in "excessive delay." Id.

The Court finds that defendant's motions are timely. While the Court is cognizant of the fact that the Rule 12(c) motions were filed almost ten years after the commencement of this case and several years after the filing of the operative complaints, the Court does not find that the delay in filing these motions is "excessive." On August 8, 2011, the Court bifurcated the trial and, in so doing, bifurcated discovery. Docket No. 116 at 16-17. Phase I discovery was limited to matters related to the Phase I pattern or practice claims. Id. at 17. The Court ordered that, "[a]fter Phase I, the parties will commence discovery on pattern or practice claims that were not bifurcated, on individual claims for punitive and compensatory damages, and on other non-overlapping discrimination claims." Id. Consistent this order, defendant waited...