Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Autozone, Inc.

934 F.Supp.2d 342

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff,Frank Mahoney Burroughs, Intervenor Plaintiff,

v.AUTOZONE, INC., and AUTOZONERS, LLC, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10–11648–WGY.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

March 29, 2013.

Markus L. Penzel, EEOC, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

David S. Godkin, Birnbaum & Godkin, LLP, Laura Maslow–Armand, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Markus L. Penzel, EEOC, Boston, MA, Sandeep K. Randhawa, The Sikh Coalition, New York, NY, for Intervenor Plaintiff.

Elise Busny, Margaret M. Pinkham, Pinkham Busny LLP, Woburn, MA, Jef Feibelman, Lisa A. Krupicka, Burch Porter & Johnson, PLLC, Memphis, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM G. YOUNG, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This pending motion for attorneys' fees of intervenor plaintiff Frank Mahoney Burroughs (“Mahoney Burroughs”) follows a settlement and consent decree between the plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “Commission”), Mahoney Burroughs, and the defendants AutoZone, Inc. and AutoZoners, LLC (collectively, “AutoZone”).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Commission commenced the underlying civil rights action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) on behalf of Mahoney Burroughs against AutoZone, Compl. Jury Trial Demand (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and Mahoney Burroughs moved to intervene, alleging violations of Title VII and Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B, section 4 (“Chapter 151B”), Mot. Intervene Frank Mahoney Burroughs, ECF No. 4; Am. Mot. Intervene Frank Mahoney Burroughs, ECF No. 10. The Court granted Mahoney Burroughs's motion to intervene. Elec. Order, Dec. 22, 2010. All of the parties moved for summary judgment. Pl. & Intervenor Pl.'s Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 33; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 41. This Court granted summary judgment for the Commission and Mahoney Burroughs on the federal and state religious accommodation claims and denied summary judgment as to the remaining claims due to genuine issues of material fact. See Tr. Mot. Hr'g 11:9–11, 13:4–10, 13:24–14:2, ECF No. 61. The parties settled and, in a consent decree approved by this Court, stipulated that, in addition to extensive injunctive relief, Mahoney Burroughs ought receive $75,000.00 in monetary relief plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Consent Decree, ECF No. 66. As the parties were not able to agree on the amount for attorneys' fees and costs, id. at 3, Mahoney Burroughs moved for reasonable attorneys' fees to be decided by this Court pursuant to the consent decree, Mot. Intervenor Pl. Att'ys' Fees & Costs, ECF No. 67.

Mahoney Burroughs seeks $220,355.50 in attorneys' fees, $1,290.25 in taxable costs, and $1,332.90 in non-taxable costs. Reply Br. Supp. Intervenor Pl.'s Mot. Att'ys' Fees & Costs (“Reply Br.”) 10, ECF No. 79; Bill Costs, ECF No. 74.

AutoZone opposes Mahoney Burroughs's requested award and argues that it ought be reduced substantially due to overstaffing, duplicative billing, excessive supervision and coordination, time spent on media-related matters, giving personal advice, billing for preparatory tasks, administrative and clerical tasks, and use of the block-billing method and partial billing in quarter-hour increments. AutoZone also contends that two of the attorneys for Mahoney Burroughs charged an unreasonably high hourly rate. Defs.' Opp'n Intervenor Pl.'s Mot. Att'ys' Fees & Costs (“AutoZone Opp'n”), ECF No. 77.

III. ANALYSISA. Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees

Both Title VII and Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B expressly provide for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k); ¹Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9. ² As Mahoney Burroughs prevailed on his federal and state law religious accommodation claims at the summary judgment stage, the parties agreed and stipulated that Mahoney Burroughs ought be compensated for his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs accordingly. Consent Decree 3–4.

The district court, in its broad discretion, determines the amount of reasonable fees and costs that are awarded. McDonough v. City of Quincy, 353 F.Supp.2d 179, 183 (D.Mass.2005).

B. Determination of Reasonable Attorneys' Fees

The “lodestar method” is the proper methodology to determine attorneys' fees. Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Patrick, 767 F.Supp.2d 244, 250 (D.Mass.2011). To arrive at a “lodestar” figure, the Court multiplies “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation ... by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); see Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Roland Teiner Co., 832 F.Supp.2d 102, 104 (D.Mass.2011). While the Court may adjust the lodestar amount in response to factors of each particular case, the lodestar figure does presumptively represent a reasonable award of fees. McDonough, 353 F.Supp.2d at 183–84;see also System Mgmt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 154 F.Supp.2d 195, 204 (D.Mass.2001), attorneys' fees determination vacated as moot,303 F.3d 100 (1st Cir.2002).

1. Hours Reasonably Spent³

To determine the hours reasonably expended on Mahoney Burroughs's case, the Court scrutinizes the contemporaneous billing records that Mahoney Burroughs's counsel submitted to determine the hours actually spent and then deducts those hours that were insufficiently documented or “duplicative, unproductive, excessive, or otherwise unnecessary.” Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 950 (1st Cir.1984); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933;see also Conservation Law Found., 767 F.Supp.2d at 251 (“Because only reasonably expended hours are to be used in the calculation, this Court may reduce the number of hours billed if inadequately documented or excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The burden of proving that the hours claimed were reasonably expended lies with the fee petitioner. Torres–Rivera v. O'Neill–Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 340 (1st Cir.2008).

Mahoney Burroughs was represented by Sandeep Kaur Randhawa (“Randhawa”) and Harsimran Kaur (“Kaur”) of the Sikh Coalition, Laura Maslow–Armand (“Maslow–Armand”) and Jamie Spiller (“Spiller”) of the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law of the Boston Bar Association (“Lawyer's Committee”), and David S. Godkin (“Godkin”) of Birnbaum & Godkin, LLP, all of whom contemporaneously recorded hours that they worked on Mahoney Burroughs's case. Mem. Law Supp. Intervenor Pl.'s Mot. Att'ys' Fees & Costs (“Mem. Supp.”) 4, 2, 8, 9, ECF No. 68. Table 1 below summarizes the total hours each attorney claims and the fees requested as amended by Mahoney Burroughs's reply brief. See id.; Reply Br. 10.

Table 1

+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
¦Name                 ¦Position                         ¦Hours¦Fee Amount ¦
+---------------------+---------------------------------+-----+-----------¦
¦David S. Godkin      ¦Lead Counsel                     ¦311.5¦$132,387.50¦
+---------------------+---------------------------------+-----+-----------¦
¦Laura Maslow–Armand  ¦Staff Attorney Lawyer's Committee¦223.4¦$ 55,850.50¦
+---------------------+---------------------------------+-----+-----------¦
¦Sandeep Kaur Randhawa¦Staff Attorney Sikh Coalition    ¦163.7¦$ 24,555.00¦
+---------------------+---------------------------------+-----+-----------¦
¦Harsimran Kaur       ¦Legal Director Sikh Coalition    ¦15.0 ¦$ 4,950.00 ¦
+---------------------+---------------------------------+-----+-----------¦
¦Jamie R. Spiller     ¦Legal Fellow Lawyer's Committee  ¦20.9 ¦$ 2,612.50 ¦
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+---------------------------------+
¦TOTAL Requested Fees:¦$220,355.50¦
+---------------------------------+

a. Overstaffing and Duplicative Billing

Fee-shifting statutes, as found in 42 U.S.C. section 2000e–5(k) and section 9 of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B, were enacted to afford effective access to the judiciary for plaintiffs whose civil rights have been violated. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933.

AutoZone argues that the Commission sufficiently represented Mahoney Burroughs's rights where the Commission's and Mahoney Burroughs's interests were related and that he was thus not entitled to attorneys' fees for any “duplicative” work performed. AutoZone Opp'n 4.

AutoZone's argument is unconvincing in light of the clear language of Title VII's fee-shifting statute. The enforcement provisions of Title VII set forth that if the Commission commences a lawsuit on behalf of an aggrieved person to litigate a civil rights violation, the aggrieved person has a right to intervene in such lawsuit to protect his individual interests. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1).⁴ As a rightful plaintiff to the lawsuit, Mahoney Burroughs is, therefore, entitled to recover such attorneys' fees as are due to any “prevailing party” under the statute. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1), (k); see also Hall v. City of Auburn, 567 F.Supp. 1222, 1226 (D.Me.1983) (“[T]he mere availability of the Commission's attorney is not enough to deny plaintiffs their attorneys' fees where the Commission's attorney did not act.”); Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Sage Realty Corp., 521 F.Supp. 263, 269 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (“A prevailing plaintiff should not be denied an award of attorneys' fees because ... [ ]he did not [him]self initiate the action but rather exercised h[is] statutory right pursuant to 42 U.S.C. s [ection] 2000e–5(f)(1) to intervene in an action commenced by the [Commission].”); Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F.Supp. 381, 389 (D.Minn.1980) (pointing out that a literal application of Title VII's fee-shifting provision warrants payment of attorneys' fees to any prevailing plaintiff including intervening plaintiffs). The Commission's interests necessarily...