Equivest St. Thomas, Inc. v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands

46 V.I. 447

EQUIVEST ST. THOMAS, INC. Plaintiff,

v.GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, and Roy Martin, in his official capacity as Tax Assessor, Defendants.

No. Civ.2001–155.

District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John.

Dec. 31, 2004.

Chad C. Messier, William S. McConnell, St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for the plaintiff.

Wayne G. Anderson, Kerry E. Drue, Carol Thomas–Jacobs, Michael S. McLaurin, St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for the defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MOORE, J.

On May 12, 2003, I found the Territory's property tax system unlawful because it “systemically employ[ed] a method of assessment not calculated to determine the actual value of properties as required by 48 U.S.C. § 1401a.” Berne Corp. et al. v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands et al., 262 F.Supp.2d 540, 561 (D.Vi.2003), aff'd,105 Fed. Appx. 324 (3d Cir.2004). Accordingly, I entered a decree in the consolidated portion of this litigation awarding injunctive and other such relief common to all parties. That relief included an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for each plaintiff as determined upon due application to this Court after the completion of the individual portion of each case. The plaintiff's individual case is now complete, and all appeals by the government have been resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Thus, all that is left to be determined in this case is the plaintiff's request for attorneys fees and costs. For the reasons set forth below, I rule that the plaintiff is entitled to $354,666.45 in attorneys' fees, $11,336.35 in costs and $120.00 in expert witness costs it incurred in successfully litigating this matter. Accordingly, I will order the government to pay the plaintiff $366,122.80.

I. LEGAL BASIS FOR AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

On May 23, 2003, plaintiff Equivest St. Thomas, Inc. [“Equivest”] filed a notice of filing of attorneys fees and costs. Equivest supplemented this filing on August 21, 2003, and July 7, 2004.¹ The government has opposed Equivest's requests for fees and costs. To the extent each of the government's many objections to Equivest's requested fees and costs are comprehensible, I will address them individually in Part II below. Before addressing these objections, however, I first review the legal basis for awarding Equivest's fees and costs and reject the government's initial argument that I should refrain from providing Equivest any such award.

The plaintiff's complaint, as amended, sought to enjoin the defendants from assessing real property taxes for commercial property in the Virgin Islands other than in strict accordance with 48 U.S.C. § 1401(a) and 33 V.I.C. § 2404. The plaintiff alleged that, because the defendants utilized outdated evaluating methods that unequally valued property among similarly situated taxpayers, the defendants were violating their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff's suit was consolidated with other similar cases brought by other plaintiffs and a bench trial was held on the issues common to all plaintiffs. Following the bench trial, I found that the

plaintiffs have proved their federal claim that Roy Martin, acting in his official capacity as the Tax Assessor for the Government of the Virgin Islands, violated plaintiffs' civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by systematically employing a method of assessment not calculated to determine the actual value of properties, as required by 48 U.S.C. § 1401a, namely, he did not use the income capitalization approach in appraising and assessing plaintiffs' commercial properties and abided by the limitation on the assessment of residential property imposed by 33 V.I.C. § 2402(a).

Berne Corp., 262 F.Supp.2d at 561. To remedy the government's unlawful behavior, I determined that Equivest and the other plaintiffs were entitled to equitable relief under federal and Virgins Islands law, namely 42 U.S.C § 1983 and 5 V.I.C. § 80. Id. at 565–72. Included in my decree enjoining the government from illegally assessing the plaintiffs properties was an order awarding each plaintiff “costs of suit incurred thus far, including reasonable attorneys fees and costs, as shall be determined upon due application to this Court as each individual case is completed.” Id. at 577.

This award of attorneys' fees and costs was permitted under federal and local law. Congress has provided courts with discretion to award attorneys' fees and costs to parties who successfully litigate civil rights claims under section 1983. See42 U.S.C. § 1988 (“the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs....”). The Virgin Islands Legislature more broadly allows a court to award to any prevailing party in a civil action costs and fees it incurred in prosecuting or defending the action. See5 V.I.C. § 541. Under both statutes, a party need not prevail on every claim to be considered a prevailing party for purposes of qualifying for an award of attorneys' fees. See Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir.2002) (“plaintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes [under § 1988] if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)); Jo–Ann's Lauder Ctr., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 1995 WL 78299 *3 (D.Vi.1995) ( “A prevailing party [under 5 V.I.C. § 541] is one who has received at least some of the benefits which were sought in the litigation....”).

In their opposition filing, the government requests that I entirely refrain from awarding Equivest fees and costs. Given that on May 12, 2003 I awarded Equivest “costs of suit incurred thus far, including reasonable attorneys fees and costs,” I will treat the government's request as a motion to reconsider my award. In addressing this motion, I note that the government has offered nothing new that would compel me to reverse my earlier decision.² That decision explained the long and tortured history of this litigation, which the government made unnecessarily burdensome by defending the indefensible at trial. See Berne Corp., 262 F.Supp.2d 540. I will incorporate this history by reference here, as it provides evidence of the substantial litigation costs the plaintiff incurred in protecting its civil rights. The plaintiff having achieved total success, it is entitled to just compensation for these litigation costs.³ Significantly, I also recognize that “although [ section 1988] expressly refers to a district court's discretion, it is well settled that a prevailing plaintiff should recover an award of attorney's fees absent special circumstances.” See County of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 535 (3d. Cir.2001) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968)). As no special circumstances are present here that would warrant denying Equivest attorneys' fees and costs, I will reject the government's motion to reconsider, and will expand my award to include costs and fees Equivest incurred after May 12, 2003.

In analyzing the grounds of the government's opposition, I will focus on the necessity of the fees and costs incurred by Equivest and whether it was reasonable for Equivest's attorneys to bill these fees and pass on their costs. As the United States Supreme Court has instructed, “the most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation .... multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 432, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Thus, after determining the appropriateness of the time Equivest spent litigating this matter, I will calculate a “lodestar” amount relative to reasonable hourly rates in this jurisdiction. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562–66, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) (discussing calculation of the lodestar). If necessary, this amount will then be adjusted to take into account any other relevant factors that are not already adequately represented in the lodestar calculation. Id. at 564–66;see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897–901, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).

II. THE GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO EQUIVEST'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

A. There Is No Evidence Of Overstaffing Or Excessive Staff Conferences

The government argues that Equivest's fees and costs should be substantially reduced because Equivest's attorneys overstaffed this litigation with nine attorneys and five paralegals. The government also complains that this alleged overstaffing resulted in an excessive number of staff conferences. A closer review of plaintiff counsels' billing records shows that, although fourteen individuals billed time on this matter, 88% of the attorneys' fees requested represent the work of one partner and one associate.⁴ Assigning two individuals to handle the vast majority of this matter hardly amounts to overstaffing, especially considering the great extent to which the government's obstruction added to the complexity of this litigation, thereby increasing the plaintiff's need to staff this matter with additional attorneys. None of the billing records indicate the individuals contributing to this matter were performing duplicative work or that their work was unnecessary. Moreover, it is entirely reasonable that the two attorneys primarily handling this matter would occasionally rely on the contribution of other attorneys and paralegals. Thus, I reject the government's claim that the plaintiff's attorneys overstaffed this litigation.

The government argues next that Equivest's award of fees and costs should be reduced due to its attorneys engaging in unnecessary staff conferences. The government stresses that Attorney Messier's participation in 120...