Esaka v. Nanticoke Health Serv. Inc.

752 F.Supp.2d 476

Emmanuel ESAKA, Plaintiff,

v.NANTICOKE HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Mid–Sussex Medical Center, Inc., t/a Mid–Sussex Medical Center, Margaret Crockett and Joseph Stokes, Defendants.

C.A. No. 10–564–MPT.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

Nov. 23, 2010.

Michael G. Rushe, Hudson, Jones, Jaywork & Fisher, Dover, DE, for Plaintiff.Lori Ann Brewington, Richards, Layton & Finger, PA, Wilmington, DE, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

MARY PAT THYNGE, United States Magistrate Judge.I. INTRODUCTION

On June 30, 2010, plaintiff Emmanuel Esaka (“Esaka”) filed a complaint against defendants Nanticoke Health Services, Inc., Mid–Sussex Medical Center, Inc. (collectively, “Nanticoke”), and individual defendants Margaret Crockett (“Crockett”) and Joseph Stokes (“Stokes”).¹ The complaint alleges Esaka was subjected to discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act (“DDEA”), 19 Del. C. § 711(a)(1). ² The complaint also alleges a breach of the Physician Employment Agreement entered into between Esaka and Nanticoke.³

On August 13, 2010, Nanticoke filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that all of Esaka's claims are subject to a dispute resolution clause requiring non-binding mediation and, if unsuccessful, binding arbitration of those claims.⁴ Alternatively, Nanticoke argues that Esaka's selection of a federal forum bars his discrimination and retaliation claims under the DDEA.⁵ Crockett and Stokes also filed a motion to dismiss on August 13, 2010, arguing that no cause of action exists under Title VII against individual defendants.⁶ The parties completed briefing on these motions on October 28, 2010.⁷ For the reasons stated below, the court grants both motions in full.

II. BACKGROUND

Esaka is a black male and a permanent resident of the United States eligible to apply for citizenship in 2011.⁸ Esaka was employed by Nanticoke at Nanticoke Hospital in Seaford, Delaware (“the Hospital”) from September 2, 2008 to May 29, 2009 as an Attending Physician in Obstetrics and Gynecology. ⁹ Prior to beginning work, Esaka executed a Physician Employment Agreement (“the Agreement”) with Nanticoke. The Agreement contained the following dispute resolution clause:

DISPUTE RESOLUTION. In addition to the right of termination specified in this Agreement, with the exception of a claim made by Center that Physician has breached Section 25 of this Agreement for which Center seeks injunctive relief and/or damages, all claims or controversies concerning this Agreement or arising in any way out of the performance of this Agreement which the parties cannot readily resolve, including any dispute regarding Physician's compensation, shall be submitted by the parties within thirty (30) days to non-binding mediation, under the Alternative Rules of Procedure for Mediation of the American Health Lawyers Association (“AHLA”). If the dispute, controversy or claim is not resolved through mediation within ten (10) days after the appointment of a dispute resolver, the dispute shall be automatically submitted to a single arbitrator pursuant to the AHLA's arbitration rules. Judgement on the award rendered by the arbitrator, which shall be in accord with the law of the State of Delaware, may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof and shall be binding on the parties. No disclosure of the award shall be made by the parties, except as required by the law or as necessary or appropriate to effectuate the terms thereof. Each party shall bear its own expenses, including attorney's fees incurred in the mediation and/or arbitration, except that the costs of the mediator and/or arbitrator shall be equally divided between the Physician and the Center. The obligations of this Section shall survive termination of this Agreement.¹⁰

The complaint alleges that, during his employment at the Hospital, Esaka was routinely referred to as “n* * * *r” by Crockett, a white female Medical Assistant for Nanticoke.¹¹ Esaka complained about these comments, both orally and via email, to Stokes (the Director of Physician Practice Operations at the Hospital) and Thomas Brown.¹² Stokes assured Esaka that the problems with Crockett would be addressed, either by transferring her or through some other means.¹³ Crockett, however, was never transferred; she was moved to the front desk where she continued to make racial slurs and disparaging remarks about Esaka to staff and patients.¹⁴

The complaint further alleges that, during the course of Esaka's employment, he was excluded from meetings held by Stokes and other physicians,¹⁵ and that he received a smaller salary than other physicians in his practice. ¹⁶

III. LEGAL STANDARDA. Motions to Dismiss

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to resolve disputed facts or decide the merits of the case.¹⁷ “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” ¹⁸ A motion to dismiss may be granted only if, after “accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” ¹⁹ While the court draws all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it rejects unsupported allegations, “bald assertions,” and “legal conclusions.” ²⁰

To survive a motion to dismiss, Esaka's factual allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” ²¹ Esaka is thus required to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief beyond mere labels and conclusions.²² Although heightened fact pleading is not required, “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” must be alleged.²³ A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff pleads factual content sufficient for the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. ²⁴

Courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record when reviewing a motion to dismiss.²⁵ Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d), if a court examines materials outside the pleadings the motion is generally treated as one for summary judgment. However, certain additional materials may be addressed without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Indeed, cases have allowed consideration of matters “incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned....” ²⁶ A party is entitled to notice and a fair opportunity to respond to any evidence the court might consider in its review of a motion to dismiss. Where a party has such notice, however, it is proper for the court to consider that evidence.²⁷

B. The Federal Arbitration Act

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., provides in relevant part that “[a] written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Federal law thus recognizes a strong public policy in favor or arbitration.²⁸ By its terms, the FAA mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which a valid arbitration agreement applies. ²⁹ “ ‘Nothing short of a showing of fraud, duress, mistake’ or some other compelling ground to invalidate a contract,” therefore, “will permit a court to preclude the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate.” ³⁰

IV. DISCUSSIONA. State Law Claims under the DDEA (Count III)

The DDEA bars a plaintiff from simultaneously seeking remedies for employment discrimination under both federal and state law in federal court.³¹ In the course of briefing, Esaka conceded this point and offered to voluntarily dismiss his state law claims.³² The court will therefore grant defendants' motion to dismiss Count III of the complaint.

B. Title VII Claims Against Individual Defendants Crockett and Stokes

Only an “employer” can be held liable for discrimination under Title VII.³³ Title VII defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees....” ³⁴ Courts in the Third Circuit have consistently interpreted these provisions to bar discrimination claims against individual employees and supervisors. ³⁵ In this case, the complaint alleges that at all relevant times Crockett was a Medical Assistant and Stokes was the Director of Physician Practice Operations at Nanticoke Hospital.³⁶ Significantly, both Crockett and Stokes are alleged to have been co-employees and/or supervisors of Esaka at the Hospital,³⁷ and neither are alleged to have employed Esaka. Esaka makes no argument on this issue beyond the allegations in the complaint. The court is therefore satisfied that there is no basis for individual liability against Crockett or Stokes, and will grant their motion to dismiss all Title VII claims against them.

C. Arbitrability of Remaining Claims1. Discrimination and Retaliation under Title VII

Esaka does not contest the validity of the Physician Employment Agreement or the arbitration clause contained therein; instead, he mounts a two-pronged attack against its application to this dispute. The first wave in this attack argues that: (1) his discrimination claim has “nothing to do with [his] job performance or...