Espinoza v. St. Mary Med. Ctr., Inc.

233 N.E.3d 1009

Martha ESPINOZA, Appellant-Plaintiff

v.ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Appellee-Defendant

Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CT-1204

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed April 1, 2024

Publication Ordered April 23, 2024

Appeal from the Lake Superior Court, The Honorable John M. Sedia, Judge, Trial Court Cause No. 45D01-1811-CT-831

Attorneys for Appellant: Mark A. Psimos, Nathan M. Psimos, Merrillville, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Michael A. Sarafin, Susan K. Swing, Johnson & Bell, P.C., Crown Point, Indiana

Weissmann, Judge.

[1] Martha Espinoza tripped and fell on two overlapped floor mats while accompanying her grandson to his appointment at St. Mary Medical Center. Espinoza filed a negligence claim against the Medical Center, arguing that it was liable for her injuries. At trial, the Medical Center obtained judgment on the evidence after Espinoza failed to prove during her case-in-chief that the Medical Center had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard.

[2] Espinoza repeated her negligence claim in a motion to correct errors while also arguing that the trial judge should have recused himself because his son worked for the law firm representing the Medical Center. The trial court rejected Espinoza’s motion in full by reiterating that judgment on the evidence was merited and ruling that disqualification was unwarranted. We affirm.

Facts

[3] When Espinoza and her husband accompanied their grandson to an appointment at the Medical Center, a security guard personally led them to their destination inside the building. En route, Espinoza tripped over two overlapping floor mats, which tipped her body forward. Despite trying to grab nearby handholds for balance, Espinoza fell on her left leg.

[4] Several people came to assist Espinoza, and someone eventually placed her in a wheelchair. Espinoza then urged the security guard to continue leading the group to their destination so her grandson would not miss his appointment. It was not until she stood up at the appointment that Espinoza recognized the pain in her left leg and requested to see a doctor. X-rays of Espinoza’s left leg revealed that her upper tibia was broken.

[5] Espinoza filed a negligence claim against the Medical Center, asserting a premises liability theory. The case proceeded to a jury trial in March 2023, and during her case-in-chief, Espinoza elicited testimony from the eyewitnesses to the accident: herself, her husband, her grandson, and the security guard. Only the security guard testified to facts beyond Espinoza’s fall, and those facts merely revealed that the hallway in which she fell was a "high traffic" area. Tr. Vol. II, p. 182.

[6] Further, Espinoza produced no evidence showing how often, or for how long, the Medical Center’s floor mats overlapped; nor that anyone at the Medical Center knew they were overlapping at the time of Espinoza’s fall. She also did not introduce any evidence of the Medical Center’s procedures for dealing with hazardous conditions in the relevant area or if there was a history of similar accidents. After Espinoza rested her case-in-chief, the Medical Center moved for judgment on the evidence, arguing that Espinoza did not prove that it had actual or constructive knowledge of any hazard, an element of her premises liability claim.

[7] The trial court granted the Medical Center’s motion, stating: "[T]here is nothing for the jury to determine as there is nothing presented that would, even minimally, suggest that [the Medical Center] had constructive knowledge of the overlapping carpets." Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 17. Although Espinoza challenged the court’s conclusion in a motion to correct error, the court reiterated its belief that judgment on the evidence was proper.

[8] But Espinoza also raised a new claim in her motion. Asserting newly discovered evidence that the trial judge’s son worked for the law firm representing the Medical Center, Espinoza alleged that the trial judge acted improperly by not recusing himself from the potential conflict of interest. The trial court rejected this argument. As the judge noted, his son had not worked on this case, was not a partner at the law firm with an economic interest in the outcome, and his employment at the law firm was public knowledge. The trial court thus concluded that no basis existed for its recusal.

Discussion and Decision

[1, 2] [9] Espinoza’s appeal arrives as a challenge to the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct error. A ruling on a motion to correct error is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 227 (Ind. 2021). We will reverse only where "the trial court’s judgment is clearly against the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial court errs on a matter of law." Id. (quoting Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013)). We review issues of law de novo. Id.

I. The Trial Court Properly Granted the Medical Center’s Motion for Judgment on the Evidence

[3–5] [10] A motion for judgment on the evidence under Trial Rule 50(A) tests the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the non-movant. Purcell v. Old Nat. Bank, 972 N.E.2d 835, 839-40 (Ind. 2012). The motion should be granted "only when there is a complete failure of proof because there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference supporting an essential element of the claim." Id. The evidence, and any reasonable inferences from it, are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id.

[6–9] [11] Determining whether evidence is enough to survive a motion for judgment on the evidence "requires both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis." Id. at 840 (quoting Am. Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 457 N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ind. 1983)). Evidence fails quantitatively only if it is wholly absent or missing. Id. If some evidence exists, the court must then determine whether the evidence is substantial enough to support a reasonable inference in favor of the non-moving party; in other words, whether the evidence is qualitative. Id. Evidence is not qualitative "when it cannot be said, with reason, that the intended inference may logically be drawn therefrom; and this may occur either because of an absence of credibility of a witness or because the intended inference may not be drawn therefrom without undue speculation." Id. (quoting Am. Optical, 457 N.E.2d at 184).

[10] [12] In Indiana, a premises liability claim is governed by the following framework:

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

Griffin v. Menard, Inc., 175 N.E.3d 811, 813 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639-40 (Ind. 1991)). Espinoza was an invitee of the Medical Center. Thus, to prevail against the Medical Center’s motion for judgment on the evidence, she must have presented, in part, substantial evidence that the Medical Center had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition: the overlapping floor mats. She did not.

A. Actual Knowledge

[11] [13] Espinoza’s evidence did not establish that the Medical Center had actual knowledge of the overlapping mats. The security guard’s testimony was the only possible evidence of actual knowledge and his testimony explicitly established that he saw nothing. Accordingly, the only avenue for Espinoza’s claim to succeed is if she provided substantial evidence of the Medical Center’s constructive knowledge.

B. Constructive Knowledge

[12] [14] Constructive knowledge, in this context, refers to a "condition which has existed for such a length of time and under such circumstances that it would have been discovered in time to have prevented injury if the storekeeper, his agents or employees had used ordinary care." Schulz v. Kroger Co., 963 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Blaylock, 591 N.E.2d 624, 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)). Espinoza did not make this showing.

[13] [15] Espinoza’s evidence amounted to the fact that while she was accompanied by a security guard in a "high-traffic" hallway, she tripped and fell on two overlapping floor mats. Tr. Vol. II, p. 182. No eyewitness reported seeing the mats overlapping before Espinoza’s fall, and three people had safely navigated the mats just before the fall. Evidence that the hazardous condition existed before Espinoza’s fall, and that it existed long enough for the Medical Center to learn of the hazard, was required here as: "[f]alling and injuring one’s self proves nothing. Such happenings are commonplace wherever humans go." Ogden Estate v. Decatur Cnty. Hosp., 509 N.E.2d 901, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).

[16] Nor does the area being busy support constructive knowledge. If anything, it undercuts Espinoza’s claim because, if the hallway is often busy and filled with people, there should be evidence about how long the floor mats had been overlapping or additional witnesses that could have testified to the existence of any hazardous condition. See Kroger Co., 963 N.E.2d at 1145 (rejecting premises liability claim where the injury occurred in a busy area of the store because finding constructive knowledge would be like "imposing a strict liability standard or mandating an employee’s presence in every aisle at all times").

[17] Also noticeably absent from Espinoza’s evidence is any reference to whether there was a history of falls from overlapping mats or in that part of the hallway in general. Espinoza also did not identify the Medical Center’s policy, if there was one, towards identifying hazardous conditions. See Griffin v. Menard, Inc., 175 N.E.3d 811, 814 (Ind. 2...