Esposito v. Aldarondo

ALFRED ESPOSITO, Plaintiff, v. RAUL ALDARONDO, EDGAR GONZALEZ, JOSE SILVA, AND CITY OF NORWALK, Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-00621-MPS

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

February 24, 2023

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

MICHAEL P. SHEA, U.S.D.J.

On November 17, 2018, Alfred Esposito was arrested by officers from the Norwalk Police Department - Raul Aldarondo, Edgar Gonzalez, and Jose Silva - after he began taking pictures of them with his cellphone. He now brings suit against these officers and the City of Norwalk, alleging that he was arrested without probable cause in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, arrested with excessive force and denied medical care after being detained. Esposito further alleges that he was maliciously prosecuted for over three years based on false charges stemming from his arrest. He brings his claims against the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Connecticut common law. His claims against the City of Norwalk are brought under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and Connecticut General Statutes § 52-557n. Defendants argue that most of Esposito's claims are brought outside the applicable statutes of limitations, that these statutes of limitations were not tolled by Governor Lamont's executive order suspending statutes of limitations for Connecticut state law claims, and that, even if these periods were tolled by executive order Esposito's § 52-557n claims against the City of Norwalk must be dismissed on other grounds. For the reasons set forth below, I grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from Esposito's amended complaint, ECF No. 7, and are accepted as true for the purpose of this motion.

At approximately 2:00 a.m. on November 17, 2018, Esposito was in downtown Norwalk, Connecticut. ECF No. 7 ¶ 9. Also in downtown Norwalk at that time were Raul Aldarondo, Jose Silva, and Edgar Gonzalez, see id. ¶ 10, 13, officers of the Norwalk Police Department who were on duty that evening, id. ¶ 6.^[1]Esposito decided to use his cellphone to take pictures of Aldarondo and Silva because he thought they were “flirting with women on the sidewalk while on duty.” Id. ¶ 10. Silva noticed Esposito and “made his way toward” him, id. ¶ 12, accompanied by Aldarondo and Gonzalez, id. ¶ 13. Esposito spoke with the three officers, engaging in a tense discussion and cursing. Id. ¶ 15-30. As the conversation concluded and the officers were walking away from Esposito, Esposito remarked “too fucking easy.” Id. ¶ 30. After Esposito made these remarks, Aldarondo “grabbed Mr. Esposito's arm to handcuff him, while defendant Gonzalez wrapped his arm around Mr. Esposito's neck to bring him to the ground.” Id. ¶ 31. Esposito was not resisting arrest, id. ¶ 32, a fact that Silva recognized by telling Gonzalez before Gonzalez used force that Esposito was “not resisting.” Id. ¶ 33. Esposito cooperated with being handcuffed and the subsequent search of his person. Id. ¶ 34. Despite his cooperation, Esposito was injured by Gonzalez's and Aldarondo's use of force, which “herniat[ed] a disc in his cervical spine (neck), aggravat[ed] the lower back injury for which he was on disability, and hyperextend[ed] his knee, causing a Baker's cyst, and inflict[ed] excruciating pain and suffering.” Id. ¶ 35.

After Esposito was arrested, he was transported to Norwalk Police Headquarters. Id. ¶ 36. He “told defendant Aldarondo that he required medical treatment,” id. ¶ 37, but Aldarondo and the other individual defendants “deliberately refused to provide Mr. Esposito with medical attention,” id. ¶ 39. Esposito was detained for ten hours, and he was not provided any medical attention or treatment during his period of detention. Id. ¶ 40.

Aldarondo, Gonzalez, and Silva charged Esposito with “misdemeanor breach of peace in the second degree in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-181” and “misdemeanor interfering with an officer in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-167a.” Id. ¶ 41. Esposito was charged with interfering with an officer on the ground that he failed “to remove his belt while in the holding cell.” Id. He was arraigned on November 20, 2018. Id. ¶ 43. After several years of court proceedings, on April 22, 2022, the prosecution entered a nolle prosequi and the Superior Court granted Esposito's motion to dismiss the charges. Id. ¶ 46. Before this dismissal, Esposito “was required to attend court in Connecticut, far from his home in New Jersey, on more than two dozen occasions, causing him to miss work and causing lost wages and diminution of earning capacity.” Id. ¶ 47.

Esposito filed this lawsuit on May 3, 2022, ECF No. 1, and filed an amended complaint on June 2, 2022, ECF No. 7. His complaint contains seven counts. See ECF No. 7 ¶¶ 49-83. Counts I (first amendment retaliation), IV (excessive force), V (due process violation denial of medical treatment), and VI (Monell municipal liability) are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and allege various violations of Esposito's constitutional rights. Id. ¶¶ 49, 62, 68, 72. Counts II (false arrest) and III (malicious prosecution) are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Connecticut common law. Id. ¶¶ 56, 59. Count VII (municipal liability) is brought under Connecticut General Statutes § 52-557n. Id. ¶ 79. Defendants have moved to dismiss all but Count III, arguing that Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, and VII are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. ECF No. 14 at 1. Defendants also argue that Count VII is legally insufficient, claiming that the amended complaint alleges that the individual defendants engaged in acts that constitute actual malice, which prevents the City of Norwalk from being liable for their conduct under CGS § 52-557n. ECF No. 14 at 7.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), I must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court accepts as true all of the complaint's factual allegations when evaluating a motion to dismiss, id., and must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,” Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2008). However, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to survive a motion to dismiss. Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Most of Defendants' arguments involve statutes of limitations. “Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that usually may not be raised in a pre-answer motion, if the running of the statute is apparent from the face of the complaint, the defense may properly be raised under Rule 12(b)(6).” Galea v. L. Offices of Cary Alan Cliff, 3:19-CV-225 (SRU), 2021 WL 1090783, at *7 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2021) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, no one disputes that, based on the allegations in the amended complaint, Esposito was arrested in 2018 and that the amended complaint was not filed until 2022, and so the defense is properly raised in Defendants' motion to dismiss.

A. Counts I, II, IV, V, VI: Executive Order 7G

Defendants argue that I should dismiss Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI because “said claims are time barred by the applicable [s]tatute of [l]imitations,” ECF No. 14 at 1, and this statute of limitations was not tolled by an executive order issued by Governor Lamont at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Executive Order 7G (“Order 7G”), id. at 10-11. I disagree and find that Order 7G did toll the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions. So Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI are timely.

Because 42 U.S.C § 1983 has no federal statute of limitations, federal courts “borrow the ‘most analogous' state statute of limitations.” Connelly v. Komm, 3:20CV1060 (JCH), 2021 WL 5359738, at *3 (D. Conn. Nov. 16, 2021) (citing Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980)). Neither party disputes that “[t]he statute of limitations for claims in Connecticut under section 1983, which courts borrow from Connecticut's personal injury statute, is three years.” Id.; see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577 (three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions). Courts also borrow state “tolling rules” in § 1983 cases, which means that “both statutory and common law rules” related to tolling a statute of limitations apply to § 1983 causes of action. Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2002). Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI all assert § 1983 claims arising from events that occurred on November 17, 2018. Esposito filed this lawsuit on May 3, 2022. These claims are thus untimely unless the applicable statute of limitations was tolled by a state tolling rule.

Order 7G was promulgated on March 19, 2020, as part of “a series of executive orders” issued “to contain and mitigate the spread of COVID-19.” Taylor v. Pillai, 3:21CV00623(SALM), 2022 WL 4080525, at *2-3 (D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2022) (citing Casey v. Lamont, 258 A.3d 647, 652 (Conn. 2021)). Order 7G provides in relevant part:

Suspension of Non-Critical Court Operations and Associated Requirements. Notwithstanding any provision of the Connecticut Statutes or of any regulation local rule or other provision of law, I hereby suspend, for the duration of this public health and civil preparedness

...