Essick v. Fid. Nat'l Info. Servs., Inc., Case No. 3:14-cv-949-J-34JRK

GREGORY A. ESSICK, SR., Plaintiff, v. FIDELITY NATIONAL INFORMATION SERVICES, INC., and CERTEGY, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 3:14-cv-949-J-34JRK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

July 6, 2016

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants Fidelity National Information Services, Inc.'s and Certegy, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. 24; Motion), filed on November 30, 2015. In the Motion, Defendants request summary judgment in their favor on all claims pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)). Plaintiff Gregory A. Essick, Sr. (Essick) filed a response in opposition to the Motion on December 23, 2015. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 36; Response).¹ Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

I. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56, "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Rule 56(c)(1)(A).² An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. See Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). "[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). "When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then gobeyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court "must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int'l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).

II. Background³

As an initial matter, the Court observes that Defendants Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. (FNIS) and Certegy Inc. are actually one entity pursuant to a February 1, 2006 merger between Fidelity National Information Services, Inc., a subsidiary of Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (FNF), and Certegy, Inc. See Phillips Decl. ¶¶ 3-7. Prior to the merger, in April 2003, Plaintiff Gregory Essick, who is African American, was working for ALLTEL Information Services, Inc. when that entity was acquired by FNF and re-named Fidelity Information Services, Inc. (FIS). See First Amended Complaint (Doc. 15; Amended Complaint) ¶ 7, filed September 2, 2014; Defendants Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. and Certegy, Inc.'s Amended Answer and Affirmative and Other Defensesto Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. 21; Answer) ¶ 6, filed July 23, 2015; P. Dep. 1 at 39-40; Phillips Decl. ¶ 2. Following his employment with FIS, Essick went to work for Certegy, Inc. See Essick Decl. ¶ 8. While Essick was working for Certegy, it merged with, and changed its name to, FNIS. Id. ¶ 9; Phillips Decl. ¶¶ 5-7. Further discussion of the complicated history of Defendant's corporate restructuring is unnecessary to the resolution of this matter as the parties do not dispute that the correct entity is before the Court. See Phillips Decl. ¶¶ 2-7. For clarity, the Court will distinguish between Essick's employers by referring to them as FIS (from 2003-2005), Certegy (prior to the merger), and FNIS (after FNIS merged with Certegy). The Court will refer to all of these entities collectively as Defendant.

Essick was employed with FIS as a "Senior Automated Messaging Analyst," which was "basically a Lotus Notes administrator." See Essick Decl. ¶ 1; P. Dep. 1 at 42-43. Essick had no issues with his employment until he was assigned a new supervisor, Jason Winters. See Essick Decl. ¶ 2. According to Essick, "Winters openly denigrated my work in front of peers and colleagues, refused to provide me training opportunities, refused to provide me assignment-critical equipment as was provided peers and colleagues, and omitted me from group settings in a way that seemed designed to single me out as compared to Caucasian peers." See Essick Decl. ¶ 2. As such, in December 2003, Essick filed a complaint with the FIS human resources department describing Winters' unfair treatment of him, as well as the unprofessional behavior of a co-worker, Don Witt, and "outlining a belief of racial bigotry and discrimination." See Essick Decl. ¶ 3; P. Dep. 1 at 48, 52; P. Dep. 2 at 23-24, Ex. 3 (the HR Complaint). Among other things, the HR Complaint details an incident where Essick's co-workers were provided with "a BlackberryRIM/Cell phone," but his request for the same device was denied "due to budget issues." See HR Complaint; see also P. Dep. 1 at 48, 79-80. Essick also complained that he did not receive the same training and growth opportunities as Witt. See HR Complaint; P. Dep. 1 at 48. Essick believes that Winters' actions were based on Essick's race because "[t]here was another employee in the department named Silvia Horan and, basically, the two minority employees . . . were being treated different. We were harassed and treated differently by members. They went to lunch and they excluded us from the lunches." See P. Dep. 1 at 49. Essick references Horan in his HR Complaint, notes that she had recently been dismissed, and observes that "the two minorities are the one[s] who have the greatest struggles here." See HR Complaint.

Following the HR Complaint, FIS transferred Essick to a different supervisor, first Mark Cato, and then, at some point in the second half of 2004, Vickie Gouin. See P. Dep. 1 at 130-31, 138; P. Dep. 2 at 41-42. According to Essick, after he complained of race discrimination to human resources, he was "subjected to efforts to retaliate against [him]," including "manufactured reasons for performance corrective action, lowered review scores, and continued denigration of my work and person." See Essick Decl. ¶ 4. Essick recalls that immediately after filing the HR Complaint the way he was treated changed—he was isolated and excluded from lunches or activities with other team members, received "false write-ups," and people stopped wanting to associate with him. See P. Dep. 1 at 45-46. In addition, Essick states that the people he had accused of race discrimination, Winters and Witt, who were still in his work environment, were "blatantly hostile," going out of their way to find problems with Essick's work. Id. at 47. Indeed, Essick received additional work "so they could try to find something wrong," followed by reports to Jay Johnson, the managerof their group, that Essick was making errors. Id. However, Essick maintains that Johnson told him that when he investigated these reports "their claims just [dis]integrated." Id.

Notably, in an email to human resources on July 8, 2004, Essick complained about retaliation from his "former team and manager" with respect to his evaluation. See P. Dep. 2 at 35-37, Ex. 8. Specifically, Essick believed Cato, his supervisor after Winters, "downgraded" his evaluation in retaliation for the HR Complaint. See P. Dep. 2 at 36-37. In the email, Essick complained that he "felt betrayed by the process" because he faced "open retaliation for going to HR and it [was] allowed." See P. Dep. 2, Ex. 8. In early 2005, Essick received another negative evaluation, this time from Gouin, his supervisor after Cato. Again Essick perceived this evaluation as retaliation against him for the 2003 HR Complaint. See P. Dep. 2 at 42-46, 48, Ex. 14. Johnson, who managed Gouin, agreed with Essick that the evaluation was unfair and assisted him in preparing a response. See P. Dep. 2 at 43-44, 46. At some point, both Gouin and Johnson left their positions in Essick's group, such that Essick's appeal of the negative evaluation went to his new manager, Linda Lander. See P. Dep. 2 at 42-44. According to Essick, Lander did not fairly review Johnson's feedback, so her role "whether active or passive" also constituted retaliation.⁴ Id. at 46. At the time Lander reviewed his appeal, Essick firmly believed he was being retaliated against for the HR Complaint, but maintains that he had no proof. Id. at 50. Finally, on May 10, 2005, Lander issued a "Final Written Warning" to Essick, signed by both Lander and Bridget Farris, a senior vice president for FIS, located in Little Rock, Arkansas. See P. Dep. 2 at 50-51, Ex. 15. Essick responded to Farris and a human resources representative that he felt this warning was part of a pattern of retaliation againsthim. See P. Dep. 2 at 10-12; P. Dep. 1 at 72-73. Feeling that he was being "forced out," Essick began...