Estate of Butler v. Maharishi Univ. Of Management

Page 1150

589 F.Supp.2d 1150

ESTATE OF Levi BUTLER, by and through his Personal Representative, Joshua BUTLER, Plaintiff, v. MAHARISHI UNIVERSITY OF MANAGEMENT, Defendant, and Maharishi University of Management, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Shuvender Sem, Third-Party Defendant.

No. 4:06-cv-00072-JEG.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

December 11, 2008.

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David Wayne Nelmark, Mark E. Weinhardt, Stephen R. Eckley, William B, Ortman, Belin Lamson McCormick Zumback & Flynn, P.C., Des Moines, IA, Lawrence F. Scalise Coppola, McConville, Coppola, Hockenberg & Scalise, West Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

Nathan John Overberg, Richard G. Santi, Amanda G. Wachuta, David H. Luginbill, Ahlers & Cooney PC, Jodie Lynn Clark, Davis Brown Koehn Shors & Roberts PC, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.

Nathan John Overberg, Amanda G. Wachuta, David H. Luginbill, Ahlers & Cooney PC, Richard G. Santi, Ahlers Cooney Dorweiler Haynie Smith & Allbee, Des Moines, IA, for Third-Party Plaintiff.

Alfredo G. Parrish, Tammy Marie Westhoff-Gentry, Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Boles Gribble, Cook Parrish Gentry & Fisher LLP, Harry Perkins, III, Robin L. Hermann, Patterson Lorentzen Duffield Timmons, Des Moines, IA, for Third-Party Defendant.

ORDER

JAMES E. GRITZNER, District Judge.

This matter now comes before the Court on a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Maharishi University of Management (MUM) against the Estate of Levi Butler (the Estate or Plaintiff), which Plaintiff resists. The Court held a hearing on the motion on April 25, 2008. Attorney David Luginbill represented MUM; attorney Mark Weinhardt represented Plaintiff.

Also before the Court is MUM's Motion to Strike, which Plaintiff resists. MUM requested oral argument; however, the Court finds the briefing adequately addresses the motion to strike, and therefore no oral argument is necessary.¹ These matters are now fully submitted and ready for disposition.

I. BACKGROUND²

The following facts are not in dispute. Levi Butler (Levi) graduated from high school in May 2002 and attended a local community college for one year. In June 2003, as Levi considered attending a four-year university, Levi's brother, Joshua Butler (Joshua), suggested that Levi look at MUM. Levi explored MUM's website and became interested in MUM's "Sustainable Living" major. Levi received recruitment materials from MUM and reviewed those materials and MUM's website with his father, Khaldun Butler (Khaldun), and his mother, Evelyn Butler (Evelyn). Levi submitted an application and received an acceptance letter from MUM on August 7, 2003. Levi moved to the MUM campus in Fairfield, Iowa, and began the MUM program on August 18, 2003.

In December 2003, Shuvender Sem (Sem) contacted MUM to inquire about attending the university. On December 15, 2003, Sem had a phone interview with MUM admissions representative Leora Rosenberg. Sem completed an application on January 1, 2004, and began attending classes at MUM shortly thereafter. As part of MUM's admissions process, Sem began receiving transcendental meditation (TM) instruction on January 19, 2004.

On March 1, 2004, suddenly and without apparent provocation, Sem stabbed fellow student John Killian (Killian) in the face and throat with a pen. Two fellow students were restraining Sem when Dr. Samuel Boothby (Dr. Boothby), a MUM administrator, approached the group. Dr. Boothby led Sem into an adjoining conference room and discussed the attack. Dr. Boothby questioned Sem about any relationship Sem might have had with John Killian and what Sem had done earlier that day, including Sem's TM technique. Dr. Boothby informed Sem he was using an improper technique when completing his TM exercises. MUM administration did not summon law enforcement or campus security; instead, Sem was placed into the custody of MUM's dean of men, Joel Wynsong (Wynsong). Killian went unassisted to the hospital, where he received several stitches.

Wynsong took Sem to Wynsong's on-campus apartment. Once at his apartment, Wynsong began his own meditation exercises, and, after completing his meditation, Wynsong discovered Sem had left the apartment. Wynsong located Sem in the campus dining hall and decided to allow Sem to mingle with the students. Sem began another abrupt and unprovoked attack on fellow student Levi Butler, stabbing Levi multiple times with a knife. Levi died from multiple stab wounds to the chest.³

Sem was taken into custody, and on March 3, 2004, Dr. James Brooks (Dr. Brooks) performed a psychiatric examination. Dr. Brooks noted Sem had a history of chronic paranoid schizophrenia and had been treated with anti-psychotic medication but ceased taking the medication several weeks before coming to MUM in January 2004. Dr. Brooks also noted Sem had been to the MUM health clinic in January but had not been treated for psychosis at that time.

On February 24, 2006, the Estate filed this action against MUM and Maharishi Vedic Education Development Corporation (MVED), asserting claims for premises liability (count one), fraudulent misrepresentation (count two), and negligence (count three). On September 24, 2008, the Court granted MVED's second motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against MVED.

On January 30, 2008, MUM filed the present motion for partial summary judgment, arguing Plaintiffs claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent screening or admission of students fail as a matter of law and must be dismissed.⁴ MUM also moved to strike affidavits⁵ filed in support of Plaintiffs resistance to MUM's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

A. MUM's Motion to Strike

MUM moves to strike the affidavits of Charles Knoles (Knoles) and Dr. Kai Druhl (Dr. Druhl), arguing that the statements contained in the affidavits are inadmissible because they do not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(1), which states, "A supporting or opposing affidavit must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated."

1. Affidavit of Charles Knoles

MUM cites portions of statements made in Knoles' affidavit and argues the affidavit is "littered" with inadmissible hearsay, allegations not based on personal knowledge, and lay opinions not based on personal knowledge. Plaintiff argues MUM fails to raise specific objections to individual paragraphs, making it impossible for Plaintiff to defend the admissibility of specific statements, and therefore MUM's sweeping objections are insufficient to support a motion to strike.

In the first three paragraphs of Knoles' affidavit, Knoles identifies himself as a student at MUM between May 2001 and June 2004 and states that he knew both Levi and Sem. Subsequent paragraphs describe Knoles' own personal experiences on the MUM campus. These statements are clearly based on Knoles' personal knowledge and demonstrate Knoles' competence to testify to these relevant matters. Furthermore, some of the statements MUM broadly challenges as inadmissible hearsay do not appear to be offered for the truth of the matters asserted and therefore are not hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 802.

As this Court has stated before,

Any defects [to an affidavit] are best addressed by reducing the weight accorded to the affidavit and not by striking the document in its entirety. See Maytag Corp. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 448 F.Supp.2d 1034 (N.D.Iowa 2006) (finding it unnecessary to strike when court can simply disregard inadmissible portions); see also Sholl v. Plattform Advertising, Inc., 438 F.Supp.2d 1303, 1307 (D.Kan.2006) ("[T]he Court ordinarily does not strike affidavits but simply disregards those portions which ... do not comply with Rule 56(e)"); Edwards v. Texas-New Mexico Power Co., 259 F.Supp.2d 544, 546 (N.D.Tex.2003) (denying motion to strike; rather than strike portions of affidavit, [the] "court will give the summary judgment evidence whatever weight it may deserve").

Pekin Ins. Co. v. Tysa, Inc., No. 3:05-cv-00030, 2006 WL 3827232, at *4 (S.D.Iowa Dec.27, 2006). The Court will follow this practice in considering Knoles' affidavit and thus denies MUM's motion to strike Knole's affidavit.

2. Affidavit of Dr. Druhl

MUM next argues Dr. Druhl's affidavit should be stricken for lack of personal knowledge because Dr. Druhl admits he worked for MUM four years prior to the events that are the subject of this lawsuit.⁶ Plaintiff argues Dr. Druhl's affidavit attests to the culture and practices at MUM and provides background information about TM.

After reviewing Dr. Druhl's affidavit, the Court concludes that the statements therein are based on Dr. Druhl's personal knowledge and experience. Furthermore, Dr. Druhl's statements are relevant to the issue of MUM's administrative practices, which are at issue in this case. The Court will simply disregard any portions of the affidavit that do not comply with Rule 56(e) and thus denies MUM's motion to strike Dr. Druhl's affidavit in its entirety.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

"[C]laims lacking merit may be dealt with through summary judgment under Rule 56." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and the Eighth Circuit has recognized that it "must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries." Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1118 (8th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted). However, "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," judgment should be rendered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct....