Estate of Fouty v. Syrian Arab Republic

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ESTATE OF BYRON W. FOUTY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-385 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

August 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

The plaintiffs-the estates and immediate family members of deceased United States servicemen Byron W. Fouty and Alex R Jimenez-bring this civil action against the defendants-the Syrian Arab Republic (“Syria”) and the Syrian Military Intelligence^[1]-pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the “Act”), 28 U.S.C §§ 1602-1611, seeking damages resulting from the kidnapping, torture, and extrajudicial killing of the servicemen by a foreign terrorist organization with material support from the defendants. See Complaint (“Compl.”) at 3, ¶¶ 1-22, ECF No. 1. On July 17, 2024, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment as to liability. See Estate of Fouty v. Syrian Arab Republic (“Fouty I”), No. 18-cv-385 (RBW), 2024 WL 3443591, at *30 (D.D.C. July 17, 2024); Order at 1 (July 17, 2024), ECF No. 42. Currently pending before the Court is the component of the plaintiffs' motion for the award of damages based on their liability default judgment. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Default Judgment as to Liability and Damages (“Pls.' Mot.” or the “plaintiffs' motion”) at 1, ECF No. 25. After carefully considering all of the relevant evidence submitted by the plaintiffs,^[2] the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the damages component of the plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment and enter a default judgment damages award against the defendant Syria in the amount of $364,049,255.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 20, 2018, the plaintiffs initiated this action against the defendants, seeking damages for the personal injuries and wrongful deaths of Byron Fouty and Alex Jimenez, two United States servicemen who were “abducted by Syrian-supported terrorists in the same terrorist attack on a military observation post . . . south of Baghdad, Iraq, on May 12, 2007[,] . . . held against their will, tortured, and finally murdered by these terrorists[]” sometime between the date of the attack and July 8, 2008, “when their remains were discovered.” Compl. at 2-3. The following fourteen plaintiffs include the estates of Byron Fouty and Alex Jimenez, as well as twelve of their immediate family members: (1) the Estate of Mickey W. Fouty (representing Byron Fouty's biological father); (2) Hilary North (Byron Fouty's biological mother); (3) Gordon K. Dibler, Jr. (Byron Fouty's stepfather); (4) Sarah Haverlock (Byron Fouty's biological half-blood sister); (5) Maria Duran (Alex Jimenez's biological mother); (6) Ramon D. Jimenez (Alex Jimenez's biological father); (7) Yaderlin Jimenez (Alex Jimenez's widow); (8) Andy Domingo Jimenez (Alex Jimenez's biological full blood brother); (9) Bryant Jimenez (Alex Jimenez's biological full blood brother); (10) Andy Jimenez Vargas (Alex Jimenez's biological half-blood brother); (11) Irving Lazaro Jimenez Vargas (Alex Jimenez's biological half-blood brother); and (12) Alexander Jimenez Vargas (Alex Jimenez's biological half-blood brother). See id. ¶¶ 2-15; Plaintiffs' 2d Additional Exhibits (“Pls.' 2d Additional Exs.”), Ex. 41 (Fouty Family Structure) at 1, ECF No. 27-24; id., Ex. 42 (Jimenez Family Structure) at 1, ECF No. 27-25.^[3] These plaintiffs allege that the kidnapping, torture, and murders of Byron Fouty and Alex Jimenez “were carried out by a [f]oreign [t]errorist [o]rganization . . . operating with material support and resources” provided by the defendants. Compl. at 3. More specifically, the plaintiffs allege that these acts were planned and executed by “the terrorist organization founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the ‘Zarqawi Terrorist Organization', which at the time of these terrorist attacks was known as the Islamic State of Iraq (‘ISI'), acting with the training, funding, material support, protection, and direction of Syria, as part of a coordinated scheme by Syria to target [United States] service-members in Iraq.” Pls.' Mot. at 3.

On January 20, 2019, the plaintiffs served the Complaint on Syria and the Syrian Military Intelligence, pursuant to the procedures authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4). See Plaintiffs' Response, Exhibit (“Ex.”) A (Letter from Jared Hess, Attorney Adviser in the United States Department of State's Office of Legal Affairs, to the Clerk of the Court (Mar. 11, 2019) (“State Department Letter”)) at 1, ECF No. 39-1; see also Fouty I, 2024 WL 3443591, at *20-21 (finding that the plaintiffs had properly served Syria and the Syrian Military Intelligence).

However, the plaintiffs were “not able to serve the Syrian [p]resident[,] Bashar al-Assad [with a summons and a copy of their Complaint].” Pls.' Mot. at 1 n.1. After the defendants who had been served failed to appear or otherwise respond to the Complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of default on April 12, 2019, see Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Default and Memorandum in Support Thereof at 1, ECF No. 21, and the Clerk of the Court entered a default against Syria and the Syrian Military Intelligence on April 16, 2019, see Default (Apr. 16, 2019) at 1, ECF No. 22. On July 24, 2020, the plaintiffs then moved for entry of a default judgment against Syria and the Syrian Military Intelligence, both as to liability and damages.^[4] See Pls.' Mot. at 1-2.

On July 17, 2024, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the plaintiffs' request for a default judgment against the defendants as to liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), state common law, and state statutory law for battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful death, conspiracy to provide material support or resources to a terrorist organization, and aiding and abetting a terrorist organization. See Fouty I, 2024 WL 3443591, at *30; Order at 1 (July 17, 2024). The Court indicated in its liability opinion that it would “issue a separate Memorandum Opinion and Order addressing the damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled.” Fouty I, 2024 WL 3443591, at *1. In this Memorandum Opinion, the Court now addresses the component of the plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment as to damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the entry of a default judgment “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend” against an action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a); see also Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[T]he default judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” (alteration in original) (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970))). Rule 55 sets forth a two-step process for a party seeking a default judgment: first, entry of a default, followed by entry of a default judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55; see also 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2682 (4th ed. 2022) (stating that “[p]rior to obtaining a default judgment under either Rule 55(b)(1) or Rule 55(b)(2), there must be an entry of default as provided by Rule 55(a)”). When a defendant has failed to plead or otherwise defend against an action, the plaintiff may request that the clerk of the court enter a default against that defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Once the clerk enters the default pursuant to Rule 55(a), Rule 55(b) authorizes either the clerk or the Court to enter a default judgment against the defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b).

Under the Act, to prevail on a motion for a default judgment against a foreign sovereign, the plaintiffs must show that the Court has original jurisdiction over the claims and personal jurisdiction over the defendant, see 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b), and must “establish[] [their] claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the [C]ourt[,]” id. § 1608(e); see also Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F.Supp.3d 64, 74-75 (D.D.C. 2017) (discussing default judgments under the Act). Such evidence may be presented using “traditional forms of evidence[, e.g., ] testimony and documentation[,]” Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 873 F.Supp.2d 232, 236 (D.D.C. 2012), and the plaintiffs may also submit evidence “in the form of affidavits or declarations[,]” Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F.Supp.2d 8, 20 (D.D.C. 2009). However, “[t]he Court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing[.]” Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (relying on declarations in reversing and remanding for the district court to enter a default judgment without an evidentiary hearing). “Upon evaluation, the Court may accept any uncontroverted evidence presented by [the] plaintiffs as true.” Belkin, 667 F.Supp.2d at 20 (citing Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F.Supp.2d 229, 255 (D.D.C. 2006)).

“After establishing liability, the [C]ourt must make an independent evaluation of the damages to be awarded and has ‘considerable latitude in determining the amount of damages.'” Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr Co., 134 F.Supp.3d 99, 103 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F.Supp.2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2011)). However, the Court “must ensure[] that there [i]s a basis for the damages specified in the default judgment.” Id. (quoting Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997)) (second alteration...