Estate of Hull v. Showman

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ESTATE OF RICKY E. HULL, DECEASED Appellant v. MELISSA S. SHOWMAN

No. 1277 WDA 2022

No. J-S09017-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

July 6, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered September 28, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s): 702 of 2022 GD

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM

BOWES J.

The Estate of Ricky E. Hull, deceased (the "Estate") appeals from the order entered in the civil division of the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas dismissing all claims in this ejectment action, without prejudice, so that the claims could instead be raised in the orphans' court division. The Estate contends that the orphans' court division lacks subject matter jurisdiction over its complaint in ejectment and that the trial court erred in dismissing this claim instead of transferring the counterclaims raised by Melissa S. Showman ("Appellee"), one of the decedent's three daughters, to the orphans' court division. We affirm the trial court's finding that the orphans' court division may exercise nonmandatory subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, but we reverse the dismissal of this action and remand with instructions to transfer the proceeding to the orphans' court division pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(c).

By way of background, Mr. Hull died testate on April 7, 2021. The Register of Wills in Fayette County subsequently issued letters testamentary to the executrix at docket number 2621-0471 of the orphans' court division. The decedent's assets included, inter alia, over sixteen acres of real estate in Springfield Township, Fayette County (the "Property"). While the orphans' court docket remained open, the Estate filed a complaint against Appellee in the civil division, raising a single count of ejectment asserting that she was occupying the Property without any right to do so.^[1]

Appellee filed a response containing new matter, affirmative defenses, and three counterclaims against the Estate. Therein, she asserted that the decedent executed a deed transferring a one-third interest in the Property to her several weeks prior to the decedent's death, and that the Estate agreed to allow her to remain on the Property if she installed a septic system. Appellee also raised the defense that the decedent's last will and testament did not fully dispose of the residue of his assets, creating a partial intestacy that entitled her to an interest in the Property. Finally, Appellee averred that the executrix of the Estate violated her fiduciary obligations by entering into an agreement of sale for the Property with a third-party for below its appraised value. As such, Appellee requested relief from the trial court in the form of attorney's fees arising from defending the ejectment action, and seeking specific performance of a contract, an accounting, a freeze of the Estate's assets, and/or a hearing to determine whether the executrix should be removed.

The Estate filed preliminary objections to Appellee's response seeking, inter alia, to dismiss her counterclaims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Estate argued that the civil division had exclusive jurisdiction over the ejectment action and that Appellee's counterclaims should be brought in a separate action within the orphans' court division. Both parties filed briefs addressing the Estate's preliminary objections.

On September 28, 2022, the trial court sustained the Estate's preliminary objection to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Appellee's counterclaims.^[2] Critically, the order dismissed all claims of both parties, without prejudice, so that they could be raised in the docket of the orphans' court division relating to the Estate. The trial court also directed that, once the claims were filed with the orphans' court division, it would appoint a master pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. § 751, with the master's costs to be borne by the Estate. The Estate filed a motion to reconsider, and thereafter timely appealed from the order sustaining the preliminary objection while the motion to reconsider was still pending.

The Estate and the trial court thereafter complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.^[3] The Estate raises the following inter-related issues on appeal:

I. Where the trial court had exclusive jurisdiction of [the Estate's] ejectment action, whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law by sua sponte dismissing that action and transferring it to the trial court's orphans' court division?

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law by sua sponte dismissing Appellant's ejectment action and transferring it to the trial court's orphans' court division to be heard by a master, even though the Appellant has the right to try the ejectment action either to a jury or a judge sitting without a jury?

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law by sua sponte dismissing Appellant's ejectment action and transferring it to the trial court's orphans' court division to be tried to a master together with all of the Appellee's counterclaims[,] none of which arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the ejectment action?

The Estate's brief at 3-4.^[4] We first address our appellate jurisdiction.^[5] The Estate asserts that the order appealed from constitutes a final order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341 or, alternatively, a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. Both the trial court and Appellee assert that the order in question is not a final order because it disposes of no claims, as they were preserved to be raised in the orphans' court division.

We agree with the Estate that the order in question constitutes a final order and is thus appealable. "It is well settled that questions as to the appealability of an order go to the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order." Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 974 A.2d 1166, 1171 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted). Generally, an appeal lies only from a final order, unless otherwise permitted by statute. See Forrester v. Hanson, 901 A.2d 548, 554 (Pa.Super. 2006). A final order is defined in Rule 341 as one that "disposes of all claims and of all parties." Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). To determine whether an order is final, this Court "must consider whether the practical ramification of the order will be to dispose of the case, making review appropriate." Friia v. Friia, 780 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa.Super. 2001) (cleaned up).

Here, the trial court's order precludes the Estate and Appellee from litigating any of their claims in the civil division, and therefore "disposes of all claims and of all parties" as to that action. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). The case was dismissed, despite the trial court giving leave for the parties to re-file their actions in the orphans' court. Accordingly, the order is final, and we have jurisdiction to address the merits of the Estate's claims.^[6] See In re Estate of Cantor, 621 A.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Pa.Super. 1993) (addressing the merits of an appeal filed from an orphans' court order dismissing claims without prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also In re Caples, 1802 EDA 2020 (Pa.Super. filed August 16, 2021) (non-precedential decision) (same).

All three of the Estate's claims on appeal concern the lower court's jurisdiction. Our standard of review for questions involving subject matter jurisdiction is as follows:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred solely by the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth. The test for whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction inquires into the competency of the court to determine controversies of the general class to which the case presented for consideration belongs. Thus, as a pure question of law, the standard of review in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.

Mazur v. Trinity Area Sch. Dist., 961 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 2008) (cleaned up).

Concerning jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas, 42 Pa.C.S. § 931(a) provides that "[e]xcept where exclusive original jurisdiction of an action or proceeding is by statute or by general rule . . . vested in another court of this Commonwealth, the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings[.]" Further, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 952,

[t]he divisions of a court of common pleas are administrative units composed of those judges of the court responsible for the transaction of specified classes of the business of the court. In a court of common pleas having two or more divisions each division of the court is vested with the full jurisdiction of the whole court, but the business of the court may be allocated among the divisions of the court by or pursuant to general rules.

Id. Our High Court has also stated that "it is now recognized that the divisions of the common pleas courts are established essentially for purposes of administrative convenience, and that each division is vested with the full jurisdiction of the whole court." In re Estate of Hall, 535 A.2d 47, 59 (Pa. 1987) (citing § 952).

Concerning the jurisdiction of an orphans' court division, § 711 of the Pennsylvania Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code ("PEF Code") states that the orphans' court shall have mandatory jurisdiction over the following enumerated matters pertinent to the instant appeal:

(1) Decedent's estates.--The administration and distribution of the real and personal property of decedents' estates and the control of the decedent's burial.

. . . .

(12) Fiduciaries.--The appointment, control, settlement of the accounts of, removal and discharge of, and allowance to and

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