Estate of Lopez v. Hamilton

1

ESTATE OF JOSEPH LOPEZ by Administrator Joe Lopez, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW HAMILTON and CITY OF GREENSBORO, Defendants.

No. 1:22CV421

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina

August 2, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.

The Estate of Joseph Lopez brings this action against Officer Matthew Hamilton of the Greensboro Police Department and the City of Greensboro alleging that Officer Hamilton shot Joseph Lopez in the face without justification, killing him. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff's Complaint alleges two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims as well a state law wrongful death claim. (Id. ¶¶ 33-45.) Before the Court is Officer Hamilton's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings made pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 20.) Also before the Court is Officer Hamilton's Contingent Motion for Stay, which asks that in the event this Court denies the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, this Court stay the case pending the resolution of a related criminal case against Officer Hamilton. (ECF No 25.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court will deny the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and the Court will likewise deny the Motion for Stay.

I. OFFICER HAMILTON'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A. BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, on the night of November 19, 2021, Officer Hamilton and other Greensboro police officers responded to a report that someone was trying to enter a residence. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 10.) When the officers arrived at the address, Lopez was “inside a small room . . . located at the rear of a two-car garage at the residence.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Officer Hamilton, who was a police dog handler, approached the small room with his dog and opened the door. (Id. ¶ 12.) While standing near the open door, Officer Hamilton said, “Greensboro police, if you're in there, make yourself known.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Lopez replied, “Yes, I'm here.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Officer Hamilton then said, “Come on out with your hands up or I'll send my dog in there and he'll bite you.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Lopez responded that he would come out when it was “safe” to do so. (Id. ¶ 16.) Officer Hamilton then released his police dog into the small room and the dog attacked Lopez, who yelled out in distress. (Id ¶¶ 17-18.) Within seconds of releasing the dog into the room, Officer Hamilton also came through the door into the room and shot his gun, hitting Lopez in the face and killing him. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Lopez was approximately fifteen feet away from Officer Hamilton and unarmed. (Id. ¶ 23.)

In this action, the Estate of Joseph Lopez has asserted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Officer Hamilton for using excessive force during the encounter, and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the City of Greensboro under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 33-41.) The Monell claim is not at issue in the motions currently before the Court.^[1] Plaintiff has also asserted a state law wrongful death claim against Officer Hamilton. (Id. ¶¶ 42-45.)

B. Standard of Review

Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where the case turns on a legal question and the pleadings demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. S. Lithoplate, Inc., 7 F.Supp.3d 579, 583 (E.D. N.C. 2014). Such a motion is generally analyzed “under the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 115 (4th Cir. 2013). “The court assumes the facts alleged by the nonmoving party are true” and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Lithoplate, 7 F.Supp.3d at 583. Like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a “Rule 12(c) motion tests only the sufficiency of the complaint and does not resolve the merits of the plaintiff's claims or any disputes of fact.” Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 474 (4th Cir. 2014).

However, unlike when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court, when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, may consider the answer. Alexander v. City of Greensboro, 801 F.Supp.2d 429, 433 (M.D. N.C. 2011). Factual allegations contained in an answer “are taken as true only where and to the extent they have not been denied or do not conflict with the complaint.” Jadoff v. Gleason, 140 F.R.D. 330, 331 (M.D. N.C. 1991). “To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Conner v. Cleveland County, 22 F.4th 412, 420 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 520 (4th Cir. 2021)).

C. DISCUSSION

Officer Hamilton presents two issues in his Motion for Judgment: qualified immunity from Plaintiff's § 1983 claim and public official immunity from Plaintiff's wrongful death claim. (ECF No. 21 at 4-6.) The Court addresses each in turn.

1. Officer Hamilton is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are shielded from liability for civil damages so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights within the knowledge of a reasonable person.” Meyers v. Baltimore County, 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013). As qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” the Supreme Court has “stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). However, a defendant who raises qualified immunity in a 12(b)(6) motion “faces a formidable hurdle”- because dismissal at this early stage “is appropriate only if a plaintiff fails to state a claim that is plausible on its face,” the defense “is usually not successful.” Owens v. Balt. City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Field Day, LLC v. County of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2006)).

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must follow the two-step procedure articulated in Saucier v. Katz.^[2] See 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Generally, the Court first decides “whether a constitutional violation occurred.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011). On a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this means asking whether, “viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” the allegations in the complaint “demonstrate a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.” See Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d 266, 270 (4th Cir. 2019). Second, the Court must examine “whether the right violated was clearly established”-that is, “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood” that his behavior violated the right at issue. See Henry, 652 F.3d at 531-34; Yates v. Terry, 817 F.3d 877, 887 (4th Cir. 2016). This standard does “not require a case directly on point.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Rather, “[w]hat matters is that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his or her conduct was unlawful in the particular situation that he or she confronted.” Livingston v. Kehagias, 803 Fed.Appx. 673, 679 (4th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (quotation omitted). To overcome a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must prevail at both Saucier steps. See 533 U.S. at 201.

For an excessive force claim, at the first Saucier step courts apply a “standard of objective reasonableness” to evaluate whether an officer's use of force was excessive. Harris, 927 F.3d at 272 (quoting Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 550 (4th Cir. 2002)). Though the standard defies “precise definition or mechanical application,” the three factors outlined in Graham v. Connor-“[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”-provide a framework for evaluating whether an officer's actions were objectively reasonable. See 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). “The ‘reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97. Officers may use deadly force only “where the officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 159 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)).

For the first Graham factor, Officer Hamilton argues that he had probable cause to believe Lopez was committing a serious crime, specifically, “attempting to gain unauthorized entry into the dwelling of another,” and that “there are no good scenarios” for why Lopez was doing this. (ECF No. 21 at 13.) Officer Hamilton suggests that Lopez may have been “trying to break and enter to steal items, or to potentially harm an occupant [of the residence].” (Id.) Plaintiff responds by conceding that “it can be inferred from . . . the Complaint that there was a previous attempt to enter a residence and an immediate trespass,” but points out that “there are no allegations that [Lopez] was...