Estate of Schroeder v. Gillespie Cnty.

23 F.Supp.3d 775

The ESTATE OF Damion Michael SCHROEDER, by and through the personal representatives Michael Schroeder and Sandra L. Keyser; and Anne M. Clancey, as guardian of L.G.C., Heir of Damion Michael Schroeder, Plaintiffs,

v.GILLESPIE COUNTY; Gillespie County Sheriff's Department; Sheriff Buddy Mills; and Deputy Reagan Givens, Defendants.

Case No. A–12–CA–1139–SS.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division.

Signed June 2, 2014

Motion granted in part and denied in part. Charles Darby Riley, Attorney at Law, Edgardo Rafael Baez, The Baez Law Firm, PC, Rosemarie Alvarado, Rosie Alvarado P.C., San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Charles Straith Frigerio, Attorney at Law, Hector Xavier Saenz, Law Offices of Charles S. Frigerio, A Professional Corporation, San Antonio, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER

SAM SPARKS, District Judge.

BE IT REMEMBERED on this day the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause, and specifically Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [# 18], Plaintiffs' Response [# 24], Defendants' Reply [# 28], Plaintiffs' Sur–Reply [# 30], Defendants' Supplement to their Motion for Summary Judgment [# 42], and Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Supplement [# 44]. Having reviewed the documents, the governing law, and the file as a whole, the Court now enters the following opinion and orders GRANTING summary judgment on all claims EXCEPT the policy-related § 1983 claims against Gillespie County and Sheriff Mills in his official capacity.

Similarly, the Plaintiffs in this case have sued the Gillespie County Sheriff's Department but have failed to show Gillespie County has ever granted the Sheriff's Department the legal capacity to engage in separate litigation. Therefore, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims seek recovery from a legal entity that does not exist for Plaintiffs' purposes. Because Plaintiffs have failed to show the Gillespie County Sheriff's Department actually has jural existence, their claims against this Defendant must be dismissed. See, e.g., Crull v. City of New Braunfels, Tex., 267 Fed.Appx. 338, 341–42 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished); Von Minden v. Jankowski, No. A–06–CA–823–LY, 2007 WL 1958615, at *2–3 (W.D.Tex. July 3, 2007); Smith v. Porter, No. 3:06–CV–691–H, 2006 WL 3325674, at *5 (N.D.Tex. Nov. 13, 2006); Patterson v. Kaufman Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 3:05–CV–962–D, 2005 WL 1421813, at *1 (N.D.Tex. June 13, 2005).

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to all claims against Defendant Gillespie County Sheriff's Department.

B. Claims Against Givens

Plaintiffs have sued Givens in his individual capacity, and Givens has asserted the defense of qualified immunity. The Court makes two inquiries to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity from claims brought against him in his individual capacity. The Court asks whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, and if so, whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the incident. Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir.1998) ( Hare III ).

With respect to the first query, Plaintiffs have alleged Givens knew Schroeder was exhibiting suicidal tendencies by virtue of his suicide attempt on May 5, 2011, and Givens's actions including, among others, placing an actively suicidal detainee in an isolated cell, checking on him in a cursory fashion at fifteen minute intervals, and failing to inspect the cell and find the socks eventually used as the ligature constituted deliberate indifference to Schroeder's serious medical needs. Plaintiffs have therefore alleged Givens violated a clearly established constitutional right. See Hare III, 135 F.3d at 326.

The second prong of the qualified immunity test is better understood as two separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and if so, whether the conduct of the defendant was objectively unreasonable in light of that then clearly established law. Id.

In order to determine whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident, the Court must first address the issue of whether this case is an “episodic acts or omissions” case as compared to a “condition of confinement” case because the standard to be applied hinges upon this classification. See Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir.1997). A “condition of confinement” case is a “ ‘[c]onstitutional attack[ ] on general conditions, practices, rules, or restriction of pretrial confinement.’ ” Id. (quoting Hare II, 74 F.3d at 644). In such cases, the reasonable relationship test of Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), is applicable because it can be “safely assume[d]” the municipality, by the very promulgation and maintenance of the complained-of condition, intended to cause the alleged constitutional deprivation. Scott, 114 F.3d at 53 (citing Hare II, 74 F.3d at 645). Under Wolfish, a constitutional violation exists only if the condition of confinement is not reasonably related to a legitimate, non-punitive governmental objective. Scott, 114 F.3d at 53 (citing Hare II, 74 F.3d at 640).

On the other hand, an “episodic acts or omissions” case occurs “where the complained-of harm is a particular act or omission of one or more officials,” and these cases are “not amenable to review under the Wolfish test.” Scott, 114 F.3d at 53 (citing Hare II, 74 F.3d at 645). In an “episodic act or omissions” case, “an actor usually is interposed between the detainee and the municipality, such that the detainee complains first of a particular act of, or omission by, the actor and then points derivatively to a policy, custom, or rule (or lack thereof) of the municipality that permitted or caused the act or omission.” Scott, 114 F.3d at 53. Because the focus of the claim is one individual's misconduct, the detainee is required to prove intent—specifically, that one or more jail officials “acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to the detainee's needs.” Hare II, 74 F.3d at 648. “[T]he reasonable-relationship test employed in conditions cases is ‘functionally equivalent to’ the deliberate indifference standard employed in episodic cases.” Scott, 114 F.3d at 54 (quoting Hare II, 74 F.3d at 646).

With respect to the claims against Givens in his individual capacity, the Court concludes they are more appropriately characterized as the Plaintiffs faulting Givens for his acts or omissions and pointing derivatively to the suicide prevention policy as permitting or causing these acts or omissions. In other words, these claims are based on the “episodic acts or omissions” of Givens, and the Court applies the deliberate indifference standard. Concerning the claims against Sheriff Mills in his official capacity and Gillespie County, however, the Court concludes they are more appropriately characterized as a constitutional attack on the jail's suicide prevention policy and rules, and the general conditions they created during Schroeder's pretrial confinement. In other words, these claims are based on “conditions of confinement,” and the Court applies the Wolfish test. The claims against Mills in his official capacity and the county are addressed below in Parts II(C)-(D).

Having established this case is an “episodic acts or omissions” case with respect to the claims against Givens, the Court returns to the question of whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of Schroeder's suicide. “[A]t least since 1989, it has been clearly established that officials will only be liable for episodic acts or omissions resulting in the violation of a detainee's clearly established constitutional rights if they ‘had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with deliberate indifference to that risk.’ ” Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff's Dep't, 228 F.3d 388, 393–94 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Hare II, 74 F.3d at 650). Therefore, the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of Schroeder's suicide.

The next question then becomes whether Givens's conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of that then clearly established law. In other words, the Court must hold Givens to the standard of subjective deliberate indifference in determining whether his conduct was objectively reasonable. See Hare III, 135 F.3d at 327. The Fifth Circuit explained “the somewhat confusing relationship” between the deliberate indifference and objective reasonableness standards as follows:

... for [an] appeal on qualified immunity, the subjective deliberate indifference standard serves only to demonstrate the clearly established law in effect at the time of the incident.... And under that standard—the minimum standard not to be deliberately indifferent—the actions of the individual defendants are examined to determine whether, as a matter of law, they were objectively unreasonable.

Jacobs, 228 F.3d at 394 (quoting Hare III, 135 F.3d at 328).

To understand whether Givens's conduct was objectively unreasonable when applied against the deliberate indifference standard, the Court must first outline what it means to be deliberately indifferent. “ ‘Deliberate indifference encompasses only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’ ” Tamez v. Manthey, 589 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir.2009) (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir.1997)). To show subjective deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs must present evidence: (1) Givens had subjective knowledge of “facts from which an inference of substantial risk of serious harm could be drawn,” (2) Givens drew that inference, and (3) Givens's response to the risk indicates he “subjectively intended the harm...