Estate of Silsby v. Roberts

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ESTATE OF CHARLES D. SILSBY, Plaintiff, v. JARROD ROBERTS, in his individual capacity; DAVID BUSS, in his individual capacity; LT. BALTICE, in his individual capacity; and, WARDEN CASEY HAMILTON, in his official capacity, Defendants.

No. 23-cv-103-GLJ

United States District Court, E.D. Oklahoma

June 16, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

GERALD L. JACKSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff the Estate of Charles D. Silsby (“Plaintiff”) deceased, filed this civil rights action against Defendants Jarrod Roberts (“Roberts”), David Buss (“Buss”) and Lt. Baltice (“Baltice”) in their individual capacities, and Warden Casey Hamilton (“Hamilton”) in his official capacity, arising out of Silsby's incarceration that ended upon his death. Plaintiff alleges Eighth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss these claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 18] should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Background and Procedural History

Plaintiff alleges that Silsby was an inmate of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections at Jess Dunn Correctional Center in Taft Oklahoma until his death on March 18, 2021. Docket No. 2, pp 1-2, 4, ¶¶ 3, 21. Plaintiff further alleges that Silsby received a colonoscopy during his incarceration, which led to him suffering a perforated bowel. Docket No. 2, p. 4 ¶¶ 21-22. As a result, Silsby experienced “extreme pain, discomfort, GI bleeding, massive hematemesis, bloody stools, and the inability to even walk.” Docket No. 2, p. 5, ¶ 27. Plaintiff contends Silsby informed Defendants Roberts, Buss, and Baltice (collectively, “Defendants”) and his fellow inmate, Dennis Boone (“Boone”), of his pain and symptoms. Docket No. 2, pp. 4-5, ¶¶ 23-24. After a week of not receiving care, Silsby was transported to Saint Francis Hospital in Muskogee where he presented in cardiac arrest and ultimately died. Docket No. 2, p. 5, ¶¶ 27, 29-30.

Plaintiff filed the present case in this Court on March 20, 2023. See Docket Nos. 12. On April 13, 2023, Defendants and Hamilton filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Docket No. 18. The motion is now fully briefed, and the Court has stayed all attendant deadlines in this case pending resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff alleges three causes of action in the Complaint. The first two are raised pursuant to § 1983 as violations of the Eighth Amendment: (i) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as to Defendants in their individual capacities; and (ii) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as to Hamilton in his official capacity. See Docket No. 2, pp. 2-4. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges a third and separate cause of action as to Defendants for punitive damages. See Docket No. 2, pp. 8-9. All Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 18], asserting (i) that Hamilton is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and (ii) that Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim as to Defendants, and that they are also entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff concedes that the claim against Hamilton in his official capacity should be dismissed. See Docket No. 22, p. 5. The Court agrees, see Babakr v. Goerdel, 2021 WL 736323 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2021) (“The defendants argue the plaintiff's § 1983 and state law claims are subject to dismissal as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The plaintiff concedes this argument as to KU. Thus, the defendant KU is entitled to dismissal from Counts III through XII.”), and Count II is therefore dismissed. The Court now addresses the remaining claims in turn.

Analysis

Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to state a claim to relief for its Eighth Amendment claim (Count I), and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff maintains that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity and that the Motion to Dismiss should be denied because it alleges sufficient facts regarding delay of medical care. The Court finds Plaintiff plausibly states a claim to relief against these Defendants and that they are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage.

I. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard of Review

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Practically, this means that the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on its face when the complaint “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “In considering whether the complaint's allegations are sufficient, the court first eliminates conclusory allegations, mere ‘labels and conclusions,' and any ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'” Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 606 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “The court then accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations and considers ‘whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting VDARE Found. v. City of Colorado Springs, 11 F.4th 1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 2021)).

“When reviewing a 12(b)(6) dismissal, the court ‘must determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.'” Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 1194, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007)). “While the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that Plaintiff establish a prima facie case in her complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action help to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012). Therefore, this Court's analysis begins with a discussion of the elements Plaintiff must plausibly allege in his complaint for an Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II. Qualified Immunity

In addition to alleging failure to state a claim, Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Specifically, it is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). While Twombly “rejects a heightened pleading standard[,]” Robbins v. Okla., 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008), “[t]he Twombly standard may have greater bite in such contexts, appropriately reflecting the special interest in resolving the affirmative defense of qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage of a litigation.” Acosta v. Jani-King of Okla., Inc., 905 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249). “Iqbal reinforced our earlier statement that in a § 1983 action it is particularly important that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted).

Thus, to make out a viable Eighth Amendment claim and to overcome the assertion of qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that “(1) [each] defendant violated his constitutional rights; and (2) the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Walker v. Mohiuddin, 947 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2020); see also Hemry v. Ross, 62 F.4th 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2023) (same); Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2013) (same). “When qualified immunity is asserted in the context of a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint are assumed to be true, and the court's analysis generally aligns with the analysis applied with determining the sufficiency of a claim.” Harper v. Woodward Cnty. Bd. Of Cnty. Commrs, 2014 WL 7399367, *8 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 29, 2014) (citing Brown, 662 F.3d at 1162-1164 and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666, 673-675, 677-684). This means that, even at the dismissal stage, Plaintiff bears the burden of showing he has alleged a constitutional violation that was clearly established. See Bledsoe, 2022 WL 16942631, *21 n.25 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 2022) (slip op.) (“Appellants are correct that once they asserted qualified immunity in the district court, which they did here, it was Bledsoe's burden to show both that he had alleged a constitutional violation and that that violation was clearly established.”) (citing Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1245 (10th Cir. 2015)). When conducting its analysis, the court has discretion in deciding which component to address first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Here, the Court will first address whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a constitutional violation.

A. Constitutional Violation: Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated Silsby's Eighth Amendment rights. Docket No. 2, p. 7, ¶ 37. To make out a viable Eighth Amendment violation claim, Plaintiff must “allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to...