Estate of Silva v. City of San Diego

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THE ESTATE OF PAUL SILVA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:18-cv-2282-L-MSB

United States District Court, S.D. California

May 22, 2023

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

[ECF NO. 242]

HON M JAMES LORENZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 of Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant City of San Diego's Summary Judgment Motion. Plaintiffs seek limited reconsideration as to claims based on Defendant Officer Murrow's conduct including the Bane Act claim Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) claims, and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim. (Mot. at 1 [ECF No. 242-1.])

I. BACKGROUND

The Court incorporates the statement of facts as contained in the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant City of San Diego's Summary Judgment Motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A “court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a).

Rule 60(b) provides:

On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed.R. Civ.P. 60(b).

“A court's power to vacate judgments under Rule 60(b) in order ‘to accomplish justice' is balanced against ‘the strong public interest in the timeliness and finality of judgments.'” Martinez v. Shinn, 33 F.4th 1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 2022).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Bane Act Claim

“The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, 1987 Cal. Stat. 4544, was enacted in 1987 to address hate crimes.” Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9^th Cir. 2018). Under the Bane Act, a plaintiff may be awarded damages, injunctive relief, and other “appropriate equitable relief” against a person or persons who “interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured” by federal or state law or the United States or California constitutions. Cal. Civ. Code. § 52.1. To plead a Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant interfered with his or her constitutional or statutory rights and that the interference was accompanied by actual or attempted threats, intimidation, or coercion. Id. “[S]section 52.1 does not require a showing of ‘threats, intimidation and coercion' separate from an underlying constitutional violation.” Reese, 888 F.3d at 1042. “Any arrest without probable cause involves coercion, and where accompanied by evidence of specific intent to violate the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights, such an arrest may provide the basis for a Bane Act claim.” Schmid v. City and County of San Francisco, 60 Cal.App.5^th 470, 483 (Cal.Ct. Ap. 4^th 2021).

Plaintiffs contend that the Bane Act claim was improperly dismissed because this Court's determination that Officer Murrow did not have probable cause to arrest Silva is sufficient to show coercion for purposes of the Bane Act. (Mot. at 1). They further contend that Officer Murrow acted with deliberate indifference which satisfies the specific intent requirement for a Bane Act claim. (Id. at 2).

In its Order denying summary adjudication as to Plaintiff's Bane Act claim, the Court held “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Murrow, who made the arrest, a reasonable jury could find that Officer Murrow did not have probable cause to arrest Silva for being under the influence of methamphetamine.” (Ord. MSJ at 12 [ECF No. 240.]) In light of the Court's finding that Officer Murrow did not have probable cause for the arrest, the arrest necessarily involved coercion sufficient to provide the basis for a Bane Act Claim. See Schmid, 60 Cal.App.5^th at 483. However, as discussed in detail below in Section III.C, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference, therefore the necessary element of specific intent is not satisfied. See Luttrell v. Hart, 2020 WL 5642613, *5 (N.D. Cal. 2020)(“As to the question of the specific intent inquiry, if a plaintiff adequately pleads a claim for deliberate indifference, which requires a pleading of reckless disregard, then he has sufficiently alleged the intent required for the Bane Act claim.) Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration on this claim.

B. Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act Claim

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Under both Title II of the ADA and the RA, discrimination on the basis of disability by state or local governments or their instrumentalities is prohibited but the RA applies specifically to programs receiving federal funding. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). Public entities are vicariously liable for the acts of their employees under both acts. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1141 (9th Cir.2001). “There is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n. 11 (9th Cir.1999). As a result, courts apply the same analysis to claims under both statutes.

Two types of ADA claims are applicable to arrests:

(1) wrongful arrest, where police wrongly arrest someone with a disability because they misperceive the effects of that disability as criminal activity; and (2) reasonable accommodation, where, although police properly investigate and arrest a person with a disability for a crime unrelated to that disability, they fail to reasonably accommodate the person's disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees.

Sheehan v. City and County of San Francsico, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9^th Cir. 2014) (rev'd on other grounds City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015).

Plaintiffs argue that the Court omitted any discussion of Plaintiffs' wrongful arrest claim under the ADA despite finding all the necessary elements pursuant to Orr v. California Highway Patrol, 2015 WL 848553, at *17 (E.D.Cal. Feb 26, 2015). (Mot. at 5). Plaintiffs further contend that Defendants did not meet their burden under the ADA to show that accommodation was not feasible. (Id. at 6). In addition, Plaintiffs claim that Officer Murrow acted with deliberate indifference by choosing not to transport Silva to a hospital. (Id.)

1. Wrongful Arrest

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs do not specifically assert that Silva was wrongfully arrested under the ADA but instead argue that SDPD “assumed Paul's symptoms of schizophrenia were symptoms of drug use” and administered field sobriety tests which a schizophrenic patient cannot pass despite being aware that the call was for “5150” indicating a mental health crisis. (FAC at ¶ 384). In addition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Silva's serious medical condition and failed to communicate his condition. (Id. at ¶ 388). As a result of these actions, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. In their Opposition to City Defendants summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs more fully address this claim and assert that Silva was wrongfully arrested under the ADA because:

Defendants knew from their training that psychiatric conditions may mimic drug use or impairment. Officers are trained to “determine whether the impairment is drug or medically related.” People with psychiatric disabilities “may be acting in a ‘bizarre' manner simply because they are not taking their medication. The DRE training manual itself informs officers that the DRE exam protocol is not very accurate in determining stimulant intoxication, effective only in 33 percent of the time. Paul was arrested because he spoke rapidly; had disorganized thought; was sweating as a result of wearing layers of winter clothes in hot weather; and because he had bad hygiene having been out all night on the streets getting into neighbors' garbage. These are all symptoms and indicators of mental illness as illustrated by the previous incident in which the PERT officers took Paul in for evaluations under 5150 for exhibiting these same symptoms.

(Oppo. at 31-32 [ECF No. 225].)

In light of these facts, Plaintiffs argue that ...