Estela v. Bristol Hosp., Inc.

179 Conn.App. 196

180 A.3d 595

Jose ESTELA

v.BRISTOL HOSPITAL, INC.

AC 38813

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 18, 2017

Officially released January 9, 2018

Joseph B. Burns, with whom, on the brief, was Pamela A. LeBlanc, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Holly L. Cini, with whom were Sara R. Simeonidis and, on the brief, Jillian R. Orticelli, for the appellee (defendant).

Lavine, Keller and Harper, Js.

HARPER, J.

This appeal is the latest installment in a long and protracted litigation between the parties. The plaintiff, Jose Estela, a physician, appeals from the trial court's judgment that his case could not be maintained under the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52–592(a),¹ because his first action against the defendant, Bristol Hospital, Inc., was dismissed for "serious disciplinary reasons" and not as a matter of form. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the defendant waived the right to challenge the applicability of § 52–592(a) ; (2) the court incorporated a different and higher standard into its decision and thus deprived him of his rights under Ruddock v. Burrowes , 243 Conn. 569, 706 A.2d 967 (1998), by limiting the § 52–592(a) hearing to the standard set forth in General Statutes § 52–212 ; (3) his alleged discovery noncompliance occurred in circumstances such as mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect; and (4) § 52–592(a) applies to any judgment of nonsuit.² We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant procedural history is as follows. Prior to commencing the present action, the plaintiff commenced his first action, Estela v. Bristol Hospital, Inc ., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV–11–6013260–S (Estela I ), on November 3, 2011, alleging that the defendant improperly had restricted his hospital privileges and engaged in anticompetitive behavior by stealing his patients. The complaint set forth causes of action for tortious interference with business expectancies, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contractual relations, and defamation. As the court in the present action, Young, J ., noted, Estela I "was heavily litigated, with well over 100 filings before it was ultimately terminated by the court, Swienton, J ., [on October 28, 2013] for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the court's deadlines [set forth in two court orders]."

On November 1, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for reargument or reconsideration of the entry of nonsuit, which the court in Estela I denied on November 18, 2013. The plaintiff then filed a motion to open the nonsuit on November 27, 2013, which the court denied on

December 16, 2013. On January 7, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration or reargument of the denial of the motion to open, which the court denied on January 21, 2014.

On February 10, 2014, the plaintiff appealed from the judgment denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to open. This court dismissed the appeal as moot because the plaintiff did not "challenge the court's finding that he failed to show that he was prevented from prosecuting his action because of mistake, accident, or other reasonable cause"; Estela v. Bristol Hospital, Inc ., 165 Conn. App. 100, 107, 138 A.3d 1042, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 904, 150 A.3d 681 (2016) ; which prevented this court from affording him practical relief, even if the plaintiff's claims were resolved in his favor. Id., at 108, 138 A.3d 1042.

Prior to the resolution of the plaintiff's appeal from the judgment rendered in Estela I , on October 24, 2014, the plaintiff commenced the present action, which was essentially identical to Estela I , relying on § 52–592(a), in avoidance of any claim that his causes of action would be time barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.³ On December 16, 2014, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In its memorandum of law in support of the motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued, in relevant part, that the applicable statutes of limitations barred the plaintiff's claims and assumed that the plaintiff was relying on the savings provisions of § 52–592(a), though the defendant did not explicitly challenge the applicability of the statute.

On February 26, 2015, prior to the plaintiff's filing an objection to the motion for summary judgment or action by the court, the defendant filed a motion for an order to bifurcate the trial, pursuant to General Statutes § 52–205⁴ and Practice Book § 15–1,⁵ to try the plaintiff's claim that his action was not time barred due to § 52–592(a) separately from the merits of the underlying tort and breach of contract claims. On March 12, 2015, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion for an order to bifurcate on the grounds that on multiple occasions the defendant had waived its right to challenge the applicability of § 52–592(a) and was estopped from doing so by way of a motion to bifurcate. No immediate action was taken on the defendant's motion to bifurcate or the plaintiff's objection.

On June 23, 2015, the court overruled the plaintiff's objection to the defendant's motion for an order to bifurcate and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether § 52–592(a) applies to the plaintiff's case. The evidentiary hearing took place on August 3, 2015. At the court's request, the parties filed posthearing briefs on August 10, 2015. On August 17, 2015, the court determined that, under the applicable analysis set forth in Ruddock v. Burrowes , supra, 243 Conn. at 569, 706 A.2d 967, § 52–592(a) did not apply to the plaintiff's case because "Estela

I was not dismissed as a matter of form ...." The court found that "[because Estela I ] was terminated for serious disciplinary reasons and not because of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect ... the viability of this action cannot be based upon ... [ § 52–592(a) ]." This appeal followed.⁶ Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

We first address the plaintiff's claim that the defendant waived its right to challenge the applicability of § 52–592 (a) by failing to raise the statute of limitations as a special defense, in a motion to dismiss, or in its motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff further claims that a motion to bifurcate was the improper vehicle to challenge the applicability of § 52–592(a). We disagree.

Absent § 52–592(a), the causes of action set forth in the plaintiff's complaint in the present case were time barred by the applicable statutes of limitations in General Statutes §§ 52–577⁷ and 52–597, which the defendant asserted, contrary to the plaintiff's claim, in its December 16, 2014 memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judgment.⁸ " Section 52–592(a) allows a plaintiff to commence a new action for the same cause, within one year, if the original action failed to be tried on its merits ... for any matter of form .... Deemed a saving statute, § 52–592 enables plaintiffs to bring anew causes of action despite the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vestuti v. Miller , 124 Conn. App. 138, 143, 3 A.3d 1046 (2010).

"Pursuant to ... § 52–205 and Practice Book § 15–1, the trial court may order that one or more issues that are joined be tried before the others. The interests served by bifurcated trials are convenience, negation of prejudice and judicial efficiency. ... Bifurcation may be appropriate in cases in which litigation of one issue may obviate the need to litigate another issue. ... The bifurcation of trial proceedings lies solely within the discretion of the trial court." (Footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dumas v. Mena , 82 Conn. App. 61, 64, 842 A.2d 618 (2004). Because "[b]ifurcation of trial proceedings lies solely within the discretion of the trial court ... appellate review is limited to a determination of whether that discretion has been abused." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Shea v. Mignone , 50 Conn. App. 577, 582, 719 A.2d 1176, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 941, 723 A.2d 319 (1998). "In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 583, 719 A.2d 1176. "[T]he ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Saczynski v. Saczynski , 109 Conn. App. 426, 428, 951 A.2d 670 (2008).

Our precedent demonstrates that the question of whether § 52–592(a) applies may be addressed through a motion for an order to bifurcate. In

Plante v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital , 300 Conn. 33, 40–41, 12 A.3d 885 (2011),⁹ the applicability of § 52–592(a) initially was challenged in a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, both of which were denied by the trial court. Thereafter, "[f]ollowing discovery and numerous revisions to the operative complaint, the trial court ... granted the hospital defendants' motion pursuant to General Statutes § 52–206 and Practice Book § 15–1 to bifurcate the proceedings, and to try the claim that the action was saved by § 52–592(a) separately from the malpractice claims." Id., at 41, 12 A.3d 885. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the court's determination that § 52–592 (a) did not save the plaintiff's action. Id., at 39, 12 A.3d 885.

Similarly here, the defendant's first response to the plaintiff's complaint was to file a motion for summary judgment, in which it argued that the applicable statutes of limitations barred the plaintiff's claims.¹⁰ The court never rendered a decision on the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the defendant filed a motion for an order to bifurcate the trial to determine whether § 52–592(a) saved the plaintiff's case. The court determined that the question of...