Estrada v. Smart

107 F.4th 1254

Brian ESTRADA, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Jacob SMART, Defendant - Appellee.

No. 23-1189

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

FILED July 16, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-00549-WJM-STV)

Nicole L. Masiello (Robert Reeves Anderson, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Denver, Colorado, and Andrew T. Tutt, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, DC, with her on the briefs), Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, New York, New York, for Appellant.

Abigail L. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Philip J. Weiser, Colorado Attorney General, with her on the brief), Colorado Department of Law, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee.

Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.

FEDERICO, Circuit Judge.

When Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") in 1996, it declared that "[w]hat this country needs . . . is fewer and better prisoner suits." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). The PLRA elevated mandatory administrative exhaustion to its current height in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a) states: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added).

Section 1997e(a) requires a prisoner to exhaust all available administrative remedies "prior to filing a lawsuit regarding prison conditions in federal court." Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing § 1997e(a)). Exhaustion under the PLRA is "mandatory" and "unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court." Jones, 549 U.S. at 211, 127 S.Ct. 910 (citing Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002)).

In May 2018, Plaintiff Brian Estrada was a prisoner confined in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections ("CDOC"). While attempting to escape a Colorado county courthouse, he was shot three times by Defendant Jacob Smart, a CDOC officer. Estrada later sued Smart under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged excessive force, but the district court granted Smart's summary judgment motion. It concluded that Estrada had failed to exhaust all available CDOC administrative remedies by not following CDOC's three-step grievance process.

Final judgment was entered, and Estrada timely appealed, so we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Estrada now argues that a county courthouse is not a CDOC prison, so his lawsuit is not "with respect to prison conditions" under the PLRA. He also claims the CDOC grievance procedures apply only to CDOC prisons, so his claim is outside the scope of when and where they apply.

Having considered the record, briefing, and oral argument in full, we affirm the entry of summary judgment. In this PLRA case, geography is not the controlling factor. Instead, as the district court correctly determined, the PLRA and CDOC's grievance procedures both applied to the shooting of a CDOC inmate by a CDOC officer.

I

In May 2018, Estrada was an inmate of CDOC. That month, CDOC transported him to the Logan County Courthouse in northeastern Colorado for a hearing in a pending criminal case. While in the jury box of a courtroom on the second floor, Estrada attempted to escape. His hands and ankles were shackled to his waist, so he could only shuffle across the floor. During Estrada's shuffle across the courtroom, he was shot three times by Smart, a CDOC officer, who was posted in the courtroom and in charge of guarding Estrada. No other officer in the courtroom had reached for their gun. Estrada was unarmed.

Estrada survived being shot and returned to custody as a CDOC inmate. In 2020, while in CDOC custody, he sued Smart, in his personal capacity, in federal district court in Colorado. His complaint alleged a single claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment under § 1983.

After Estrada filed his First Amended Complaint, Smart moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) based on qualified immunity. The district court denied that motion, ruling that Smart "should have been on notice that use of deadly force on an unarmed prisoner restrained in the manner as was Plaintiff would violate Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free of the use of excessive force[.]" Aplt. App'x at 79-80.

The case then entered the discovery phase. Beyond Estrada's deposition, it is unclear whether any other depositions occurred. The parties cite to no depositions in the record, nor do they mention written discovery.

After discovery concluded, Smart filed a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 based on his affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Estrada was a CDOC inmate at the time of the shooting and when he filed suit, yet he did not pursue CDOC's three-step grievance process regarding the courthouse shooting.

In support of the summary judgment motion, Smart introduced the following evidence: (1) a declaration from Anthony DeCesaro (the "DeCesaro Declaration"), a CDOC Step 3 Grievance Officer with personal knowledge about Estrada's grievance filings and the scope of the CDOC's grievance procedures; (2) CDOC Administrative Regulation ("AR") 850-04; and (3) portions of Estrada's deposition testimony.

As described by Estrada in his Opening Brief, the DeCesaro Declaration "appended a complete copy of the operative administrative regulation governing grievances, and the regulation in effect at the time this suit was filed." Aplt. Br. at 15 (citations omitted). The DeCesaro Declaration detailed CDOC's "formalized three-step grievance process for inmates set forth in Administrative Regulation ('AR') 850-04." Aplt. App'x at 116.

At summary judgment, Estrada disputed only the scope of AR 850-04. He argued it did not apply to the courthouse shooting, as he pointed out that the Logan County Courthouse is not a CDOC facility.

As to the scope of the administrative regulation, both sides focused on AR 850-04(IV)(D)(1), which states that the CDOC grievance procedures cover "a broad range of complaints including, but not limited to: policies, conditions, and incidents within the facility that affect the offender personally; actions by employees and offenders and for resolving offender issues relating to health care concerns." Id. at 123.

Smart also showed that other language in AR 850-04 supported his interpretation. He pointed to AR 850-04(IV)(D)(2), which lists several exclusions for which CDOC's grievance procedures do not apply; it states that "[t]his grievance procedure may not be used to seek review" of the excluded topics listed. Id. Yet incidents external to a CDOC facility, including a courthouse, are not part of this exclusions list. Id.

DeCesaro next declared: "Inmates may also file grievances regarding incidents that occur outside of the facility while they are in the custody of the CDOC, such as during transport to court appearances or medical visits." Aplt. App'x at 117 (citing AR 850-04(IV)(D)(1)-(2)). AR 850-04 supports this statement because it says the CDOC grievance procedures are available "to offenders sentenced to the [C]DOC. This includes [C]DOC offenders housed in private facilities and offenders who have been released to parole, community, or ISP supervision." Aplt. App'x at 121 (AR 850-04(IV)(A)(2)); see also Aplt. App'x at 117 (DeCesaro Declaration, at ¶ 10) (citing AR 850-04(IV)(A)(2)).

DeCesaro further established that Estrada had filed three grievances on unrelated topics in the year following the shooting, which ranged from May 1, 2018, to May 30, 2019. Thus, the CDOC grievance system was "available" to Estrada, and he utilized it three times in the year following the courthouse shooting. But, as DeCesaro established, Estrada did not file a grievance for the courthouse shooting.

By introducing the DeCesaro Declaration and attachments, Smart met his burden of proof on his affirmative defense. He established that Estrada failed to exhaust the available CDOC administrative remedies, while simultaneously filing three grievances on unrelated topics.

At this point, the summary judgment burden shifted to Estrada, the nonmovant, to show that the CDOC regulations did not apply or were not available. To survive summary judgment, Estrada needed to offer evidence. But he provided only bare allegations and legal arguments made by his counsel about the scope of AR 850-04. And he did not make the definitional challenges to the PLRA that he now raises on appeal. Estrada failed to attach or cite any evidence or deposition testimony (for example, deposition testimony from DeCesaro or a Federal Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of CDOC); his response included as exhibits only an inmate orientation video and handbook from a CDOC facility. He failed to establish the factual or legal significance of either exhibit. Nor did he offer his own declaration or deposition testimony to describe what he received from CDOC regarding the grievance procedures, when he received it, where he received it, from whom he received it, or anything else. Indeed, in support of his argument before the district court, Estrada effectively provided no summary judgment evidence.

The district court granted the motion for summary judgment without holding an evidentiary hearing. It ruled that both the PLRA and CDOC's three-step grievance procedures applied to the May 2018 courthouse shooting, and that Estrada failed to exhaust CDOC's available administrative remedies.

On appeal, Estrada argues the May 2018 courthouse shooting is beyond the scope of both the PLRA, generally, and the CDOC's specific three-step grievance process. According to Estrada, a courthouse is not a prison, so his claim about the courthouse shooting is not "with respect to prison conditions," as the scope of § 1997e(a) requires.

II

"We review de novo the district court's finding...