Estrella v. Damiani

ROBERT ESTRELLA, as the Executor of the Estate of Armando Damiani and the Executor of the Estate of Lillian Estrella, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL DAMIANI; NAVIGANT CREDIT UNION; STEVEN DAMIANI; RICHARD A. RANONE; and JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT LLC, Defendants.

C. A. No. PC-2017-5227

Superior Court of Rhode Island, Providence

February 13, 2020

For Plaintiff: Thomas L. Mirza, Esq.

For Defendant: Michael Marino, Esq.; Melissa L. Curley, Esq. Richard G. Fallago, Esq.; Lauren E. Jones, Esq.; Paul D Ragosta, Esq.

For Interested Party: Kristin B. Pettey, Esq., Tanya M. Gravel Esq.

DECISION

STERN J.

Before the Court are various post-trial motions: Defendants Janney Montgomery Scott LLC (Janney) and Richard A. Ranone's (Ranone) (collectively, Defendants) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (Rule 59(e)), Motion for a New Trial and Alternative Request for Remittitur pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 59(a) (Rule 59(a)), and Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (Rule 50(b)); Defendant Steven Damiani's (Steven) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), and Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Rule 50(b); and Plaintiff Robert Estrella's (Plaintiff), as the Executor of the Estate of Armando Damiani (Mandy) and the Executor of the Estate of Lillian Estrella (Lillian), Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) and Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 6-13.1-5.2(d). The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 9-30-1, 8-2-13, and 8-2-14.

I Facts and Travel

The facts of this case are fully set forth in this Court's January 9, 2019 decision and incorporated by reference herein. See Estrella v. Damiani, et al., No. PC-2017-5227, Jan. 9, 2019, Stern J. (TRO Dec.). Accordingly, the facts of this case will be set forth only to the extent necessary to resolve the present motions.

Following a five-day jury trial, a verdict returned for the Plaintiff on March 12, 2019, finding that 1) Mandy intended to open an account with Janney, Am. Verdict Form (question 1); 2) Mandy did not intend to designate Steven as the transfer-on-death (TOD) beneficiary on the TOD-1 or the TOD-2, Am. Verdict Form (question 2); and 3) awarding compensatory and punitive damages to Mandy's Estate and Lillian's Estate on various claims, Am. Verdict Form (questions 3-10). Thereafter, on June 7, 2019, this Court entered a declaratory judgment finding that Mandy properly opened a TOD account with Janney (the Janney Account), that both TODs designating Steven as the beneficiary were invalid and unenforceable, and that therefore certain disputed funds (Disputed Funds) belonged to Mandy's Estate (the Declaratory Judgment). See Estrella v. Damiani, et al., No. PC-2017-5227, June 7, 2019, Stern, J. (Decl. J. Dec.). On July 17, 2019, judgment entered, awarding $2, 241, 909.46 in compensatory damages and $2, 241, 909.46 in punitive damages to the Plaintiff, along with statutory interest (the Judgment).

The parties timely filed post-trial motions which were accompanied by memoranda. The parties also filed objections and reply memoranda. On December 16, 2019, the Court heard from both parties. After considering the written and oral arguments, the Court now decides the post-trial motions.

II Analysis

A

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

Standard of Review

It is well settled that "[a] trial justice may review his or her own decision after a nonjury trial in a civil matter 'only if [he or she] found a manifest error of law in the judgment entered or if there was newly discovered evidence but unavailable at the original trial and sufficiently important to warrant a new trial.'" Bogosian v Bederman, 823 A.2d 1117, 1119 (R.I. 2003) (quoting American Federation of Teachers Local 2012 v. Rhode Island Board of Regents for Education, 477 A.2d 104 105-06 (R.I. 1984)). "[A] manifest error of law in a judgment would be one that is apparent, blatant, conspicuous, clearly evident, and easily discernible from a reading of the judgment document itself." American Federation of Teachers Local 2012, 477 A.2d at 106. In this case, the Judgment was entered based on the jury's Amended Verdict Form and the Court's Declaratory Judgment. Accordingly, this Court can consider the cross-motions to alter or amend the Judgment based on its Declaratory Judgment, which was rendered without the jury.

Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

Plaintiff moves to alter or amend the Declaratory Judgment, arguing that it is inconsistent with the evidence and fails to do substantial justice between the parties. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the jury necessarily concluded that Lillian was Mandy's intended beneficiary and that but for the Defendants' wrongdoing, Lillian would have been designated as the TOD beneficiary on the Janney Account. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks amendment of the Judgment to find that the Disputed Funds belong to Lillian's Estate. Defendants object, arguing that the jury did not make a finding that the Disputed Funds belonged to Lillian's Estate and that the Plaintiff improperly speculates what the jury may have found on questions it was not asked.

This Court's Declaratory Judgment finding that the Disputed Funds were part of Mandy's Estate was informed by the jury's findings that Mandy intended to open the Janney Account and did not intend to designate Steven as the TOD beneficiary. See Am. Verdict Form (questions 1-2). The jury was not asked whether Lillian was the intended TOD beneficiary, and this Court will not infer jury findings where none were made. See Jolicoeur Furniture Co., Inc. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740, 754 (R.I. 1995) (reversing trial justice's decision to amend judgment where trial justice assumed the jury made certain conclusions, but those conclusions were not discernable from the verdict). Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no manifest error that would warrant alteration or amendment of the Judgment, and Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is denied.

Defendants' Motions to Alter or Amend Judgment

Defendants also move to alter or amend the Judgment, arguing that the compensatory damages awarded by the jury are not based on the evidence; the damages awarded to Lillian must be vacated because the Court adjudged that the Disputed Funds were not assets of Lillian's Estate; and the punitive damages awarded in the absence of compensatory damages are not supported by evidence and/or are patently excessive. Plaintiff objects, arguing that the jury's findings as to liability should not be disturbed because the jury scrutinized each claim and was not confused as to liability.^[1]

a Conversion

Defendants first argue that neither Lillian's Estate nor Mandy's Estate had a claim for conversion. First, Defendants assert that Lillian's Estate could not meet the element of conversion requiring Lillian to be in possession or entitled to possession of the Disputed Funds because the Disputed Funds were not part of Lillian's Estate. To prevail on a claim for conversion, a plaintiff "must establish that [he or] she was in possession of the personalty, or entitled to possession of the personalty, at the time of the conversion." Montecalvo v. Mandarelli, 682 A.2d 918, 928 (R.I. 1996). Here, the Judgment states that "the Disputed Funds are an asset of Mandy's estate." J. 2. Accordingly, the jury's finding for Lillian's Estate on the conversion claim is clearly erroneous from the face of the Judgment because Lillian's Estate was never in possession of, or entitled to possession of, the Disputed Funds.

Defendants next assert that Mandy's Estate could not meet the element of conversion requiring that another exercised dominion and control inconsistent with Mandy's right to possession because Ranone held the funds as an agent of Mandy and did not have possession of the Disputed Funds without Mandy's consent. While it is true that "the gravamen of an action for conversion lies in the defendant's taking the plaintiff's personalty without consent and exercising dominion over it inconsistent with the plaintiff's right to possession," Narragansett Electric Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 97 (R.I. 2006) nothing in the Judgment reflects that Ranone was an agent of Mandy's and held the Disputed Funds with Mandy's consent.

Moreover the Court's Declaratory Judgment specifically found that both the TOD-1 and the TOD-2 were void. As to the TOD-1, the Court found that Ranone's testimony of an alleged phone call with Mandy on February 1, 2016-"whereby Mandy instructed Ranone to insert Steven's name into the blank space on the TOD-1," Decl. J. Dec. at 9-was not credible and that Ranone violated Janney policy by allowing Mandy to sign the blank TOD-1 without a notary present. Id. at 10. Furthermore, the Court relied on the jury's finding that Mandy did not intend to designate Steven as his TOD-1 beneficiary. Id. (citing Am. Verdict Form (question 2)). As to the TOD-2, the Court found it to be void and unenforceable due to undue influence. See id. at 10-15. The Court based this finding on the relationship of trust and confidence between Mandy and Ranone, Mandy's reduced physical and mental state which rendered him susceptible to undue influence, and circumstantial evidence of Ranone pressuring Mandy to sign the TOD-2. See id. Because the Court found that both the TOD-1 and the TOD-2 were void, the March 2016 statement of Steven's Janney account-showing that Steven received $1, 566, 909.46-supports a finding that Steven and Ranone converted an asset of Mandy's Estate. See Pl.'s Ex. 49; see also J. 2.

Based on the foregoing, the Court alters the Judgment to vacate the finding for...