Eurton v. Thomas

1

MARK W. EURTON, JR.; and LAUREN E. WHISMAN PLAINTIFFS v. PARKER THOMAS; TYLER COVINGTON; and OLDHAM COUNTY FISCAL COURT DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-00508-GNS

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

May 23, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GREG N. STIVERS, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (DN 8). The motion is ripe for adjudication. For the outlined reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Defendants Parker Thomas (“Thomas”) and Tyler Covington (“Covington”), both officers with Oldham County Police Department (“OCPD”), conducted a welfare check on Plaintiff Mark W. Eurton, Jr. (“Eurton”), in February 2022. (Compl ¶¶ 6, 12, DN 1). At his residence, Eurton was repeatedly asked whether he intended to hurt himself, which he denied. (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16). Eurton and Thomas spoke for a time before Eurton entered his home and closed the door. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20-21). Thomas pursued Eurton, forcibly opened the door, and drew his taser Covington drew his firearm. (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23-25). Eurton was then detained. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-35).

Eurton and his wife, Lauren E. Whisman (collectively “Plaintiffs”), initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted claims against Thomas and Covington, in their individual and official capacities, and Oldham County Fiscal Court (“OCFC”) (collectively “Defendants”) for civil rights violations and state law claims. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 49-96). Defendants move to dismiss the official-capacity claims and intentional infliction of emotion distress claim against Thomas and Covington and all claims against OCFC. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, DN 8). Plaintiffs now abandon their official-capacity claims against Thomas and Covington and state-law claims against OCFC, and Defendants concede that dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim would be premature. (Pls.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 2, DN 9; Defs.' Reply Mot. Dismiss 1-2, DN 10). Accordingly, the abandoned claims will be dismissed. See Bradley v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Schs., 598 F.Supp.3d 552, 566-68 (W.D. Ky. 2022). Therefore, the sole dispute is whether the Section 1983 claims against OCFC are sufficiently pled.

II. JURISDICTION

The Court exercises subject-matter jurisdiction over this action based upon federal question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true,” but it is not required to “accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'” Tackett v. M&G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). A pleading offering only labels, formulaic recitations of a claim's elements, or generalized assertions without factual support does not meet this burden. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Facts “‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability” or that “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” are inadequate, as it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'” Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

“A municipality^[1] is a ‘person' under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and so can be held liable for constitutional injuries for which it is responsible” but “only for its own wrongdoing, not the wrongdoings of its employees.” Morgan v. Fairfield Cnty., 903 F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 620 (6th Cir. 2015)); cf. D'Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 388-89 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that a municipality cannot “be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory-in other words, ‘solely because it employs a tortfeasor.'” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691)). Thus, liability “attaches only under a narrow set of circumstances ....” Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 828 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). A Monell claim requires proof that “through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force' behind the injury alleged.” Id. (quoting Alman v. Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 903 (6th Cir. 2013)); accord Bd. of the Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (“[A] plaintiff must . . . demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.”).

To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom,^[2] (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). The existence of an illegal policy or custom may be demonstrated through “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead facts which, if taken as true, would establish one of the four methods to show an illegal policy or custom on the part of OCFC. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that OCFC “was responsible for the establishment of rules, policies, and procedures, either formally or by custom or practice, regarding employment, training, supervision and conduct of its police officers, including Defendants Thomas and Covington.” (Compl. ¶ 7). This includes OCPD Standard Operating Procedure 28.02 which “prohibits officers from making a warrantless entry into a home in a domestic violence situation without probable cause.” (Compl. ¶ 47). “Despite this [procedure], OCPD exonerated Thomas and Covington of misconduct in connection with the events” in this action. (Compl. ¶ 47). Plaintiffs do not identify who made the final determination as to any potential misconduct. Ultimately, Plaintiffs contend that OCFC “failed to institute or enforce any (or adequate) policies, customs, or practices, or to screen and/or employ qualified persons, or to properly train or supervise its officers and its employees including Thomas and Covington, or investigate thoroughly and honestly complaints by the public to prevent or remedy conditions ....” (Compl. ¶ 11). Thus, Plaintiffs have not alleged that any policy or legislative enactment was illegal.

Plaintiffs have not specifically identified an official with final decision-making authority who ratified the actions of Thomas and Covington. This ratification method requires a plaintiff to allege (1) that “an individual with policymaking authority issue[d] a final decision affirming a subordinate's decision on the merits or otherwise . . . thereby adopting it as municipal policy,” or (2) that “a policymaker fail[ed] to meaningfully investigate the [unconstitutional] acts of a subordinate.” Meyers v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 343 F.Supp.3d 714, 729 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (citations omitted); see Scott v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't, 503 F.Supp.3d 532, 53738 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (“An official acting with final decision-making authority may ratify the unconstitutional acts of its employees in two ways.”). In both circumstances, this requires specificity as to the identity of the individual policymaker.

Plaintiffs do not identify any specific policymaker who allegedly ratified Thomas' and Covington's conduct. Rather, Plaintiffs plainly allege that “OCPD exonerated Thomas and Covington of misconduct ....” (Compl. ¶ 47). This generalized claim is inadequate to properly plead such a claim. See Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447, 462 (6th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the argument that the entire police department ratified the officers' conduct when a final decisionmaker was not named and concluding that this lack of identification was “insufficient to establish the requisite degree of culpability.”).

Third Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged a policy of inadequate training or supervision. Municipalities may be liable for failure-to-train claims,^[3] but “culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citing City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-23 (1985)); see Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822 (“[T]he ‘policy' [of failing to train] . . . is far more nebulous, and a good deal further removed from the constitutional violation, than was the policy in Monell.”). “[A] plaintiff ‘must establish that: 1) the City's training program was inadequate for the tasks that officers must perform; 2) the inadequacy was the result of the City's deliberate indifference; and 3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.'” Jackson, 925 F.3d at 834 (quoting Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2006)); Hill v. McIntyre, 884 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1989); cf. Ellis ex rel....