Evans v. Civitas Educ. Partners

1

DONALD EVANS, Plaintiff, v. CIVITAS EDUCATION PARTNERS, LLC, CHICAGO CHARTER SCHOOL FOUNDATION d/b/a CHICAGO INTERNATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOLS, INC., TORRY BENNETT, AND LAHARI GOUD, Individually, Defendants.

No. 22 C 3842

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

October 9, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN T. THARP, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Donald Evans brings this claim against his former employer, its officials, and its parent company for wrongful termination tortious interference with a business relationship defamation per se, and violations of the Illinois Eavesdropping Act and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act. He claims that the defendants fired him for advocating on behalf of an employee who accused the interim CEO of racial discrimination, and for reporting alleged violations of Illinois privacy law.

Before the Court are two motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Defendant Chicago International Charter Schools, Inc. (CICS) seeks dismissal of all counts against it on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to establish its liability as a joint employer. The remaining defendants attack each of the plaintiffs five claims individually, raising a variety of purported defects.

Jurisdiction in this case is predicated on Evans' federal claim under § 1981 (Count 1). The remaining claims are premised on state law and are before the Court pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). As discussed below, however, the complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to permit the inference that Evans engaged in “protected activity”-a necessary element of a § 1981 retaliation claim. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the plaintiff's § 1981 claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The plaintiff will be given leave to amend, however, so it is prudent, for the sake of judicial efficiency, to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims to also evaluate whether they are adequately alleged.^[1] Accordingly, the Court will analyze each of the five counts in turn.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Donald Evans worked as the Director of Human Resources for Civitas Education Partners from August 2019 to April 2021. One year into his tenure, Evans became embroiled in a dispute between Dina Everage, the company's Chief Academic Officer, and Lahari Goud, the interim CEO.

Conflict began to simmer in autumn 2020. On September 30, Everage (a black woman) told Evans that she wanted to file a complaint against her boss, Goud, for racial discrimination. (The complaint does not describe what Everage alleged regarding discrimination by Goud.) As the HR Director, Evans helped Everage with her complaint. But Everage explained that she did not want to file for fear of retaliation.

Sometime later, Goud reached out to Evans, directing him to terminate Everage. Evans opposed the idea, explaining that Goud lacked cause and, in any case, had not taken remedial measures to address any performance issues. Goud apparently did not take kindly to this feedback, “constructively demot[ing]” Evans by directing him to report to Civitas' Chief Operating Officer on all future matters.

Temperatures continued to rise. On January 1, 2021, Everage decided to submit her complaint against Goud for racial discrimination. Evans interviewed Goud to investigate the allegations. Soon afterwards, Goud directed the COO to keep Evans-the Director of HR-“out of the loop” on all HR-related matters. Nevertheless, the COO explained to Evans that Goud was still demanding Everage's termination and that, if Evans did not comply, Evans' own employment would be jeopardized. Again Evans pushed back, insisting that Goud could not fire Everage without first documenting her failings and trying to remedy them.

On March 23, 2021, Goud conducted a Civitas leadership meeting over Zoom. She decided to record the meeting without the participants' consent. Some of the attendees complained to Evans the next day about the recording, prompting Evans to send Gould an email accusing Goud of violating Illinois privacy law.

Tensions reached a boiling point shortly thereafter. On April 7, 2021 Evans informed Goud and Tony Bennett, the incoming CEO set to succeed Goud, that Everage had just filed a second complaint. Goud and Bennett arranged a Zoom meeting with Evans, purportedly to discuss the allegations. Instead, the two officials informed Evans that he was being terminated, effective the next day. Goud and Bennett explained that the termination was unrelated to Evans' work product and was instead driven by a desire to ensure that the team “work[ed] better.” They also informed Evans, apparently for the first time, that the position of Director of Human Resources was being eliminated. Goud subsequently told other employees that Evans had been terminated because he “did not know what he was doing” and “was not performing his job responsibilities.”

After his discharge, Evans saw a job posting for a “Director of Talent” at Civitas. The posting described essentially the same job functions as the Director of Human Resources, so Evans decided to apply. As soon as he did, Civitas removed the job posting.

Burned, Evans brought a federal lawsuit against Bennett, Goud, his former employer Civitas, and its parent company CICS. In a five-count complaint, Evans alleged: (1) that all four defendants violated § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act by terminating him in retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination; (2) that all four defendants violated the Illinois Eavesdropping Act by surreptitiously recording a Zoom meeting without participants' consent; (3) that Bennett and Goud tortiously interfered with Evans' business relationship with the company by terminating him; (4) that all four defendants defamed Evans per se when Goud claimed he had been terminated for incompetent performance; and (5) that Civitas and CICS engaged in wrongful termination by terminating him for reporting violations of the Illinois Eavesdropping Act.

In response to Evans' complaint, the defendants filed two motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Bennett, Goud, and Civitas argued that each of Evans' five claims was either legally defective or unsupported by sufficient factual allegations in his complaint. CICS filed separately, arguing that it played no part in terminating Evans or otherwise managing personnel decisions at Civitas and thus cannot be held liable.

DISCUSSION

The defendants contend that Evans has fallen short of the minimum requirement to state a valid claim under federal pleading standards. That minimum is set by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which directs plaintiffs to articulate “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P 8(a)(2). Rule 8 does not require a plaintiff to “set forth a complete and convincing picture of the alleged wrongdoing.” Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 727 (7th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff need only allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

When evaluating whether a complaint states a valid claim, the Court construes it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2014). That said, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted), and gives no weight to allegations that consist solely of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

The defendants argue that all of Evans' claims fail as a matter of law. The Court assesses each, starting with § 1981.

Count I: Retaliation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Section 1981 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees based on race. See Lewis v. Indiana Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 759 (7th Cir. 2022) (emphasizing that “[t]he legal analysis for discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981 is largely identical”). The statute extends beyond direct victims of discrimination to also protect persons who faced retaliation for opposing discrimination against others. See CBOCS W., Inc. v Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008); see also O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011). To bring a retaliation claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she engaged in an activity protected by the statute; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Mintz v. Caterpillar Inc., 788 F.3d 673, 680-81 (7th Cir. 2015).

Section 1981 sets “a low bar” for what qualifies as protected activity. See Mattson v. Caterpillar Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 892 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff does not need to prove-or, at the pleading stage, allege-that the action she opposed constituted unlawful discrimination. Fine v. Ryan Int'l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). But the plaintiff must, at a minimum, state facts plausibly suggesting that she “reasonably believed in good faith that the practice she opposed violated” anti-discrimination law. Id. The plaintiff must also allege that she took “some step in opposition to...