Evans v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp.

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PAULINE EVANS, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, and NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION LINCOLN, Defendants.

No. 21-CV-10378 (PAE) (VF)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

August 7, 2023

HONORABLE PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, United States District Judge

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

VALERIE FIGUEREDO, United States Magistrate Judge

On December 6, 2021, Plaintiff Pauline Evans, proceeding pro se commenced this action against Defendants New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (“H+H”) and New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation Lincoln (“Lincoln Hospital”). See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff was terminated on November 1, 2021 from her position as Head Nurse at Lincoln Hospital because she failed to comply with the hospital's COVID-19 vaccination requirement for healthcare workers. Plaintiff asserts that her termination violated: (1) her right to refuse unwanted and medically unnecessary medical care (that is, her right to bodily integrity); (2) the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution; (3) the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution; and (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7). See ECF No. 40. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND^[1]

1. Factual Background^[2]

Defendant H+H is a public benefit corporation created by the New York State Legislature that operates Defendant Lincoln Hospital, a full-service medical center and teaching hospital in the Bronx. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11. Plaintiff was hired, by Lincoln Hospital on December 18, 1989, as a Nurse's Aide. Id. ¶¶ 9, 13. She subsequently rose to the position of Head Nurse and remained in that position until November 1, 2021, when her employment was terminated. Id.; see also id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff's employment was terminated because of her refusal to accept a COVID-19 vaccine. Id. ¶¶ 9, 13.

In the spring of 2020, the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, which can cause the disease COVID-19, was spreading across the globe, leading the World Health Organization to declare COVID-19 a “global pandemic.” Id. ¶¶ 23-24. In response, the United States launched “Operation Warp Speed,” a program by the federal government aimed at developing three separate COVID-19 vaccines for “emergency use.” Id. ¶ 24. On December 11, 2020, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) issued an Emergency Use Authorization (“EUA”) for the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine. Id. ¶ 26. One week later, the FDA issued an EUA for the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine. Id. ¶ 27. Both vaccines were authorized pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3, an emergency use authorization statute under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id. ¶¶ 29, 31. Other COVID-19 vaccines have since been added to the FDA's EUA list. Id. ¶ 28.

On August 26, 2021, the New York State Department of Health enacted an emergency rule requiring healthcare facilities, such as Lincoln Hospital, to ensure that their employees (including members of the medical and nursing staff) were vaccinated against COVID-19. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 2.61 (2021) (the “Vaccine Mandate”).^[3] Lincoln Hospital adopted the Vaccine Mandate, thereby “implement[ing] a mandatory [vaccination] policy as a condition for Plaintiff retaining her employment.” Compl. ¶ 34.

On September 3, 2021, Plaintiff received a notice from Lincoln Hospital, informing her of the Vaccine Mandate and instructing her that she needed to get vaccinated to remain employed at the hospital. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff responded to the notice in writing on September 7, 2021, objecting to the Vaccine Mandate “pursuant to established federal law.” Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 35; see also id. at 19-23. In her response, Plaintiff explained that the Vaccine Mandate violated her right to privacy and therefore was preempted by federal law. Id. 19-23; see also id. ¶ 35. On September 14, Plaintiff received an “advanced notice” of “relief from duty” from the Director of Human Resources for H+H. Id. at 24. The notice stated that because Plaintiff had not complied with the Vaccine Mandate, she would be “relieved from duty without pay,” effective September 27, 2021, until she complied with the vaccination requirement. Id.

On October 21, 2021, Plaintiff received a notice from H+H's Senior Vice President of Human Resources informing her that because she “remained non-compliant with the COVID-19 vaccination requirement,” she had three options: Plaintiff could get vaccinated by October 29, 2021 and return to work; she could choose to remain unvaccinated and voluntarily resign, but continue to receive health benefits through the end of her separation date (which would be no later than December 31, 2021);^[4] or she could choose to remain unvaccinated and not elect to receive the additional benefits, and her separation date from H+H would be November 1, 2021. Id. at 17; see also id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff did not respond to the notice, and on November 1, 2021, her employment was terminated. Id. ¶¶ 1, 13, 21.

2. Procedural History

Following her termination from Lincoln Hospital, Plaintiff commenced the instant action on December 6, 2021, alleging that the Vaccine Mandate violated her right to refuse unwanted and medically unnecessary medical care (i.e., her right to bodily integrity), the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. On July 25, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a motion for default judgment (ECF No. 17), which the undersigned recommended be denied in a Report and Recommendation issued on November 28, 2022 (ECF No. 37). The Honorable Paul A. Engelmayer adopted the report on January 27, 2023, denying the motion for default judgment. See ECF No. 37.

On February 16, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF Nos. 40-42. On the same day, Judge Engelmayer referred the motion to the undersigned. ECF No. 45. Plaintiff submitted her response in opposition to the motion on April 19, 2023 (ECF No. 48); and on April 24, 2023, Defendants submitted their reply brief (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff filed an additional affidavit in opposition to the motion on April 27, 2023. See ECF No. 52.

LEGAL STANDARD

1. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint “must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Green v. Dep't of Educ. of City of New York, 16 F.4th 1070, 1076-77 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (citation omitted). In determining if a claim is sufficiently plausible to withstand dismissal, a court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). “[W]hen the plaintiff proceeds pro se, as in this case, a court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations.” Jacobs v. Ramirez, 400 F.3d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 105 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that pro se pleadings should be read “liberally and interpret[ed] . . . to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest”) (citation omitted).

The court's function on a motion to dismiss is “not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient.” Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court may consider documents that are referenced in the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff's possession or that the plaintiff knew of when bringing suit, or matters of which judicial notice may be taken. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

2. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7), a court must dismiss an action for failure to join a necessary party under Rule 19. See Viacom Int'l., Inc. v. Kearney, 212 F.3d 721, 72425 (2d Cir. 2000); C.D.S., Inc. v. Zetler, 198 F.Supp.3d 323, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Federal Ins. Co. v. SafeNet, Inc., 758 F.Supp.2d 251, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Courts assess three factors in determining whether a non-party is “necessary” under Rule 19(a): (1) “whether the court can afford complete relief in the absence of the non-party”; (2) “whether the non-party's absence will impair or impede its ability to protect its interests”; and (3) “whether the existing parties would be subject to double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations.” See C.D.S., 198 F.Supp.3d at 335-36 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1). “If a party does not qualify as necessary under Rule 19(a), then the court need not decide whether its absence warrants dismissal under Rule 19(b).” Giuliano v. Barch, No. 16-CV-0859 (NSR), 2017 WL 1234042, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

If the court finds that a party is necessary under Rule 19(a) but joinder is not feasible because, for example, the joinder...