Evans v. NPAS, Inc.

LAVONNE EVANS, Plaintiff, v. NPAS, INC. Defendant.

Civil Action No. 8:18-cv-02139-PX

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

March 2, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court in this fair debt collection case is Defendant NPAS Inc.'s ("NPAS's") motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 30, and Plaintiff Lavonne Evans' motion for judicial notice, ECF No. 42. The motions are fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons discussed below, NPAS's motion is granted and Evans' motion is denied.¹

I. Background

This case concerns whether NPAS's attempt to collect on a newly outstanding medical debt triggers federal statutory debt collection protections.

On March 21, 2017, Plaintiff Lavonne Evans was admitted to United Medical Center ("UMC"), a hospital in Washington, D.C., for a knee operation. See ECF No. 30-2 at 3-4; ECF No. 30-3 at 2-4. When admitted, Evans executed a document entitled "Conditions of Admission" that addressed, among other things, terms of payment for any treatment received at UMC. See ECF No. 30-3 at 3. The document stated that patient is responsible for "payment of charges" not otherwise "paid by any third party payor," and "all charges . . . that are not paid by[her] insurance provider." Id. It also provided that a patient's failure to pay "an installment when due" could result in referral of the debt to the District of Columbia's Central Collection Unit ("CCU"), which is "authorized by law to charge an additional 20% of the outstanding balance at the time of placement." Id. The Conditions of Admission also stated that medical expenses for services at UMC "shall be paid in full at the time of discharge." Id.

Evans was discharged the same day she was admitted. See ECF No. 30-5 at 18 (records indicating "SVC" from 03/21/2017 through 3/21/2017). It is undisputed that Evans had health insurance and believed her insurance would cover whatever costs she incurred. See ECF No. 41 at 23. It is also undisputed that no invoice, bill, or statement of charges were presented to Evans for payment at the time of her discharge.

On June 6, 2017, Evans' insurer determined that it would cover the lion's share of the $10,138.29 costs, but that Evans was responsible for $228.30. ECF No. 30-5 ¶¶ 13, 16; ECF No. 30-6; see ECF No. 30-7 at 2. Seven days later, on June 13, 2017, UMC referred the $228.30 bill to NPAS for collection. ECF No. 30-5 ¶ 13; see id. at 12-15.

NPAS describes itself as an "early out" collection service retained by hospitals like UMC to obtain payments from patients for medical services that UMC had provided. Id. ¶ 2; ECF No. 32-1 at 2; ECF No. 32-2 at 2. NPAS's contract with UMC (called the "Extended Business Services Agreement," or "EBO") makes clear that NPAS will service only "early out" invoices, and will not service delinquent debt. ECF No. 30-5 ¶¶ 8-10; ECF No. 32-1 at 2-3; ECF No. 32-2 at 2-3.

With regard to Evans' outstanding bill, NPAS sent a her "Payment Request" dated June 13, 2017. ECF No. 30-5 at 21-22.² This letter stated that the total medical expenses incurred,less payments from the insurer, to arrive at the amount due. Id. It also explained that Evans' "insurance company was billed, leaving an unpaid balance of the amount shown above." Id. NPAS's letter asked Evans to "[p]lease send payment in full at this time," advised her that payment was due by June 28, 2017, and explained different payment options. Id. The reverse side of the letter also thanked Evans for choosing UMC and advised that NPAS was "managing [her] account for the healthcare provider." Id. at 22.

On or about July 14, 2017, NPAS sent Evans another notice that was substantially similar to the first correspondence. Id. ¶¶ 25-28; see ECF No. 30-8. It stated that NPAS "records reflect that you were previously contacted regarding the unpaid balance," and "to send payment in full today." ECF No. 30-8 at 2. It also listed a new payment due date of July 29, 2017. Id.

NPAS sent a third notice dated August 26, 2017. ECF No. 30-5 ¶¶ 29-30; ECF No. 30-9. 27-28. This letter—which bore the red-highlighted title of "Attention Required"—advised: "You are obligated to pay for the services provided and we strongly urge you to take advantage of this FINAL opportunity to settle your balance. If payment in full is not received, your account may be referred to a debt collector without further notice." ECF No. 30-9 at 2. The letter stated that the new due date for the amount owed was September 5, 2017. Id.

On July 13, 2018, Evans brought suit alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA"). Evans, more particularly, avers that NPAS violated the FDCPA through "false, deceptive and/or misleading" communication because it failed to identify itself as a debt collector or [advise] that any information obtained would be used for collection of" the debt. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 23-27 (Count I). Evans also alleges that NPAS violated related notice and disclosure requirements applicable to debt collectors. Id. ¶¶ 28-31(Count II).³

NPAS now moves for summary judgment, arguing that because Evans' debt was not in default when NPAS assumed responsibility for collection efforts, the FDCPA does not apply. See ECF No. 30-11 at 8-12. Evans opposes the motion and requests that the Court take "judicial notice" of averred facts in two, unrelated judicial opinions and information included in certain websites. ECF No. 42. Evans also objects to the Court considering certain record evidence and urges reopening of discovery. ECF No. 41 at 2-13. Each argument is addressed below.

II. Scope of Record Evidence

Evans requests that the Court judicially notice facts included within two websites and Direct Supply, Inc. v. Specialty Hospitals of America, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-00683-JSG (D.D.C. March 27, 2013) regarding the corporate structure of UMC and its relationship to CCU. Evans also asks the Court to take judicial notice of the facts at issue in Thomas v. City of Annapolis, No. BPG-16-3823, 2018 WL 1183657 (D. Md. Mar. 6, 2018). Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows the court to "judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Of course, and critical to the request here, the judicially noticeable facts must be relevant to legal questions under consideration. Wireless Buybacks, LLC v. Hanover Am. Ins. Co., 223 F. Supp. 3d 443, 451 (D. Md. 2016).

Evans' requests are easily resolved. The interrelationship between UMC and CCU is wholly irrelevant to whether NPAS qualifies as a debt collector. And nothing within Thomas presents even the opportunity to judicially notice any relevant facts. The request is denied.

Next, Evans lodges several "objections" to NPAS's record evidence that are best understood as motions to strike. At the summary judgment stage, the Court must consider only such record evidence as would be admissible at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The Court addresses each objection separately.

First, Evans objects to certain portions of Steve Warner's sworn declaration. ECF No. 41 at 2, 5, 7-10. Warner is the Regional Vice President at Parallon Business Solutions, LLC, which indirectly owns NPAS. See ECF No. 30-5 ¶ 1. Warner also oversees collection operations at NPAS and thus has personal knowledge about how NPAS conducts its business. Id. According to Evans, Warner cannot to offer testimony "on behalf of NPAS" because NPAS did not disclose Parallon's ownership in its corporate disclosure statement or in discovery. ECF No 41 at 2-3. The Court disagrees.

Warner's role overseeing NPAS collection operations provides sufficient foundation for offering facts relevant to NPAS operations. Whether NPAS complied with this Court's corporate disclosure requirements, see Loc. R. 103.3 (requiring disclosure of "any parent or other affiliate of a corporate party and a description of the relationship"), does not undercut Warner's personal knowledge. Thus, although the Court must caution NPAS to ensure that it comply with this Court's rules regarding corporate disclosures, see Bluebell Bus. Ltd. v. Jones, No. RDB 17-2150, 2018 WL 3740694, at *16 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2018), the Court finds no basis to exclude Warner's declaration.

Evans next contends that NPAS's "Account Notes" pertinent to Evans and an "Explanation of Benefits," purportedly authored by Evans' insurer have not been authenticated. ECF No. 41 at 2-3. Although Evans may be correct that Warner may not have personal knowledge regarding the authenticity of these documents, exclusion does not affect the outcomeof this matter. Put differently, even if the Court struck these documents from the record, it would nonetheless find that NPAS is not a debt collector as a matter of law. Similarly, whether UMC received partial payment from Evans' insurer does not affect whether NPAS is a debt collector under the FDCPA. Nor does the Court consider Warner's interpretation of the NPAS contract with UMC relevant to the legal issues before the Court.

As for Evans challenging documents reflecting UMC's referral of Evans' account to NPAS via UMC's electronic interface on June 6, 2019, id. at 13, the Court will not strike these records. They are records within NPAS custody and control, generated by its electronic recordkeeping system, and are proffered as authentic. See ECF No. 30-5 at ¶¶ 11-13 (Warner attesting the documents are "true and accurate" copies). This is sufficient to consider the documents at the summary judgment stage. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Sall v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. DKC 10-2245, 2012 WL 5463027, at * 1 n.1 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2012). The Court next turns to the merits of NPAS's motion.

III. Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, finds...