Evans v. State

CRYSTAL LATRICE EVANS v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 507

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2016

March 27, 2017

UNREPORTED

Berger, Beachley, Sharer, J. Frederick (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Sharer, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

In a joint trial in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, a jury convicted Crystal Latrice Evans, appellant, and her co-defendant, Javonie Harper, of second-degree child abuse and second-degree assault. Before this Court, appellant presents three issues for review, which we have rephrased:¹

1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain appellant's convictions for second-degree child abuse and second-degree assault?

2. Did the court abuse its discretion in permitting portions of State's rebuttal closing argument?

3. Did the court err in excluding character evidence from a defense witness?

For the reasons stated below, we answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. Further, we answer "yes" to appellant's third question, but conclude that the error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

BACKGROUND

In August 2015, appellant resided with her partner, Ms. Harper, and Ms. Harper's twin children in Severn, Anne Arundel County. At the time of the events in the case, the twins were nine years old.

On the evening of August 3, 2015, one of the twins - whom we shall refer to as "the child" or "the victim" - took some candy from his mother's room, without permission. Appellant stopped the child and ordered him to go to his room, strip, and return to the railing next to Ms. Harper's room. Appellant told the child to place his hands on the railing, whereupon she proceeded to beat his back, buttocks, legs, and neck with a belt. The child did not recall how long the beating lasted or how many times he was hit, but he testified that appellant hit him "[a] lot" and "[h]ard." At various times during the beating, the child fell crying to the floor and begged appellant to stop, but appellant ordered him to stand up and continued to beat him as he lay on the floor. The child would get up, and the beating continued.

At some point during the beating, Ms. Harper joined in and used the same belt used by appellant to beat the child's back and buttocks. The child testified that after his mother hit him "[a] lot," appellant hit him some more with the belt. Eventually, appellant ceased striking the child and offered to take him to get an iTunes gift card.

The next day, as further punishment, appellant and Ms. Harper kept the child home from the Boys and Girls Club in Severn. When the child returned to the Boys and Girls Club on August 5th, Jessica Tongue, the program director, noticed that he was moving "slow" and was not participating in activities, which was unusual. In speakingwith the child, Ms. Tongue observed bruises on his back and neck, and asked the child about them. The child then showed Ms. Tongue his back, and she saw "a lot of bruises." Ms. Tongue called police.

Officer Michael Smith of the Anne Arundel County Police Department responded to the Boys and Girls Club. He spoke with Ms. Tongue and the child and observed dark red bruises on the child's back and the back of his left arm. The child told Officer Smith that appellant and Ms. Harper caused his injuries. Michelle Jackson, a crime scene technician, took photographs of the child's back, neck, and arms, which the jury viewed at trial.

The State charged both appellant and Ms. Harper with second-degree child abuse, second-degree assault, and reckless endangerment. The State nolle prossed the reckless endangerment charge, and the jury convicted both appellant and Ms. Harper of the remaining charges. The circuit court merged appellant's conviction for assault into the conviction for child abuse and subsequently sentenced appellant to a prison term of six years, with all but six months suspended, to be followed by a five-year period of probation.²

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant first contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain her convictions for second-degree child abuse and second-degree assault.³ Specifically, appellant argues that the State failed to demonstrate that her action was not a reasonable exercise of parental discipline that had a benevolent purpose.⁴ Furthermore, appellant maintains that the force used to instill discipline on the child was reasonable and not excessive or inhumane. Additionally, appellant argues that the State failed to demonstrate that appellant's actions caused the bruises on the child's back, neck, and buttocks. Appellant further posits that because the child could not testify as to which woman caused specific bruises, the State had not established causation.

The State responds that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to convict. The State maintains that appellant's actions were not reasonable or appropriate discipline and, therefore, she cannot assert the parental privilege to excuse her conduct. Specifically, the State points out that the beating was "extensive and malicious" and far surpassed whatever reasonable amount of force appellant may have used to discipline the child. Moreover, the State notes, appellant continued to beat the child when he fell to the floor several times. Furthermore, the State contends that the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that appellant caused some of the bruising to the child. The State argues that appellant's causation standard is too exacting and does not comport with the law.

Standard of Review

"'The standard of review for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.'" Spencer v. State, 450 Md. 530, 549 (2016) (quoting Harrison v. State, 382 Md. 477, 487 (2004)) (internal citations omitted). "'We defer to the fact-finder's decisions on which evidence to accept and which inferences to draw when the evidence supports differing inferences. In other words, we give deference to all reasonable inferences [that] the fact-finder draws, regardless of whether . . . [we] would have chosen a different reasonable inference.'" Mason v. State, 225 Md. App. 467, 475 (2015) (quoting Montgomery v. State, 206 Md. App. 357, 385 (2012)). The Court of Appeals has stated that "'[t]he purpose [of reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence] is not to undertake a review of the record that would amount to, in essence, a retrial of the case. Rather, . . . we do not re-weigh the credibility of witnesses or attempt to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.'" Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 129 (2013) (quoting Titus v. State, 423 Md. 548, 557 (2011)).

The Offenses

Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 Suppl.), Criminal Law Article ("C.L."), § 3-601(d)(1)(ii) provides that "[a] household member or family member may not cause abuse to a minor."⁵ C.L. § 3-601(a)(2) defines abuse as "physical injury sustained by a minor as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a result of a malicious act under circumstances that indicate that the minor's health or welfare is harmed or threatened by the treatment or act."

C.L. § 3-203(a) criminalizes assault. Maryland recognizes three "types" of assault: "(1) the 'intent to frighten' assault, (2) attempted battery and (3) battery." Snyder v. State, 210 Md. App. 370, 380 (2013). Before us is a battery-type assault. This Court has defined a battery as "a touching that is either harmful, unlawful or offensive." Quansah v. State, 207 Md. App. 636, 647 (2012) (citing Marlin v. State, 192 Md. App. 134, 166 (2010)).

Appellant first asserts a parental privilege in disciplining the child. The Court of Appeals recognized this privilege, stating:

"Long before the advent of contemporary child abuse legislation, it was a well-recognized precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence that the parent of a minor child or one standing in loco parentis was justified in using areasonable amount of force upon a child for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the child's welfare. . . . So long as the chastisement was moderate and reasonable, in light of the age, condition and disposition of the child, and other surrounding circumstances, the parent or custodian would not incur criminal liability for assault and battery or a similar offense."

Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 271 (2001) (quoting Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 126 (1978)). The Court continued:

"On the other hand, where corporal punishment was inflicted with 'a malicious desire to cause pain' or where it amounted to 'cruel and outrageous' treatment of the child, the chastisement was deemed unreasonable, thus defeating the parental privilege and subjecting the parent to penal sanctions in those circumstances where criminal liability would have existed absent the parent-child relationship."

Id. (quoting Bowers, 283 Md. at 126).

Stated more succinctly, "corporal punishment is legal as long as 'the force [is] truly used in the exercise of domestic authority by way of punishing or disciplining the child - for the betterment of the child or promotion of the child's welfare - and [is] not [] a gratuitous attack.'" B.H. v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Dep't of Social Servs., 209 Md. App. 206, 229 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. State, 61 Md. App. 436, 444 (1985)). This Court has held that "'[w]hen a court is deciding whether a particular parental discipline is child abuse . . . the court always determines whether the corporal punishment was reasonable.'" Id. (quoting Charles Cnty. Dep't of Social Servs. v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 303 (2004)). See also Fisher, 367 Md. at 272 (noting that in determining whether a parent acted to...