Evans v. Tiger Claw, Inc.

141 Conn.App. 110

61 A.3d 533

Christopher EVANS

v.TIGER CLAW, INC., et al.

No. 33618.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 4, 2012.

Decided March 5, 2013.

Sid M. Miller, Hamden, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Taryn D. Martin, with whom, on the brief, was Robert A. Ziegler, Plainville, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

LAVINE, ALVORD and FOTI, Js.

ALVORD, J.

The plaintiff, Christopher Evans, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, denying his claim for hourly wages allegedly due from the defendants, Tiger Claw, Inc., David Hartmann, David Martel and Donald Martel.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that the doctrine of res judicata precluded the recovery of those wages because of a prior determination by a wage enforcement agent for the department of labor. The defendants cross appeal from the judgment, claiming that the court improperly (1) awarded the plaintiff $10,027.26 for unpaid commissions and (2) found the individual defendants liable for the amounts awarded to the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and reverse in part.

The following facts were found by the court or are not disputed. Tiger Claw, Inc., was a start-up company when the plaintiff began working for the corporation in January, 2003. The individual defendants are corporate officers and hold various managerial positions within the company. Tiger Claw, Inc., manufactures hidden deck fasteners for the construction industry, and the plaintiff was hired to sell the fasteners and was compensated on a commission basis. Shortly after he joined the company, the plaintiff was asked and agreed to perform other administrative duties to be compensated at an hourly rate. According to the plaintiff, he and the defendants agreed that his hourly wages and his first $10,000 in commission earnings would be withheld and invested in shares of stock of Tiger Claw, Inc. After the plaintiff had accumulated $10,027.26 in sales commissions, which was set aside in a “stock fund,” he was paid commissions for subsequent sales that he made and received 1099 forms for that income.² As of the date of trial, $10,027.26 was the total amount set aside in the stock fund.³ The plaintiff never was paid for the hourly administrative work he did between January, 2003, and April, 2005.

The plaintiff ceased doing noncommission, hourly administrative work in March, 2005. By letter dated April 7, 2005, the plaintiff was notified that his “relationship with Tiger Claw, Inc., [was] terminated.” On October 13, 2006, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the department of labor for unpaid wages totaling $191,966.91. After an investigation, Blair F. Bertaccini, the wage enforcement agent, determined that certain costs had been deducted improperly from one of the plaintiff's commission checks and that the plaintiff was owed $3603.67 in unpaid wages. The plaintiff was unwilling to resolve his claim for that amount, and the complaint was withdrawn. On August 13, 2007, he commenced the present action against the defendants.

The plaintiff's operative complaint alleged that the defendants (1) failed to pay him hourly and commission wages and/or the shares of stock to which he was entitled ⁴ and (2) obtained the plaintiff's property,i.e., wages and/or stock, by false pretenses. The defendants filed special defenses alleging that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations; General Statutes § 52–596; and by the doctrine of res judicata.⁵ Following a six day trial, the court issued its memorandum of decision on April 27, 2011. Although the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, it limited his recovery for unpaid hourly wages to $3603.67, which was the amount Bertaccini recommended to resolve the wage claim filed by the plaintiff with the department of labor. The court held that the doctrine of res judicata precluded any further recovery by the plaintiff for unpaid hourly wages. The court added $10,027.26 to that award, however, representing the sales commissions set aside for the purchase of corporate stock, for a total recovery of $13,630.93, plus taxable costs.⁶ This appeal and cross appeal followed.

IPLAINTIFF'S APPEAL ON RES JUDICATA CLAIM

The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that Bertaccini's investigation of the plaintiff's wage complaint filed with the department of labor precluded any further recovery by the plaintiff for hourly wages. The plaintiff argues that the investigation, conducted pursuant to General Statutes § 31–76a, did not bar his claim for unpaid wages in this action under the doctrine of res judicata. The defendants argue that Bertaccini's report was the determination of an administrative tribunal, that the plaintiff had sufficient opportunity to litigate his claims in that forum and that any adverse decision by that tribunal could have been appealed pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4–166 et seq. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, reverse that part of the trial court's judgment.

“The doctrine of res judicata holds that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated as to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.... If the same cause of action is again sued on, the judgment is a bar with respect to any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 594, 600, 922 A.2d 1073 (2007). The applicability of the doctrine of res judicata presents a question of law subject to plenary review. Stein v. Horton, 99 Conn.App. 477, 481, 914 A.2d 606 (2007).

Under certain circumstances, the determination of an administrative tribunal will have res judicata effect with respect to any subsequent claims made by a party to that agency determination. “As a general proposition, the governing principle is that administrative adjudications have a preclusive effect when the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate.... [A] valid and final adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal has the same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafayette v. General Dynamics Corp., 255 Conn. 762, 773, 770 A.2d 1 (2001). An administrative tribunal's decision is not entitled to res judicata effect in subsequent proceedings between the parties, however, if the initial decision was not subject to judicial review. “[W]ithout the availability of judicial review, neither the decision of an administrative agency nor that of a court is ordinarily entitled to be accorded preclusive effect in further litigation.” Convalescent Center of Bloomfield, Inc. v. Dept. of Income Maintenance, 208 Conn. 187, 201, 544 A.2d 604 (1988).

In the present case, the plaintiff filed his initial wage claim with the department of labor on October 13, 2006. The matter was assigned to Bertaccini, who conducted an investigation pursuant to § 31–76a.⁷ Bertaccini testified at trial and described the administrative process for reviewing the plaintiff's wage claim. He stated that he was authorized by statute to investigate a period of two years prior to the filing date of the claim to determine if any wages were due the plaintiff.⁸ Accordingly, he did not consider any claimed wages earned prior to October 12, 2004. ⁹ After reviewing documents on the plaintiff's claim, Bertaccini sent a letter to the counsel for Tiger Claw, Inc., advising him that a certain deduction had been made improperly from the plaintiff's commission check.¹⁰ According to Bertaccini's calculations, the plaintiff was owed $3603.67. Although Tiger Claw, Inc., accepted Bertaccini's recommendation for resolving the matter, the plaintiff refused to accept a check for $3603.67 as payment in full for his claimed past due wages. Accordingly, Bertaccini closed the investigation and considered the complaint to be withdrawn.

Bertaccini's final report, indicating that the complaint was withdrawn, is dated March 22, 2007. On August 13, 2007, the plaintiff commenced the present action. The defendants argue that Bertaccini's determination was an adjudication by an administrativetribunal. They claim that the plaintiff could have requested a hearing and then appealed from any adverse decision pursuant to the UAPA. We disagree. Bertaccini's decision was not a final decision in a contested case and was not subject to judicial review under the UAPA.

“It is well established that the right to appeal an administrative action is created only by statute and a party must exercise that right in accordance with the statute in order for the court to have jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Human Rights Referee, 66 Conn.App. 196, 199, 783 A.2d 1214 (2001). “The UAPA grants the Superior Court jurisdiction over appeals of agency decisions only in certain limited and well delineated circumstances.... Judicial review of an administrative decision is governed by ... § 4–183(a) of the UAPA, which provides that [a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies ... and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the superior court.... A final decision is defined in § 4–166(3)(A) as the agency determination in a contested case.... A contested case is defined in § 4–166(2) as a proceeding ... in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by state statute or regulation to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held.... Not...