Evenson-Childs v. Ravalli Cnty.

1

TERI LEA EVENSON-CHILDS, DANIEL O'TOOLE, RICHARD CHURCHILL, and KEITH LEONARD, individually, and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. RAVALLI COUNTY; STEPHEN HOLTON, in his official capacity as RAVALLI COUNTY SHERIFF; JENNIFER RAY, in her official capacity as RAVALI COUNTY JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; JIM BAILEY, in his official capacity as RAVALLI COUNTY JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; HOWARD RECHT, in his official capacity as DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE 21st JUDICIAL DISTRICT and JENNIFER LINT; in her official capacity as DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE 21st JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Defendants.

No. CV 21-89-M-DLC-KLD

United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division

January 13, 2023

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Kathleen L. DeSoto, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs Teri Lea Evenson-Childs, Daniel O'Toole, Richard Churchill, and Keith Leonard bring this putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging Defendant Ravalli County's Jail Diversion Program on constitutional and state law grounds. This matter comes before the Court on the following motions, which have been fully briefed and argued: (1) Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Against Defendants Holton and Ravalli County (Doc. 40); (2) Defendants Ravalli County, Stephen Holton, Jennifer Ray, and Jim Bailey's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 46) (3) Defendant District Court Judges' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 48); and Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 60).

I. Background^[1]

Individuals arrested in Ravalli County, Montana are typically booked at the county jail and may be released by the court upon paying bail or on their own recognizance without bail. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 36). If an arrestee is released subject to conditions of supervision, the court may assign the arrestee to Ravalli County's Jail Diversion Program and specify what program conditions, such as drug testing and electronic monitoring, the arrestee will be subject to while on pretrial release. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 3). An arrestee who is assigned to the Jail Diversion Program must pay certain fees associated with the conditions of pretrial supervision, and failure to do so may result in revocation of release. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 2).

The four named Plaintiffs, all of whom are indigent, are current or former participants in the Jail Diversion Program. Evenson-Childs was arrested in February 2020, and her bail was set at $30,000. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 64). The court imposed pretrial supervision and alcohol monitoring as release conditions. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 64). Evenson-Childs posted bail, and as part of the Jail Diversion Program was required to pay supervision and alcohol monitoring fees totaling $325 per month while on pretrial release. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 65, 68). As a result of having to pay the Jail Diversion Program fees, Evenson-Childs has not been able to secure stable housing, and without stable housing, she has not been able to obtain stable employment. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 71). O'Toole has had three recent criminal cases in Ravalli County and has been cycling in and out of jail because of the Jail Diversion Program for years. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 75, 76). In addition to posting bail as set by the court in each of his criminal cases, O'Toole has paid thousands of dollars in Jail Diversion Program fees while on pretrial release. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 79, 83, 86). As a result of his periodic incarcerations while in the Jail Diversion Program, O'Toole has not been able to find and maintain employment. (Doc. 34, at ¶ 75). Churchill was released subject to pretrial supervision and random drug testing in December 2020. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 91-92). Churchill was required to pay approximately $335 per month in supervision and drug testing fees while in the Jail Diversion Program, and he was jailed twice in 2021 because he could not afford the program's drug testing fees. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 93, 98). Leonard entered the Jail Diversion Program in January 2021, and has gone into debt as a result of having to pay at least $120 every month for twice-daily alcohol tests. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 101). Leonard claims he faced new criminal charges resulting from the Jail Diversion Program because he has twice been charged with criminal contempt for drinking alcohol, which would not otherwise be considered criminal conduct. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 102).

Plaintiffs commenced this § 1983 action against Ravalli County, the Ravalli County Sheriff, two Ravalli County district court judges, and two Ravalli County justice court judges in August 2021, and have amended their complaint twice since then. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the operation of the Ravalli County Jail Diversion Program and their Second Amended Complaint asserts nine claims for relief. (Doc. 34). Count 1 alleges “Violation of Procedural Due Process Regarding Deprivation of Property Interest in Fee Amount.” (Doc. 34 at 54). Plaintiffs claim that Defendants Ravalli County and Ravalli County Sheriff Stephen Holton deprived them of their property without due process as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by charging them for pretrial fees without any finding of guilt. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 193).

Count 2 alleges “Violation of Procedural Due Process for Arbitrary Bail.” (Doc. 34 at 55). Plaintiffs assert Defendant Justice Court Judges Jennifer Ray and Jim Bailey, and Defendant District Court Judges Howard Recht and Jennifer Lint impose pretrial conditions without any nexus to risk factors and without any timeline as to how long pretrial arrestees will be subject to those conditions, and Sheriff Holton charges fees associated with those conditions for however long the case remains in pretrial status. Plaintiffs allege that pretrial fees are thus imposed as quasi-bail, without the attendant due process protections. (Doc 34 at ¶ 195).

Count 3 alleges “Status-Based Discrimination on the Basis of Homelessness.” (Doc. 34 at 55). Plaintiffs assert that Sheriff Holton, through the Jail Diversion division of the sheriff's office, discriminates against unhoused arrestees on ankle monitoring by requiring arrestees to pay a multi-thousand dollar cash deposit before being released from jail, thereby criminalizing homelessness in violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment embodied in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 197-98).

Count 4 alleges “Violation of Procedural Due Process Regarding Ability to Pay.” (Doc. 34 at 56). Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' practice of assessing pretrial fees without considering ability to pay violates the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 200-201).

Count 5 alleges “Violation of Procedural Due Process for Incarceration for Non-Payment of Fees.” (Doc. 34 at 56). Plaintiffs assert that by permitting the revocation of bail based on failure to pay pretrial fees without considering ability to pay, Defendants are effectively criminalizing poverty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural due process clause. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 203-05).

Count 6 alleges “Violation of Federal Equal Protection for Wealth-Based Discrimination.” (Doc. 34 at 57). Because indigent pretrial arrestees may be incarcerated if they cannot afford pretrial fees, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants treat similarly situated pretrial arrestees differently based indigency, and in doing so engage in wealth-based discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 209-10).

Count 7 asserts “Violation of State Equal Protection for Social Condition Discrimination.” (Doc. 34 at 57). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants discriminate against pretrial arrestees on the basis of social condition, specifically indigency, in violation of the equal protection clause of Article II, § 4 of the Montana Constitution because indigent pretrial arrestees face punishment for non-willful failure to pay Jail Diversion Program fees, while similarly situated wealthy pretrial arrestees only face punishment for willful nonpayment. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 212-14).

Count 8 alleges “False Imprisonment.” (Doc. 34 at 58). Plaintiffs claim that Sheriff Holton, through the Jail Diversion division, unlawfully detains pretrial arrestees beyond their release date by conditioning release on payment of arbitrary pretrial fees, and that “[s]uch unlawful and involuntary restraint” constitutes false imprisonment. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 216-17).

Count 9 alleges “Violation of Due Process via Contract Increasing Criminal Exposure.” (Doc. 34 at 58). Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Holton, through the Jail Diversion division, unlawfully requires pretrial arrestees to sign contracts “agreeing” to further criminal charges if they do not comply with certain pretrial conditions. (Doc. 34 at ¶¶ 219-22).

Plaintiffs request declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. First they seek a declaratory judgment that (1) the Jail Diversion Program, and Ravalli County and Sheriff Holton's conduct in implementing and enforcing the program, is unlawful; and (2) the District and Justice Court Judge Defendants' ongoing practices of ordering participation in the Jail Diversion Program; failing to conduct ability-to-pay and risk assessments; and revoking pretrial arrestees for nonpayment of Jail Diversion Program fees are unlawful. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 224(a)(b)). Second, Plaintiffs request a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Ravalli County and Sheriff Holton from continuing the unlawful policies and practices of the Jail Diversion Program. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 224(c)). Plaintiffs also seek a judgment ordering Sheriff Holton to train all Ravalli County Sheriff's Office employees on the preliminary and permanent injunctions. (Doc. 34 at ¶ 224(d)). Finally, Plaintiffs request...