Ex parte Charette

1

EX PARTE ROBBIE GAIL CHARETTE, Appellant

Nos. PD-0522-21, PD-0523-21, PD-0524-21, PD-0525-21

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

September 11, 2024

ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS WASHINGTON COUNTY

Slaughter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Hervey, Richardson, Newell, and Walker, JJ., joined. Keller P.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Yeary and Keel JJ., joined. McClure, J., concurred.

OPINION

SLAUGHTER, J.

The Texas Ethics Commission ("TEC") is a constitutionally-created state agency with "the powers and duties provided by law." Tex. Const. Art. III, §24a. Those "powers and duties" are set forth in Chapter 571 of the Texas Government Code. The stated purpose of Chapter 571 (and by extension, the TEC) is to "protect the constitutional privilege of free suffrage by regulating elections and prohibiting undue influence while also protecting the constitutional right of the governed to apply to their government for the redress of grievances." Tex. Gov't Code § 571.001. To further this purpose, the statutes in Chapter 571 "shall be construed to . . . eliminate opportunities for undue influence over elections and governmental actions," and "to ensure the public's confidence and trust in its government." Id.

To effectuate this purpose, the Legislature instructed that the TEC "shall administer and enforce" various enumerated Election Code and Government Code provisions. Id. § 571.061. Most of the enumerated statutes set forth regulations on the conduct of political candidates and elected public servants which, if violated, can give rise to criminal liability. Chapter 571 also establishes a detailed procedural scheme that the TEC must follow in investigating and addressing alleged violations of election and campaign laws. Such procedures include a process for receiving sworn complaints, holding multiple hearings, issuing civil disciplinary action, and, if appropriate, referring violators for criminal prosecution. See Tex. Gov't Code § 571.121 et seq. The statutes also mandate that the TEC maintain confidentiality of all matters until a determination on a sworn complaint has been reached. This is to guard against unfairly impacting a political campaign or the elections process through the public release of uninvestigated allegations.

In this case, which solely involves statutes within the TEC's purview, no sworn complaint was filed with TEC, and so no TEC investigatory process took place. Instead, a special prosecutor pursued criminal charges against a political candidate for campaign law violations shortly before a primary election, with no prior TEC referral. Appellant then complained in a pretrial habeas application that the prosecution was unauthorized in the absence of prior TEC proceedings. The question raised by this case, therefore, is whether Chapter 571 establishes a "pervasive regulatory scheme" which demonstrates that the Legislature intended for the TEC to have exclusive jurisdiction over "the problem to which the regulation is addressed." Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002). If so, then a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any offenses within the TEC's purview unless and until the TEC has made a final determination on the allegations. If the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, then a prosecutor has no authority to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court for a criminal prosecution.

We conclude that the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions establish that the Legislature intended for the TEC to have exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses listed in Chapter 571. Therefore, exhaustion of administrative remedies in the TEC is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the bringing of criminal charges against a political candidate for campaign-law violations. The defendant in this case was criminally charged for campaign-law violations absent any prior proceedings in the TEC or a referral for criminal prosecution by the TEC. Accordingly, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these charges, and it should have dismissed them. We, therefore, hold that pretrial habeas relief is warranted. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and order dismissal of the indictments.

I. Background

A. Factual Background and Trial Court Proceedings

In 2018, Robbie Gail Charette, Appellant, was a Republican candidate for Judge of the County Court-at-Law in Washington County. Shortly before the primary election, someone filed a complaint with the Washington County District Attorney's Office alleging that Appellant had violated several campaign laws.^[1] The District Attorney recused himself, and a special prosecutor from neighboring Austin County was appointed to review the allegations.

In June 2018, a grand jury indicted Appellant on four misdemeanor charges, which included: (1) knowingly misrepresenting the true source of a campaign communication;^[2](2) knowingly representing in a campaign communication that Appellant held a public office she did not hold;^[3] (3) failing to timely file a personal financial statement;^[4] and (4) failing to maintain a proper record of political expenditures in excess of $100.^[5]

Appellant filed an "application for pretrial writ of habeas corpus and/or first motion to quash and dismiss the indictment as prosecution improperly brought." Appellant argued that the indictments were void as a result of the State's "complete failure to comply with applicable Texas constitutional and statutory procedure requiring the Texas [Ethics] Commission's oversight of the alleged violations[.]" Specifically, Appellant contended that, pursuant to the provisions in Article III, Section 24a of the Texas Constitution and Texas Government Code Chapter 571, enforcement of the violations at issue must be initiated by a sworn complaint to the TEC, see Tex. Gov't Code § 571.122, followed by an administrative review process, which includes notice to the accused, an opportunity to respond, and multiple hearings, if necessary. Id. §§ 571.124 through 571.129. Appellant further observed that the Government Code contains a provision indicating that the Commission may "refer matters to the appropriate prosecuting attorney for criminal prosecution" only upon the vote of six of eight members of the TEC. Id. § 571.171(a). Thus, because Appellant did not receive any of these procedural protections before being criminally charged in these cases, she argued that the prosecution was unauthorized or, alternatively, that her rights to due process and due course of law had been irreparably violated, such that dismissal of the indictments was warranted.

The State, represented by the Special Prosecutor, responded that Appellant's application should be dismissed for failing to allege a cognizable basis for pretrial habeas corpus relief. Specifically, the State contended that TEC proceedings were civil in nature and that a pretrial writ of habeas corpus in a criminal case could not "be used to collaterally complain about deprivation of civil due process rights by a regulatory commission." Alternatively, the State urged that relief should be denied on the merits because the TEC has no "jurisdiction, discretion, or authority over a prosecutor's decision to investigate and prosecute crimes." The State further cited separation of powers principles under Article V, Section 21, of the Texas Constitution and contended that "County and District Attorneys have the right to prosecute any crimes within their jurisdictions, and any effort to infringe on that right is unconstitutional."

The trial court held a hearing on Appellant's claims. During the hearing, Appellant offered into evidence a letter from the TEC confirming that no sworn complaint had been filed against her, nor had the TEC undertaken any investigation nor referred Appellant to the district attorney for criminal prosecution.

The trial court ultimately rejected Appellant's arguments. In its order denying relief, the court noted that it had found "no legislative language that grants the Commission the exclusive authority to enforce" the violations for which Appellant was charged. The court further reasoned that the "Legislature did not grant the Commission any authority over criminal prosecution. It has only allowed the Commission the authority 'to refer matters to the appropriate prosecuting attorney for criminal prosecution.'" (quoting Tex. Gov't Code § 571.171(a)). Thus, "any district attorney may conduct an investigation on his own initiative to determine if criminal conduct occurred in connection with an election," and there is "no requirement for the district attorney to present the results of an investigation in connection with an election or campaign finance laws to [TEC] prior to commencement of criminal prosecution."

B. On Appeal

On direct appeal from the trial court's order denying Appellant pretrial habeas relief, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling. Charette v. State Nos. 14-19-00855-CR, 14-19-00856-CR, 14-19-00857-CR, 14-19-00858-CR, 2021 WL 1538197, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] April 20, 2021) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The court explained that "appellant's current arguments, even if true, fail to deprive the Washington County District Court of jurisdiction over her cases or warrant her immediate release." Id. at *3. The court reasoned that the district court was vested with original jurisdiction over all misdemeanors involving "official misconduct," which includes misconduct by candidates for political office. Id.^[6] Thus, because the misdemeanor charges here derived from crimes Appellant was alleged to have knowingly committed while acting...