Ex parte Files

1

Ex parte David Eugene Files

In re: David Eugene Files v. State of Alabama

No. SC-2023-0816

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 14, 2024

Walker Circuit Court: CC-02-289.63; Court of Criminal Appeals CR-2023-0062

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

SHAW Justice.

David Eugene Files petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the Walker Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition seeking postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P. We granted the petition and now affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2002, Files was indicted for the murder of Carlie Little. In November 2002, the case was assigned to Judge James Brotherton. Judge Brotherton became the presiding judge of the Walker Circuit Court in 2004. In December 2005, Files filed a motion seeking Judge Brotherton's recusal alleging that a "heated disagreement" had occurred between Judge Brotherton and Files's counsel. Judge Brotherton granted the motion and appointed Judge Jimmy D. Wells of the Walker District Court to preside over Files's case. See Rule 13(A), Ala. R. Jud. Admin. ("A presiding circuit court judge, by order, may assign a judge who is within the circuit to serve within the circuit courts or within the district courts of the circuit."). In January 2006, Files filed a motion seeking Judge Wells's recusal, which was granted. Judge Brotherton then appointed Judge Larry Lapkovitch of the Walker District Court to preside over the case.

In 2006, Files was found guilty of murder, and Judge Lapkovitch sentenced him to serve life in prison. Files's conviction and sentence were affirmed, by an unpublished memorandum, on direct appeal. See Files v. State, (No. CR-05-2389, Apr. 20, 2007) 9 So.3d 580 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (table). It appears undisputed that Files, at trial and on direct appeal, did not challenge Judge Lapkovitch's assignment to preside over his case.

In December 2021, Files filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., his third such petition, challenging his conviction and sentence. In his pleadings he argued, among other things, that Judge Lapkovitch had been improperly assigned to serve as his trial judge and, thus, that his murder conviction was void. Specifically, he alleged:

"... It is well settled that once a judge recuses himself from presiding over a case, he cannot appoint another judge to preside in the case. Lawler Mfg. Co. v. Lawler, 306 So.3d 23 (Ala. 2020); Ex parte Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 776 So.2d 76 (Ala. 2000).

". It is also well settled that a judgment entered by a judge who was appointed by a judge who recused himself is a judgment entered by a court without jurisdiction. Id."

The State filed a response and a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing, among other things, that Files's claim was barred under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5), Ala. R. Crim. P., because it could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, and was barred as untimely under Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P. The State also argued that the appropriateness of Judge Lapkovitch's appointment as the judge in Files's case did not implicate the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court. After Files submitted a reply, the Rule 32 petition was dismissed under Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.^[1]

Files appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the judgment by an unpublished memorandum. See Files v. State (No. CR-2023-0062, Sept. 15, 2023), __So. 3d__ (Ala.Crim.App.2023) (table). Files's application for a rehearing was overruled, and he filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court. In his certiorari petition, Files argued: "The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with Lawler Mfg. Co. v. Lawler, 306 So.3d 23 (Ala. 2020). In that case, this Court held that a judge who had recused himself lacked authority to appoint another judge, such that all orders entered by the appointed judge were void." Petition at 3. This Court granted the petition.

Standard of Review

Because this case presents a question of law, our review is de novo. Ex parte Key, 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003) ("This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal cases de novo."), and Ex parte Collins, 363 So.3d 73, 74 (Ala. 2021).

Discussion

In Ex parte Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 776 So.2d 76, 78 (Ala. 2000), the issue presented on appeal was "whether a trial judge, who has been disqualified from presiding over a case by the Canons of Judicial Ethics, can, pursuant to Rule 13, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., appoint his successor." In that case, the trial judge, who was the presiding judge in that circuit and had initially presided in two related actions, recused himself and, pursuant to Rule 13, assigned the actions to another judge. Several parties moved for the successor judge to recuse himself, arguing that he had been improperly assigned to those actions. That judge denied the motion, and several parties then petitioned this Court for relief, challenging the assignment and whether the successor judge's subsequent actions were valid. Id. at 77-78.

This Court noted that Rule 13 gives a presiding circuit-court judge the authority to temporarily assign circuit- or district-court judges to serve in that circuit. Id. at 78. However, this Court stated:

"[I]n order to avoid the appearance of impropriety, we hold that after a judge presiding in a particular case has been disqualified from hearing that case, under the Canons of Judicial Ethics, either voluntarily or by objection, he or she can take no further action in that case, not even the action of reassigning the case under Rule 13, Ala. R. Jud. Admin. For such a judge to make the reassignment would be contrary to Canon 3(C), because the impartiality of the reassignment might reasonably be questioned."

Id. at 80. The Court further provided a detailed procedure describing how a case should be assigned when the presiding judge has been disqualified. Id.

In Lawler Manufacturing Co. v. Lawler, 306 So.3d 23 (Ala. 2020), this Court was presented with a similar issue. There, an action had been initially assigned to the presiding judge of that circuit, Judge Chad E. Woodruff. Judge Woodruff entered an order recusing himself and a separate order appointing a district-court judge, Judge Jeb Fannin, to hear the action. 306 So.3d at 24. Judge Fannin subsequently entered an order requiring some of the parties to take certain actions while the case was pending, and that order was appealed. Id.

On appeal, this Court considered whether the assignment of Judge Fannin to hear the action was "valid and vested him with jurisdiction to preside over" the case. 306 So.3d at 24. This Court noted both that Rule 13 authorizes the temporary assignment of circuit-or district-court judges and that, under Ex parte Jim Walter Homes, supra, a presiding judge who recuses himself pursuant to the Canons of Judicial Ethics "does not have authority to appoint his successor." Id. at 24. The Court thus held:

"In accordance with Ex parte Jim Walter Homes, when Presiding Judge Woodruff disqualified himself from this case, he no longer had authority to appoint his successor or to enter the order appointing Judge Fannin. Therefore, Presiding Judge Woodruff's appointment of Judge Fannin was not a valid judicial appointment, and that order is vacated. Ex parte K.R., 210 So.3d [1106,] 1113 [(Ala. 2016)]. Additionally, because Judge Fannin never had jurisdiction over this case, any orders entered by Judge Fannin are void. Id."

Id. at 25 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

In this case, the State contends that the Lawler decision overextended the rule set forth in Ex parte Jim Walter Homes. It argues that although, under Ex parte Jim Walter Homes, a presiding judge who is disqualified or has recused himself or herself from a case errs in assigning another judge to hear it, that error -- contrary to the holding in Lawler -- does not impact the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. We agree.

Subject-matter jurisdiction, generally, and the jurisdiction of a circuit court in a felony criminal prosecution, specifically, have been defined as follows:

"Jurisdiction is '[a] court's power to decide a case or issue a decree.' Black's Law Dictionary 867 (8th ed. 2004). Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court's power to decide certain types of cases. Woolf v. McGaugh, 175 Ala. 299, 303, 57 So. 754, 755 (1911) ('"By jurisdiction over the subject-matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought."' (quoting Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 316, 19 L.Ed. 931 (1870))). That power is derived from the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630-31, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court's 'statutory or constitutional power' to adjudicate a case). In deciding whether [a] claim properly challenges the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, we ask only whether the trial court had the constitutional and statutory authority to try the offense with which [the defendant] was charged and as to which he has filed his petition for certiorari review.

"Under the Alabama Constitution, a circuit court 'shall exercise general jurisdiction in all cases except as may be otherwise provided by law.' Amend. No. 328, § 6.04(b), Ala. Const. 1901 [(now Ala. Const. 2022, art. VI, § 142(b))]. The Alabama Code provides that '[t]he circuit court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all felony prosecutions ....' § 12-11-30, Ala. Code 1975."

Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536, 538 (Ala. 2006).

It has been further noted that "[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction generally lies with a...