Ex parte Hartfield

442 S.W.3d 805

Ex parte Jerry HARTFIELD.

In re Jerry Hartfield.

Nos. 13–14–00238–CV

13–14–00239–CV

13–14–00240–CR

13–14–00344–CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi–Edinburg.

Aug. 14, 2014.

Discretionary Review Refused August 27, 2014.

Rehearing Overruled Sept. 24, 2014.

David R. Dow, Jeffrey Newberry, Houston, for Jerry Hartfield.

Joseph P. Corcoran, Lisa M. Tanner, Office of Atty. Gen., Austin, Steven E. Reis, Dist. Atty., Lindsay K. Deshotels, Asst. Dist. Atty., Bay City, for Appellee.

Before Justices RODRIGUEZ, GARZA, and BENAVIDES.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice RODRIGUEZ.

In June 1977, a jury convicted appellant Jerry Hartfield of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On September 17, 1980, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed his conviction and ordered a new trial. Hartfield v. State (Hartfield I), 645 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (en banc) (reversing and remanding for a new trial on the basis that the State violated Hartfield's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by striking a juror for cause because of her reservations about the death penalty). The court of criminal appeals issued its mandate on March 4, 1983. On March 15, 1983, the Governor purportedly commuted Hartfield's sentence to life in prison, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice maintained custody of Hartfield.

In 2006 and 2007, Hartfield asserted his speedy-trial claims through an article 11.07 post-conviction habeas petition.¹ See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (setting out the procedure for seeking postconviction habeas relief in a noncapital felony case). When the state courts denied him relief, Hartfield filed a pro se federal habeas application in the United States District Court. The federal district court construed Hartfield's application as a pretrial habeas application under section 2241 and dismissed his speedy-trial claims, without prejudice, as unexhausted. See Hartfield v. Thaler (Hartfield II), 498 Fed.Appx. 440, 444 (5th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (outlining the course of Hartfield's proceedings in federal court); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(3) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113–120 ). Both parties appealed that determination, and the Fifth Circuit certified the following question to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals: “What was the status of the judgment of conviction after these events[, the issuance of the mandate and the commutation of the sentence,] occurred?”Hartfield II, 498 Fed.Appx. at 445. In 2013, after the court of criminal appeals answered “[t]he status of the judgment of conviction is that [Hartfield] is under no conviction or sentence,” see Hartfield v. Thaler (Hartfield III), 403 S.W.3d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.2013), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's judgment dismissing Hartfield's section 2241 application without prejudice. Hartfield v. Stephens (Hartfield IV), 536 Fed.Appx. 455, 456 (5th Cir.2013).

On June 20, 2013, Hartfield again sought to enforce his constitutional right to a speedy trial in state court, this time by filling an article 11.08 pretrial habeas petition in each of three trial-court cause numbers, two civil and one criminal. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.08 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (setting out the procedures for post-indictment, pre-conviction habeas petitions that challenge confinement). In the criminal cause, Hartfield also filed a motion to dismiss the 1976 indictment on speedy-trial grounds, which the trial court later denied. In April 2014, after a December evidentiary hearing on Hartfield's pretrial habeas petitions, the trial court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding, in sum, the following: “In the final balance, this [trial] court concludes that the four Barker factors weighs [sic] against finding a speedy[-]trial violation.” See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (setting out the following four-factor weighing and balancing test for assessing a claim that the speedy-trial right of the Sixth Amendment has been violation: (1) length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the accused). On April 17, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying Hartfield's petitions for writ of pretrial habeas corpus and his motion to set aside the indictment. Hartfield appealed from the trial court's denial of his habeas petitions.

By a single issue on appeal, Hartfield contends that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. See id. (explaining that the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). On May 14, 2014, this Court granted Hartfield's unopposed motion to give preferential treatment in this Court's scheduling. See Tex.R.App. P. 43.6 (“The court of appeals may make any other appropriate order that the law and the nature of the case require.”). With the issuance of this opinion, we have handled the cases expeditiously because of the significant issue involved. See id. ; see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 21.001(b) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“A court shall require that proceedings be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and control the proceedings so that justice is done.”).

The trial court then set a trial on this matter for September 22, 2014. Hartfield responded by filing, in this Court, a petition for writ of prohibition and motion for emergency stay of the September trial setting, pending our resolution of this appeal. On June 25, 2014, we entered an order staying the trial court's proceedings.

Even though this case documents what appears to be the longest gap between indictment and trial in any speedy-trial case that has come before this Court or any other court, the uniqueness and fundamental differences that underlie Hartfield's speedy-trial claim, no matter how extraordinary, cannot establish its independent pretrial appealability.See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 857 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978). Because a pretrial habeas proceeding is not an appropriate avenue for raising a speedy-trial claim, we vacate the portion of the trial court's order denying Hartfield's petitions for writ of habeas corpus, and we dismiss Hartfield's appeals. See Ex parte Barnett, 424 S.W.3d 809, 811 (Tex.App.-Waco 2014, no pet.) (dismissing the appeal because Barnett's pretrial habeas proceeding was not an appropriate avenue for raising his penalty-range challenge) (citing Ex parte Doster, 303 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (dismissing Doster's appeal after vacating the court of appeals' opinion that affirmed the trial court's denial of his writ of habeas corpus)). Having resolved the appeals, we dismiss the writ of prohibition as moot and lift the stay in the trial court's proceedings.

I. Background²

A. Conviction, Appeal, and Purported Commutation of Sentence: 1977–1983

In 1977, a jury convicted Hartfield of the capital murder of Eunice Lowe and sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, Hartfield complained of a Witherspoon error—specifically that a member of the venire panel was improperly excluded from the jury. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (holding “that sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty”). The court of criminal appeals agreed, and on September 17, 1980, it reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

On October 2, 1980, the State sought leave to file a motion for rehearing, urging the court of criminal appeals to reform the sentence to life imprisonment instead of remanding for a new trial. Alternatively, the State asked for a reasonable period of time to seek a commutation of Hartfield's sentence from the Governor. On November 26, 1980, the court of criminal appeals granted the motion for leave to file the motion for rehearing. However, on January 26, 1983, it denied the State's motion for rehearing, refusing the State's request to reform the sentence and holding that the fifteen-day period between the rendition of its decision and the date that the mandate issues was a reasonable time to seek commutation of Hartfield's sentence from the Governor. On March 1, 1983, the court of criminal appeals denied the State's motion for leave to file a second motion for rehearing. Mandate issued on March 4, 1983, and the trial court acknowledged receipt of the mandate on March 9, 1983.

On March 14, 1983, the Board of Pardons and Paroles sent a letter to the Governor recommending that he commute Hartfield's death sentence to life. The following day, March 15, 1983, the Governor signed proclamation number 83–04805 purportedly commuting Hartfield's sentence from death to life imprisonment. On March 23, 1983, the trial court returned a postcard to the court of criminal appeals stating that the execution of the mandate had been carried out. The card read “Executed on March 16, 1983 by Governor Mark White,” with a notation stating, “Death Sentence commuted to Life by Governor.” No further action was taken, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice maintained custody of Hartfield.³

B. Proceedings in State and Federal Courts: 2006–2013

On November 14, 2006, Hartfield filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court, seeking relief under article 11.07 of the code of criminal procedure. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07. On November 27, Hartfield supplemented his petition with a speedy-trial claim. The district court forwarded Hartfield's petition and supplement to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Also, on January 4, 2007, Hartfield filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus in the court of criminal appeals, seeking to compel a new trial. On January 31, 2007,...