Ex parte J.P.

EX PARTE J.P.

No. 04-20-00100-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio

June 22, 2022

From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2019W1790 Honorable Stephanie R. Boyd, Judge Presiding

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Patricia O Alvarez, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

OPINION

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

This is an appeal by the Texas Department of Public Safety of an order granting a petition for expunction of an acquittal. J.P., who was acquitted of a fourth charge for driving while intoxicated (DWI), petitioned the trial court to expunge his records relating to this fourth DWI, notwithstanding his three prior DWI convictions. His petition was granted, and the Department appealed.

Because J.P.'s fourth DWI offense arose out of a criminal episode, and article 55.01(c)'s exception to a right to expunction applies, J.P. was not entitled to expunction of the records and files relating to his fourth DWI arrest, and the trial court erred in granting his petition. We reverse the trial court's order and render judgment denying J.P.'s petition.

Background

On April 18, 1994, J.P. was arrested for driving while intoxicated, a Class B misdemeanor. J.P. pled not guilty. A jury found him guilty, and J.P. was convicted. He was assessed a $750 fine and sentenced to two-years' probation. On October 11, 2000, J.P. was arrested for a second DWI, a Class A misdemeanor. J.P. pled guilty and was convicted and assessed a $500 fine and sentenced to nine-months' probation. Later, J.P. was once again arrested for DWI and charged with a third-degree felony offense because of his two prior DWI convictions. J.P. pled guilty to a Class A misdemeanor of DWI 2nd, for which he was convicted on August 19, 2013.

On July 15, 2018, J.P. was arrested for driving while intoxicated. At the time, J.P. had completed the sentences for the three prior DWI convictions. On October 31, 2018, a grand jury issued a true bill of indictment for 3rd Degree Felony offense of DWI 3rd ("July 15 felony DWI").^[1]The indictment referenced a DWI judgment of conviction dated April 10, 2001 (from the October 11, 2000 arrest), and the August 19, 2013 DWI conviction. J.P. pled not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. At the end of the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, a jury acquitted J.P. of the July 15 felony DWI. On November 12, 2019, the trial court rendered a judgment of acquittal.

On November 18, 2019, J.P. filed a petition under Chapter 55 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure for an expunction order for his July 15 felony DWI. The same day, the trial court granted his petition and signed an expunction order. No reporter's record of the expunction hearing was taken. The Department was timely notified of the acquittal and filed a motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motion and the Department appeals.

Standard of Review

We review "[a] trial court's ruling on a petition for expunction . . . for abuse of discretion." State v. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018); accord Ex parte J.A.B., 592 S.W.3d 165, 168 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2019, no pet.). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, appellate courts afford no deference to the trial court's legal determinations because a court has no discretion in deciding what the law is or in applying it to the facts." T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 620 (citing In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)). Under these circumstances, a trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id.; see also Ex parte J.A.B., 592 S.W.3d at 168; Ex parte K.R.K., 446 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014, no pet.).

When construing a statute, we analyze it "'as a cohesive, contextual whole' with the goal of effectuating the Legislature's intent and employing the presumption that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result." T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 620 (quoting Sommers for Ala. &Dunlavy, Ltd. v. Sandcastle Homes, Inc., 521 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2017)). "[O]ur analysis is limited to the application of the plain meaning of the statutory language 'unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd or nonsensical results.'" Id. at 621 (quoting Jaster v. CometIIConst., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. 2014)). "We also 'operate under the presumption that the legislature chooses a statute's language with care, deciding to omit or include words purposefully.'" Ex parte J.A.B., 592 S.W.3d at 169 (quoting In re Expunction of J.B., 564 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2016, no pet.)). Where the "statute assigns detailed definitions to many of the terms it employs, . . . we must adhere to statutory definitions." Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. 2018) (citing TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011)).

Issues on Appeal

In this appeal, the Department presents two issues: (1) that, under Chapter 55, J.P. is not entitled to an expunction of his July 15 felony DWI because he had prior DWI convictions arising out of the same criminal episode as the offense for which he was acquitted, and (2) the evidence is legally insufficient to conclude that J.P. was entitled to expunction.

Is J.P. Entitled to Expunction Under Article 55.01?

A. The Expunction Statute

Article 55.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled "Right to Expunction," provides the framework for our analysis. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01. Article 55.01 "permit[s] the expunction of records of wrongful arrests." Ex parte J.A.B., 592 S.W.3d at 168 (citing Harris Cty. Dist. Atty's Office v. J.T.S., 807 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1991)). "If an applicant who has been arrested for the commission of an offense meets all the requirements of the expunction statute, then all information about the arrest is removed from the State's records." Id. (citing In re Expunction of J.B., 564 S.W.3d at 439). "Expunction is not a right; it is a statutory privilege." Id. (quoting In re State Bar of Tex., 440 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. 2014)). "The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that all of the statutory conditions or requirements are met." Id. (citing T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 620; In re Expunction of J.B., 564 S.W.3d at 439).

Article 55.01(a) provides that,

(a) A person who has been placed under a custodial or noncustodial arrest for commission of either a felony or misdemeanor is entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest expunged if:

(1) the person is tried for the offense for which the person was arrested and is:

(A) acquitted by the trial court, except as provided in Subsection (c) ....

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(1)(A). Subsection (c) of article 55.01 provides the following exception to an expunction:

(c) A court may not order the expunction of records and files relating to an arrest for an offense for which a person is subsequently acquitted, whether by the trial court, a court of appeals, or the court of criminal appeals, if the offense for which the person was acquitted arose out of a criminal episode, as defined by Section 3.01, Penal Code, and the person was convicted of . . . at least one other offense occurring during the criminal episode.

Id. art. 55.01(c) (emphasis added). Section 3.01 of the Texas Penal Code defines "criminal episode" as the commission of two or more offenses, regardless of whether the harm is directed toward or inflicted upon more than one person or item of property, under the following circumstances:

(1) [intentionally omitted]; or

(2) the offenses are the repeated commission of the same or similar offenses.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.01; accord Ex parte K.T., No. 20-0977, 2022 WL 1510329, at *2 (Tex. May 13, 2022); Ex parte J.A.B., 592 S.W.3d at 169. At issue in this case is whether J.P.'s fourth DWI arose out of a "criminal episode."

B. Arguments of the Parties

The Department argues that J.P.'s four DWIs fall within the definition of section 3.01(2) because all were the repeated commission of the same DWI offense and, as such, meet the definition of criminal episode.

J.P., on the other hand, argues that he is entitled to expunction because the Department failed to show how the July 15 felony DWI, for which he was acquitted, fell within the statutory definition of criminal episode. In a nutshell, J.P. also contends there is no statute or Texas Supreme Court case law that defines a felony DWI as evidence of a criminal episode per se. He argues that the prior DWIs, especially those noted in the indictment of his July 15 felony DWI, are only relevant to define jurisdiction or the range of punishment and, accordingly, cannot be used as evidence of a criminal episode.

C. Analysis

We begin our analysis by construing the definition of criminal episode under section 3.01(2) of the Texas Penal Code.

1. Criminal Episode Defined

Under section 3.01(2), a criminal episode is defined as "the commission of two or more offenses [that] are the repeated commission of the same or similar offenses." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.01(2); accord Ex parte K.T., 2022 WL 1510329, at *2. In construing section 3.01(2), we look to the plain meaning of each word. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 621.

The plain meaning of "repeated" is something that is "renewed or recurring again and again." Repeated, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/repeated (last visited May 25, 2022).

The plain meaning of "same" is "resembling in every relevant respect." Same, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/same (last visited May 25, 2022).

The plain meaning of "similar" is something "having characteristics in common: strictly comparable." Similar,...