Ex parte Meza Segundo

EX PARTE JUAN RAMON MEZA SEGUNDO, Applicant

No. WR-70, 963-02

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

May 25, 2022

ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN CAUSE NO C-3-W011370-0974988-B IN CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NUMBER THREE TARRANT COUNTY

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

We have before us a postconviction application for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071, Section 5.^[1]

In December 2006, a jury convicted Applicant of capital murder for murdering a person in the course of committing or attempting to commit aggravated sexual assault or burglary of a habitation. Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). The jury answered the special issues submitted pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.0711 and the trial court, accordingly, set punishment at death. This Court affirmed Applicant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Segundo v State, 270 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

On October 17, 2008, Applicant timely filed in the habeas court his initial postconviction application for a writ of habeas corpus. Applicant raised thirteen claims, including a claim that he is intellectually disabled and thus exempt from execution. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). This Court denied relief on all of Applicant's claims, including his claim of intellectual disability. Ex parte Segundo, No. WR-70, 963-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2010) (not designated for publication).

On September 25, 2018, Applicant filed in the habeas court his first subsequent habeas application. Invoking the United States Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. Texas, 137 S.Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017), as a previously unavailable legal basis, Applicant argued that his prior claim of intellectual disability had been analyzed under an unconstitutional standard. He sought another opportunity to show that, under current clinical diagnostic standards, he is a person with intellectual disability. This Court determined that, in light of the Moore decision and the facts presented in Applicant's subsequent habeas application, the application satisfied the requirements of Article 11.071, Section 5. We remanded the application to the habeas court for resolution of the intellectual disability issue. Ex parte Segundo, No. WR-70, 963-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2018) (not designated for publication).

On July 7, 2021, the habeas court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which the habeas court concluded that Applicant had "met his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he satisfied the medical criteria for a diagnosis of intellectual disability." Having reviewed the record in this case, we agree with the habeas court that Applicant has met his burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is a person with intellectual disability. We adopt the habeas court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Relief is granted. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. Applicant's death sentence is reformed to a sentence of life imprisonment.^[2] Newell, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Hervey and Keel, JJ., joined.

We have already recognized that the United States Supreme Court's death-penalty test for determining intellectual disability does not answer whether an intellectually disabled capital murderer fits into that category of offenders whose moral blameworthiness is lessened by their intellectual disability.^[1] The test, or at least the floor for the diagnostic criteria, has become untethered from the rationale for that test set out in Atkins v. Virginia.^[2] This defendant, a serial killer who brutally raped and murdered eleven-year-old Vanessa Villa (as well as two other women while the Villa murder remained unsolved), could not provide a clearer example of the Supreme Court's intellectual failure. Segundo does not fit the mold that the Supreme Court used to justify the intellectual disability exemption from the death penalty.^[3]

Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that the execution of intellectually disabled defendants violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.^[4] When we decide cases involving the United States Constitution, we are bound by United States Supreme Court case law interpreting it.^[5] If we disagree with the Court's holding, too bad. It is up to the United States Supreme Court to fix it, not us.

In this case, Applicant presented some evidence of his intellectual disability during his trial, but he was denied a specific jury instruction on the issue. In his first habeas application, Applicant raised a claim regarding intellectual disability. The trial court made findings and conclusions regarding Applicant's claims based in part upon the criteria we set out in Ex parte Briseno.^[6] We deferred to those findings and denied relief.^[7] The United States Supreme Court subsequently made clear in Moore v. Texas that we cannot rely upon the test set out in Briseno because it violates the federal constitution.^[8] Applicant filed a subsequent writ application based upon Moore, and we remanded the case for the habeas court to resolve Applicant's claim of intellectual disability.^[9]

Applying the standard set out in Moore, the habeas court resolved Applicant's claim in his favor. The habeas court made factual findings to support its conclusion that Applicant is intellectually disabled under Moore. Those findings are supported by the record.^[10] The State does not contest those findings and agrees that it cannot execute Applicant due to his intellectual disability. Applicant is entitled to relief under Supreme Court precedent, and the Court correctly grants it. We've already seen what happens when we ignore the Supreme Court on this issue.^[11]

With these thoughts, I join the Court's order.

Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

The habeas court and this Court conclude that Applicant "has met his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence" that he is a person with intellectual disability under the current clinical diagnostic framework. I would hold that this is the wrong standard, because Applicant presented the intellectual disability issue to the trial court at trial and could have raised it on appeal. Instead, we should employ an Elizondo-type^[1] standard and ask whether it has been shown by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror could find against Applicant on his intellectual disability claim.

Applicant was convicted in 2006-four years after the Supreme Court decided the Atkins case^[2] that exempted intellectually disabled persons from the death penalty. At trial, Applicant requested the submission of an intellectual-disability instruction, which the trial court refused. Applicant could have complained about the trial court's refusal on direct appeal, but he did not.

Because intellectual disability was litigated at trial, we should treat the issue on habeas the same as we treat any other issue on habeas that has been litigated at trial. We should not be deciding the issue of intellectual disability as if it had first been litigated here. But deciding whether Applicant is intellectually disabled by a preponderance of the evidence does just that.

There are several ways that a claim that was litigated at trial might be raised on habeas. To complain about a trial court's refusal to submit a requested intellectual-disability instruction, an applicant could claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that would have supported an instruction.^[3] Or he could claim that false evidence was presented that influenced the trial court to refuse the instruction.^[4] An applicant might be able to raise a claim that the trial court erred in refusing to submit the requested instruction if he can also show that the issue was decided adversely on appeal and that a retroactive change in the law requires a different outcome.^[5] An applicant might be able to advance a "no evidence" claim that the evidence at trial conclusively established his intellectual disability.^[6] But Applicant has advanced none of these claims, nor does his current claim resemble any of these claims. He is not claiming that the trial was tainted by the malfeasance of one of the trial participants (judge, counsel, or witness), or that the trial record, by itself, shows that he is intellectually disabled. Rather, he is claiming that all of the evidence before us now-both at trial and on habeas-shows that he is intellectually disabled.

Applicant makes this claim after an adverse determination of his intellectual disability claim at trial. That procedural fact makes his claim most resemble a claim of actual innocence. While, in Texas, the term "actual innocence" is reserved for situations in which the defendant is not guilty of the charged offense or any lesser-included offense, we have recognized analogous situations.^[7] An analysis similar to that for actual innocence can occur when the issue is whether the defendant is ineligible for the punishment assessed.^[8] And although the procedural "innocence" exception to the subsequent writ bar in federal court differs from the substantive doctrine of actual innocence as a freestanding claim, ^[9] federal courts recognize a parallel procedural "innocence of the death penalty" exception to the federal subsequent writ bar.^[10]

A comparison of the various freestanding and procedural "innocence" standards in the caselaw supports the conclusion that a "clear and convincing . . . no reasonable juror" standard is the appropriate one to apply in this case. The Elizondo freestanding innocence standard and the Sawyer procedural "innocence of the death penalty" standard both employ "clear and convincing . . . no reasonable juror" language.^[11] The Schlup...