Ex parte Peake

Ex parte Taylor Peake

In re: Taylor Peake v. Spencer Wyatt

Taylor Peake v. Spencer Wyatt

Nos. 2190952, 2190953

Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

September 24, 2021

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (DR-18-900658.02 DR-18-900658.01

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

PER CURIAM.

Taylor Peake ("the mother") and Spencer Wyatt ("the father") were divorced by a judgment entered on March 22, 2019 ("the divorce judgment"), by the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court"). The divorce judgment incorporated an agreement of the parties. Paragraph 13 of the divorce judgment stated that the mother would "provide the principal residence for of the parties' minor child," G.M.W. ("the child"), paragraph 16 awarded the parties "shared legal custody" of the child, and paragraph 24 ordered the father to pay the first $20, 000 of the child's

"preschool tuition (and related fees and expenses), 5K through 12th grade school tuition (if applicable) and fees reasonable and necessary school supplies, reasonable and necessary after-school-care fees (this shall only include school-sanctioned after-school-care and not include money for babysitters), and all expenses and fees related to [the child's] agreed-upon extracurricular activities, sports and athletic participation, and camps and the like."

Paragraph 24 of the divorce judgment further provided that "[i]f [the child's] School and Extracurricular Expenses exceed $20, 000 in any given year, and [the father] has provided sufficient proof to [the mother] of his payment of same, the parties shall equally split (50-50) [the child's] School and Extracurricular Expenses in excess of [the father's] annual $20, 000 obligation."

In August 2019, the mother filed a petition seeking a modification of the custody provisions of the divorce judgment; the mother's action was assigned case number DR-18-900658.01 ("the modification action"). The father answered the mother's petition, denying the allegations contained therein. He also filed a separate petition seeking a modification of certain provisions of the divorce judgment and requesting that the mother be held in contempt; the father's action was assigned case number DR-18-900658.02 ("the contempt action"). The trial court ultimately consolidated the modification action and the contempt action.

In July 2020, the father filed in the modification action a motion he entitled "Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion to Compel" ("the motion to compel"). In the motion to compel, the father sought to enforce paragraph 13 of the divorce judgment, which provides:

"13. Principal Residence. [The mother] shall provide the principal residence for the parties' minor child .... [The mother] is currently a resident of Homewood Alabama, and the parties intend to enroll [the child] in the Homewood City Schools. However, the parties acknowledge that they may mutually agree at some point after this Agreement to enroll [the child] in a school outside of the Homewood City Schools. Both parties shall cooperate with one another in terms of school enrollment requirements."

He alleged in the motion to compel that the mother had enrolled the child in Highlands School without his consent and asserted that he "desire[d] for the parties' intent as expressed in the [divorce] [j]udgment to be carried out and for the minor child to attend school in Homewood, where both parties currently reside." The father requested that the trial court enter an order preventing the mother from enrolling the child in any school other than the school in the Homewood City School System for which the child was zoned, requiring the mother to comply with the divorce judgment and to enroll the child in the appropriate Homewood City school, and requiring her to pay his attorney's fees relating to the motion to compel.

On July 23, 2020, the mother filed a response opposing the motion to compel. She alleged that, pursuant to paragraph 16 of the divorce judgment, the parties had joint legal custody of the child but that, "regardless of the parties' stated intentions regarding Homewood City Schools" in paragraph 13, paragraph 16 "designated [the mother] as having final decision making authority with respect to medical educational, religious, and athletic activities." The mother also alleged that the father had cooperated with her in applying to Highlands School but that he had not cooperated regarding the enrollment of the child in Highlands School. Ultimately, the mother requested that the trial court "uphold the [divorce judgment]" and deny the motion to compel.

The trial court held a hearing on the father's motion to compel on August 21, 2020, a few days after the child had begun attending Highlands School. At the hearing, the parties presented arguments regarding their respective understandings of the divorce judgment with respect to the school the child would attend. The mother also presented the testimony of Clyde Simpson Adams III, who was the director of admissions and enrollment for Highlands School, who testified about the parents' having submitted an application for the child to the school and a meeting he had had with the parents.

During the hearing, the father's counsel argued that paragraph 13 of the divorce judgment required the enrollment of the child in the Homewood City School System and permitted the child's attendance in a school outside that system only upon the parties' mutual agreement. In response to the trial court's question about why the second and third sentences in paragraph 13 had been included in the parties' settlement agreement, the mother's counsel relied on the language of paragraph 16, which awarded the mother final decision-making authority over "educational ... activities," stating:

"Your Honor, I mean, we'll have to have some testimony on that from both of the parties about why it was in there. But, you know, Your Honor, the legal standard of joint custody allows for a final decision-making maker, and it could also be why do we have a final decision-making authority [in paragraph 16] if we also have this other language in here? And so to me, the question is which one -- which one trumps, you know, the paragraph 13 or the joint legal custody [in paragraph 16]? And I think the joint legal custody in my opinion as an Alabama legal standard for custody is more weighted than the parties saying they attempt to do something in the future, agree to do -- mutually agree to something in the future which isn't even binding."

As the mother notes in her brief on appeal, during the hearing the trial court also expressed concern regarding paragraph 24 of the divorce judgment, stating, in part: "I cannot change it. I'll let y'all know that, but it's a bad agreement when one person gets to decide what happens and the other person has to have the pocketbook."

On September 15, 2020, the trial court entered an order in the modification action ("the September 2020 order"). The September 2020 order granted the motion to compel and required the mother to remove the child from Highlands School "within seventy-two (72) hours of [the] date of this Order" and to enroll the child "in the appropriate school in the Homewood City School System within twenty-four (24) hours of ... removing the ... child from ... Highlands School." The September 2020 order also stated, in pertinent part, that paragraphs 13 and 16 of the divorce judgment were not ambiguous and contained the following additional provisions:

"6. That Paragraph 13 ... clearly states the intent of the parties was to enroll the ... child in the Homewood City Schools.

"7. That Paragraph 16, second sentence, awarded [the mother] ... final decision-making authority regarding educational decisions for the child ....

"8. That the [divorce judgment] states the intent for the enrollment of the child in a school outside of the Homewood City Schools would be by mutual agreement.

"9. That there is no mutual agreement for the enrollment of the child at ... Highlands School.

"10. That the award to [the mother] of the final decision-making authority would take preceden[ce] in all educational matters not specifically addressed in the [divorce judgment].

"11. That the issue of when the child would be enrolled outside of the Homewood City Schools was addressed in Paragraph 13 of the [divorce judgment]."

On September 16, 2020, the mother filed a notice of appeal to this court in both the modification action, which was assigned case number 2190952, and the contempt action, which was assigned case number 2190953.^[1] Contemporaneous with the filing of her notices of appeal, the mother filed a motion in the modification action and a motion in the contempt action requesting that the trial court stay enforcement of the September 2020 order; the trial court did not immediately rule on those motions. This court entered an order consolidating the mother's appeals. She filed an emergency motion for a stay in this court, which we denied.

On October 1, 2020, the trial court denied the mother's motions to stay, and she filed another motion to stay with this court, which we denied. On February 9, 2021, the trial court entered orders staying further proceedings in that court pending a decision as to the present appellate proceedings and as to mandamus petitions that were filed regarding interlocutory orders entered in other postdivorce proceedings between the parties. See Ex parte Peake [Ms. 2200302, Apr. 30, 2021] ___ So.3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2021); and Ex parte Wyatt Props., LLC, [Ms. 2200159, Apr. 16, 2021] ___ So.3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2021). The mother has advised this court that the child continued to attend the Highlands School for the 2020-2021 school year, and, although the father filed a motion on September 25, 2020, seeking to...