Ex parte Thomas

1

Ex parte Lester Lee Thomas

In re: Jennifer Dell Peach v. Lester Lee Thomas et al.

No. SC-2022-0525

Supreme Court of Alabama

March 3, 2023

Mobile Circuit Court: CV-18-901977

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

PER CURIAM.

Jennifer Dell Peach sued, among others, Lester Lee Thomas in the Mobile Circuit Court ("the trial court"), asserting claims arising from a multivehicle accident that took place after Thomas, a State trooper with the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, allegedly blocked both lanes of a highway to perform traffic stops of speeding drivers. Thomas moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that he was entitled to State-agent immunity. The trial court denied that motion. Thomas petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in his favor on the ground of State-agent immunity. For the following reasons, we deny the petition.

Facts and Procedural History

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on August 13, 2016, Thomas initiated a traffic stop of a speeding driver ("the first speeder") traveling north on Interstate 65 ("I-65") near mile marker 22. Thomas initiated the stop along a stretch of I-65 that has two northbound travel lanes ("the left inside lane" and "the right outside lane") with a speed limit of 70 miles per hour.

Thomas was parked in his police vehicle on the right shoulder of I-65 when his radar recorded the first speeder drive past him at 83 miles per hour in the left inside lane. Thomas activated his vehicle's emergency lights, merged into the left inside lane, and began to pursue the first speeder. As Thomas accelerated his vehicle in pursuit of the first speeder, he noticed, in his rearview mirror, another speeding driver ("the second speeder") traveling behind him in the left inside lane. The first speeder pulled his vehicle off the highway, coming to a stop on the right shoulder of I-65 near mile marker 33. Shortly thereafter, Thomas stopped his police vehicle, in the right outside lane next to the first speeder's vehicle, obstructing access to one of only two travel lanes, and disembarked from his vehicle.

After exiting his police vehicle, Thomas walked into the left inside lane and, facing the second speeder's oncoming vehicle, gestured for the second speeder to stop and pull over.^[1] The second speeder applied his vehicle's brakes and came to a sudden halt in the left inside lane. Upon seeing the blockade of both travel lanes ahead, the five motorists traveling behind the second speeder applied their vehicles' brakes to avoid colliding with the vehicles in front of them. The driver in the first vehicle behind the second speeder diverted his vehicle to the left and into the grass median, while the driver in the second vehicle behind the second speeder came to a halt. Peach was a passenger in the third vehicle behind the second speeder when her daughter, the driver of that vehicle, hit her vehicle's brakes in response to the sudden stop in traffic flow but lost traction and control of her vehicle which then slid and crashed into the vehicles ahead. Peach suffered serious injuries in the crash.

In August 2018, Peach sued Thomas in the trial court, alleging that Thomas had negligently or wantonly caused the chain-reaction collision that led to her injuries. Thomas filed a motion for a summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that he was entitled to State-agent immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975, and Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000) (plurality opinion),^[2] as modified by Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So.2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006). The trial court denied the summary-judgment motion. Thomas now petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in his favor on the basis of State-agent immunity.^[3]

Standard of Review

The denial of a motion for a summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus. Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794 (Ala. 1996). Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary remedy, and it will be issued only when there is "(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte Horton, 711 So.2d 979, 983 (Ala. 1998) (citing Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501 (Ala. 1993)). "In determining, on mandamus review, whether the trial court exceeded the limits of its discretion, 'the appellate courts will not reverse the trial court on an issue or contention not presented to the trial court for its consideration in making its ruling.'" Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So.2d 776, 786 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Ala. 1999)).

When reviewing the denial of a summary-judgment motion asserting State-agent immunity, this Court asks whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the movant is entitled to immunity. Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002). In making that determination, we "view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence, and resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving party." Id. (citing Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000)).

If a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether the movant is entitled to State-agent immunity, summary judgment is not appropriate. Id.

Discussion

Thomas contends that Peach's claims against him are barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity. In Ex parte Cranman, this Court restated the doctrine of State-agent immunity. The Cranman restatement, as modified by Hollis v. City of Brighton, provides, in pertinent part:

"'A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's

"' ....

"'(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons, or serving as peace officers under circumstances entitling such officers to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975.'"

950 So.2d at 309 (second emphasis omitted). Thomas also asserts "peace-officer immunity" pursuant to § 6-5-338(a). In Hollis, this Court modified category (4) of the Cranman restatement to incorporate the immunity for peace officers set forth in § 6-5-338(a). Accordingly, this Court now recognizes that the restatement of State-agent immunity as set out by this Court in Cranman, and as modified by Hollis, "governs the determination of whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a)." Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So.3d 282, 292 (Ala. 2012); see also Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201, 204 (Ala. 2003) and Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So.2d 1276, 1281-82 (Ala. 2008).

There are two exceptions to the immunity recognized in Cranman:

"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity

"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency require otherwise; or

"(2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law."

792 So.2d at 405.

Furthermore, this Court has established a "burden-shifting" process when a party raises the defense of State-agent immunity. Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So.2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006). A party who asserts the defense of State-agent immunity bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from a function that would entitle the State agent to immunity. Id. If the State agent satisfies that initial burden, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must demonstrate that one of the two exceptions to State-agent immunity applies. Id. "One of the ways in which a plaintiff can show that a State agent acted beyond his or her authority is by proffering evidence that the State agent failed '"to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist."'" Kennedy, 992 So.2d at 1282-83 (quoting Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)). A State agent also acts beyond his or her authority by violating a rule or statute that imposes a mandatory duty upon the State agent and is "'so specific that it removes the [S]tate agent's discretion and puts him on notice that certain, specific acts are unacceptable.'" Odom v. Helms, 314 So.3d 220, 229 (Ala. 2020) (quoting King v. Archer (No. 2:17-CV-174-KOB, Sept. 6, 2018) (N.D. Ala. 2018) (not reported in F.Supp.3d)); see also, e.g., Norris v. City of Montgomery, 821 So.2d 149, 155 (Ala. 2001) (holding that police officer was not entitled to discretionary-function immunity under § 6-5-338(a) because evidence demonstrated that officer had violated statute imposing a mandatory duty).

We conclude that Thomas met his initial burden of demonstrating that he was engaged in law-enforcement activities for which State-agent immunity would be available. It is undisputed that Thomas was acting generally within the line and scope of his law-enforcement duties and was attempting to enforce the traffic laws of the State when he initiated the double traffic stop giving rise to this action. See, e.g. ...