Ezeiruaku v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co.

VINCENT EZEIRUAKU, Plaintiff, v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANYand ADAM THOMASON, Defendants.

1:20-cv-00177-NLH-KMW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

September 18, 2020

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

VINCENT EZEIRUAKU

900 MONET COURT

WILLIAMSTOWN, NEW JERSEY 08094

Plaintiff appearing pro se

HUGH A. KEFFER

FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP

105 EISENHOWER PARKWAY, SUITE 103

ROSELAND, NEW JERSEY 07068

On behalf of Defendants Fidelity National Title Insurance Company and Adam Thomason

HILLMAN, District Judge

This defamation matter concerns a dispute between an individual and a title insurance company over whether a property was encumbered by a mortgage at the time it was sold. Plaintiff Vincent Ezeiruaku, appearing pro se, filed a one-count claim for defamation per se, alleging that Defendants Fidelity National Title Insurance Company and Adam Thomason defamed him in a letter requesting he indemnify the company against any losses or expenses associated with the mortgage. Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for dismissal of Plaintiff's claim, (Docket No. 7), which Plaintiff has opposed. (Docket No. 8). For the reasons expressed below, Defendants' motion will be granted and the claim will be dismissed with prejudice.

Background

Plaintiff alleges that in 2012 he sold property and conveyed the deed to third-party purchasers "free of any outstanding liens or encumbrances." (Docket No. 4 at ¶ 8). Nevertheless, on July 22, 2019, Plaintiff received a letter from Thomason, a Fidelity employee, regarding a potential encumbrance on the property. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11. Plaintiff alleges that the letter accuses him of having committed a crime by fraudulently and knowingly conveying an encumbered property while stating that it was free of encumbrances. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11, 14-20. According to Plaintiff, this letter was made available not only to other employees of Fidelity who had access to the claim file for the property's title insurance, but also to the purchasers of the property and a third-party bank. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 17.

Discussion

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because there is complete diversity of citizenshipbetween the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

B. Legal Standards Governing Motions to Dismiss

When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . ." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994); and then citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks "not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions' . . . ."); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) ("Iqbal . . . provides the final nail in the coffin for the 'no set of facts' standard that applied to federal complaints before Twombly."). "A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court may not consider "matters extraneous to the pleadings." Crisdon v. City of Camden, No. 11-cv-02087, 2012 WL 685874, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2012) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)); Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). "However, an exception to the general rule is that a 'document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint' may be considered 'without converting the motion [to dismiss] into onefor summary judgment.'" In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426 (quoting Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)). Such documents include "matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case." Crisdon, 2012 WL 685874, at *2 (quoting Buck v. Hampton Twp. School Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006)). If any other matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court, and the court does not exclude those matters, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be treated as a summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

Defendants' motion relies predominantly on four documents attached to the motion papers but not to the Complaint: a 1990 deed showing that the property in question had been conveyed to Plaintiff, a 2012 deed showing that Plaintiff had conveyed the property to third-party purchasers, a 2005 "Mortgage and Assignment of Rents" naming Plaintiff as the mortgagor and bearing his signature, and the allegedly defamatory letter sent by Defendant Thomason to Plaintiff on July 22, 2019. (Docket No. 7-2, Exs. 2, 3, 6, and 7). Although he does not dispute the authenticity of any of these documents, Plaintiff argues that, by presenting to the Court documents not attached to theComplaint, Defendants have turned the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. (Docket No. 8 at 3-4).

Here, the Court easily finds that it can consider the July 22, 2019 letter, as it is explicitly referenced in the Complaint and is the document that contains the allegedly defamatory statements at the heart of the Complaint. (Docket No. 4 at ¶¶ 9-12). The Court also finds that it may consider the other documents described above. The 2005 Mortgage and Assignment of Rents and the 2012 deed are also explicitly referenced in both the Complaint and the allegedly defamatory letter, (Docket No. 4 at ¶ 9; Docket No. 7-2, Ex. 7), and are integral to Plaintiff's claim that it was defamatory for Defendants to state that he had granted a mortgage that was outstanding at the time of the 2012 conveyance. Plaintiff cannot "survive the present Motion to Dismiss simply by failing to attach these documents to his Complaint." Inacio v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2015 WL 457049, at *1 (D.N.J. 2015). Even were they not, however, the mortgage, as well as both the 1990 and 2012 deeds, can be considered by the Court as they are "matters of public record" under New Jersey law. Maturo v. Bank of America, N.A., Case No. 16-350 (CCC), 2017 WL 773878, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2017); N.J.S.A. 46:26A-2.¹

The Court now looks to Defendants' arguments in their moving papers considering these documents.

C. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants defamed him by "falsely accusing [him] of having conveyed a property that was encumbered while knowingly and intentionally stating that it was not encumbered." (Docket No. 4 at ¶ 16). To plead a prima facie case of defamation, "a plaintiff must establish (1) the assertion of a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) the unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party, (3) fault amounting to at least negligence by the publisher, and (4) damages." Robles v. U.S. Envt. Universal Serv., Inc., 469 Fed. Appx. 104, 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1267-68 (N.J. 2004)); Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 969 A.2d 1097, 1113 (N.J. 2009).

Defendants respond by arguing that the Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently plead a claim for defamation and must be dismissed for three reasons: (1) the allegedly false statements were in fact true; (2) the statements were not defamatory and donot constitute defamation per se, even if they were false; and (3) the Complaint fails to adequately allege publication of the statements. The Court agrees with all three of Defendants' arguments.

The primary element of a defamation claim is that the offending statements are false. "[T]he truth of the statement is a complete defense to a defamation action." Read v. Profeta, 397 F.Supp.3d 597, 651 (D.N.J. 2019) (quoting McLaughlin v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc., 751 A.2d 1066, 1071 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)); G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 310 (N.J. 2011).

Both the public record and Plaintiff's own filings demonstrate that each of the statements regarding Plaintiff in the letter were true. The July 22, 2019 letter is brief, and the only statements it makes regarding Plaintiff or his actions were that he had granted a mortgage on the property while he owned it, that he conveyed the property in 2012 with a covenant against grantor's acts, and that the mortgage was still outstanding on both the date of the conveyance and the date of the letter. (Docket No. 7-2, Ex. 7). Based on these statements, the letter presents Defendants' position that Plaintiff is responsible for the outstanding amount of the mortgage and should indemnify Fidelity against any associated losses or expenses. Id.

As alleged by...