Ezenwa v. Shadowens

1

MAXWELL C. EZENWA, (BOP # 83800-079), Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SHADOWENS, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. H-23-2610

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division

October 26, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Lee H Rosenthal United States District Judge

Maxwell C. Ezenwa, a federal inmate representing himself and proceeding without prepaying the filing fee, has filed a prisoner's civil rights complaint against United States Postal Inspector Andrew Shadowens, the Harris County Sheriff and two officers in the Sheriff's Office, Sergeant Novitz and an investigator named “Victor.” (Docket Entry No. 1). Ezenwa alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional rights during the events resulting in his arrest and conviction on multiple federal charges. (Id.). At the court's request, Ezenwa filed a more definite statement of his claims. (Docket Entry No. 8). Because Ezenwa is a prisoner, the court is required to closely examine his claims and dismiss the complaint in whole or in part if it determines that it “is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). After reviewing Ezenwa's complaint, the court dismisses his action, for the reasons explained below.

I. Background

Ezenwa is a federal inmate serving a 78-month sentence for one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, eight counts of wire fraud affecting financial institutions, one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, and five counts of mail fraud. See United States v. Ezenwa, No. 4:20-cr-267 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2022). These convictions resulted from evidence that Ezenwa and his coconspirators obtained stolen credit card information and processed fraudulent transactions on the cards through their businesses. See United States v. Ezenwa, No. 21-20609, 2023 WL 3059165 (5th Cir. Apr. 24, 2023). The evidence also showed that Ezenwa and a coconspirator obtained funds from individuals who intended those funds to be invested and instead deposited them into the conspirators' bank accounts for their own use. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Ezenwa's convictions and sentences. Id. To date, he has not sought review in the United States Supreme Court.

On July 17, 2023, Ezenwa filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket Entry No. 1). At the court's request, he also filed a more definite statement of his claims. (Docket Entry No. 8). In these pleadings, Ezenwa alleges that Inspector Andrew Shadowens and Sergeant Novitz came to Ezenwa's place of business on July 6, 2016. (Docket Entry Nos. 1, p. 3; 8, p. 2). Ezenwa alleges that Sergeant Novitz had an “illegal pocket warrant” for Ezenwa's arrest that was not based on probable cause. (Docket Entry No. 1, p. 9). Sergeant Novitz also had a search warrant, which Ezenwa alleges was invalid because it contained false information and intentional omissions. (Id. at 6-7). Ezenwa alleges that during the search, Inspector Shadowens forced him to unlock his phone, resulting in a second illegal search. (Id. at 17). After the search, Inspector Shadowens and Sergeant Novitz arrested Ezenwa and seized $13,026.00 in cash, $9,600 in first-class postage stamps, five uncashed checks, Nigerian bank account records, a blue internet logbook, and computer disks, none of which have been returned to him. (Id. at 13).

Ezenwa alleges that in an effort to support the charges, Investigator Victor “spied on” Ezenwa's Nigerian bank accounts during July and November of 2016 by traveling to Nigeria, speaking with bank representatives there, and obtaining records. (Docket Entry Nos. 1, p. 3; 8, p. 5). Ezenwa alleges that Investigator Victor also defamed him and his businesses by telling the media that he had been arrested for credit card fraud. (Docket Entry No. 8, p. 5). Finally, Ezenwa alleges that the Harris County Sheriff failed to properly train and supervise his employees. (Id. at 6). The basis for the failure-to-train claim is that if the Harris County Sheriff's officers had been properly trained, they would not have violated Ezenwa's constitutional rights. (Id.).

II. The Legal Standards

A. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

Because Ezenwa is a prisoner seeking relief from the government, the court is required to screen his complaint as soon as feasible after docketing. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (requiring courts to screen complaints filed by persons proceeding without prepaying the filing fee); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (requiring courts to screen suits filed by prisoners under § 1983). “As part of this review, the district court is authorized to dismiss a complaint if the action ‘is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.'” Fleming v. United States, 538 Fed.Appx. 423, 425 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)). A complaint is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact when the facts alleged are “clearly baseless,” “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (quoting Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325-29 (1989)). The court may dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).

B. Pro Se Pleadings

Ezenwa is representing himself. Courts construe pleadings filed by self-represented litigants under a less stringent standard of review. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Under this standard, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,' and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But even under this liberal standard, self-represented litigants must still “abide by the rules that govern the federal courts.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014). They must also “properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary judgment evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.” Id. (cleaned up).

III. Discussion

A. The Claims Against Inspector Shadowens

Ezenwa alleges that Inspector Shadowens committed trespass, an illegal search and seizure, and a false arrest, on July 6, 2016. These claims must be dismissed because they are barred by limitations.

Ezenwa's claims against Shadowens arise, if at all, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens extends the protections of § 1983 to parties injured by federal actors. See Abate v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 993 F.2d 107, 110 n.14 (5th Cir. 1993). In Texas, Bivens claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. See Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2010); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a). A claim for relief filed more than two years after the cause of action accrues is barred by the statute of limitations.

While state law sets the limitations period, federal law determines when a cause of action accrues. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). “A cause of action accrues, under federal law, when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 589-90 (5th Cir. 1999). A cause of action for an illegal search and seizure accrues on the date of the search and seizure. See Jaramillo v. Renner, 697 Fed.Appx. 326, 326 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). A cause of action for trespass accrues on the date of the trespass “even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred.” EnerQuest Oil & Gas, LLC v. Plains Expl. & Prod. Co., 981 F.Supp.2d 575, 615 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (quoting Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tex. 1997)). And a cause of action for false arrest that results in criminal proceedings accrues when “the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process,” which is generally the date charges are filed. Johnson v. Harris County, No. 22-20549, 2023 WL 6627822, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2023) (quoting Wallace, 549 at 397). If any of these claims is brought more than two years after the claim accrued, the claim is barred by limitations and subject to dismissal as legally frivolous under § 1915A(b)(1). See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1998).

Ezenwa alleges that the trespass, illegal search and seizure, and false arrest by Inspector Shadowens occurred on July 6, 2016. Ezenwa's trespass and illegal search and seizure claims accrued on that date. Publicly available records show that charges were filed against Ezenwa based on his arrest and that he was detained after a probable cause hearing on July 7, 2016. See Harris County District Clerk, www.hcdistrictclerk.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2023). At the latest, his claim for false arrest accrued on that date. Ezenwa did not file his civil rights complaint until July 13, 2023, well beyond the two-year deadline.

Claims that are plainly barred by the applicable statute of limitations are subject to dismissal as legally frivolous. See Gonzalez, 157 F.3d at 1019-20; Gartrell v Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993) (per...