F. Exclusionary Rule Applicability
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (An officer in one county learned that the defendant was at the station to retrieve some belongings from his truck, which had been impounded. The officer had the clerk check for any outstanding warrants on the defendant and, finding none, requested that the clerk contact the neighboring county clerk for a warrant check as well. The neighboring county clerk found that there was an active arrest warrant out for the defendant, and the officer asked that a copy of the warrant be faxed over; prior to receiving this information, however, the officer pulled the defendant over as he left the station and arrested him, finding methamphetamine and a pistol in the vehicle. In the meantime, the neighboring county clerk had realized that the warrant had actually been recalled five months prior, and called to notify the clerk of the mistake. However, the defendant had already been arrested and searched in the time span it took for the clerk to uncover that information, approximately ten to fifteen minutes, and was subsequently indicted for possession. The defendant subsequently moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that the arrest was illegal because the warrant was invalid. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the motion, finding that the officers acted with the good faith belief that the warrant was valid; the district court adopted these recommendations and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the other county's actions were negligent, "not a deliberate or tactical choice to act" and, thus, there would be little to no benefit in suppressing the evidence. The defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was granted. HELD: When police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply. The assumption that a Fourth Amendment violation did in fact occur does not therefore automatically trigger the application of the exclusionary rule. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter authorities from acting inappropriately, and, further, the benefits of such deterrence must outweigh the costs. A series of cases have held the exclusionary rule inapplicable in similar situations as here, i.e. when officers arrested a defendant on the basis of a warrant that was later found to be invalid, for one reason or another (United States v. Leon, Arizona v. Evans, Massachusetts v. Sheppard). However, the police conduct must not be "flagrant" and the officers must not have knowledge that the search and arrest were unconstitutional. Thus, for the exclusionary rule to apply, the police conduct must be so "deliberate" that the exclusion of evidence would sufficiently deter future misconduct, and so culpable that deterrence is worth the cost to society. Here, the conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion. Moreover, if the officers had been "reckless in maintaining a warrant system" or were knowingly creating false entries in the system to provide for future false arrests, exclusion would be justified. But here, there was no evidence here that there were widespread errors in the county's system, or that the system was maintained recklessly, and, as such, exclusion would thus have been improper).
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (The defendant, a Mexican national, was arrested by police following an exchange of gunfire with police and subsequently made incriminating statements while in detention. He was not informed that he could have the Mexican consulate notified about his detention according to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. He claimed the state authority's failure to do so should require imposition of the exclusionary rule on the incriminating statements. HELD: Neither the Court's supervisory power to impose on state courts the remedy of suppression, nor the Vienna Convention implicit terms require such exclusionary rule remedy.) See also People v. Najeva, 371 Ill.App.3d 1144, 864 N.E.2d 324 (2nd Dist. 2007) (The defendant pled guilty to criminal sexual abuse. He later filed a section 2-1401 petition, in which he contended that the judgment of conviction was void. The defendant alleged that he was a citizen of Mexico and that when he was arrested, he was not informed of his right to contact the Mexican embassy or consul general, and the consul general was not informed of his arrest. HELD: The Vienna Convention does not generally provide rights enforceable by an individual defendant. To the extent that the defendant might have been able to claim a judicial remedy in this case, his guilty plea waived that right.); People v. Montano, 365 Ill. App. 3d 195, 848 N.E.2d 616 (2d Dist. 2006) (The defendant, a Mexican national, argued on appeal that he was denied his constitutional right to due process because he was not advised of his right to communicate with the consular officials of Mexico upon arrest as guaranteed by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The defendant claimed that such a right is an individual right, not the right of the foreign state, and that the failure to inform him of his right to contact the Mexican consulate should result in a new trial. HELD: The defendant had no enforceable right that should warrant a new trial).
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (The police obtained a valid search warrant to seize drugs and firearms in a residence. Before making entry, they announced their presence but only waited three to five seconds before making entry. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence found because of non-compliance with the knock and announce rule. HELD: The Fourth Amendment requires a knock and announcement unless there is reasonable suspicion that the police or evidence would be endangered or compliance would be futile. The proper measure for how long police must wait depends on how long it could take four occupants to dispose of the contraband. Here, the State of Michigan conceded the rule was violated. However, exclusion of the evidence is not warranted. Suppression of evidence must be the "last resort, not.the first impulse." Exclusion involves social costs--potential release of dangerous criminals. On the other hand, it advances the interest of deterring the police from ignoring the Constitution. Exclusion cannot be premised on the mere fact a constitutional violation was a "but for" cause of obtaining the evidence. Attenuation can occur not only where the causal connection was remote, but also where the interest in deterrence is outweighed by the cost of loss of evidence. The knock and announce rule does not prevent the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. Since the interests behind the rule have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule should not apply. The defendant can be afforded relief by resort to civil remedies and can be protected by internal police discipline).
Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1999) (HELD: The exclusionary rule is inapplicable in state parole revocation hearing). See also United States v. Brimah, 214 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2000) (the exclusionary rule inapplicable in sentencing hearing).
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (HELD: Generally, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. "Having said this, we hasten to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers"). See also People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 813 N.E.2d 93 (2004) (following Ornelas standard); People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001) (review of ultimate question of whether evidence should be suppressed is de novo, citing Ornelas).
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (holding Fourth Amendment requires exclusionary rule in forfeiture proceedings where evidence in issue was seized in illegal search); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) (the exclusionary rule applicable in quasi-criminal forfeiture proceeding); People ex rel. Devine v. $30,700.00 United States Currency, 199 Ill. 2d 142, 766 N.E.2d 1084 (2002) (exclusionary rule applicable in forfeiture hearing); People v. $280,020 In United States Currency, 2013 IL App (1st) 111820, 922 N.E.2d 533 (exclusionary rule applicable in forfeiture hearing).
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (HELD: The exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings such as a deportation hearing. Application of the exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings can only be justified if the rule is likely to add significant protection to Fourth Amendment rights by deterring police misconduct. However, there is no "convincing" evidence it will "contribute materially to that end").
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (HELD: Federal habeas corpus is not open to a defendant's Fourth Amendment claims if the State courts provided the opportunity for full and fair litigation of such claims).
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding evidence seized illegally by State police admissible in federal civil tax litigation).
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (HELD: The federal constitutional exclusionary rule does not apply to non-criminal proceedings or civil proceedings and, as such, allowing a grand jury witness to raise the exclusionary rule and challenge grand jury questions based on evidence obtained from illegal search and seizure would unjustifiably hamper the Grand Jury from discharging its duties in a effective and expeditious manner).
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377...
