F.H. v. State

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F.H., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner

No. 23A-JV-2733

Court of Appeals of Indiana

May 28, 2024

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

Appeal from the LaGrange Circuit Court The Honorable William R Walz, IV, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 44C01-2210-JD-28

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana George P. Sherman Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

WEISSMANN, JUDGE.

[¶1] Sixteen-year-old F.H. was adjudicated a delinquent for committing what would have been, if committed by an adult, sexual battery against 13-year-old E.L. F.H. appeals, arguing that the juvenile court wrongly excluded evidence under Indiana's rape shield rule. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[¶2] F.H. and E.L. met online sometime in 2022. On July 6 of that year, a few days after the two had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse, F.H. and E.L. arranged to meet at F.H.'s house in the middle of the night. When E.L. arrived, they went to F.H.'s bedroom in the basement, where F.H. quickly began to pressure E.L. to have sexual intercourse again. Despite E.L. saying "wait" and "stop," F.H forced E.L. to perform oral sex on him and to engage in sexual intercourse. Tr. Vol. II, p. 74.

[¶3] Later that day, a distraught E.L. told her mother and sister what had happened at F.H.'s house. E.L.'s mother contacted police and took E.L. to a sexual assault center for a forensic exam. Tests showed that F.H. was the likely contributor of sperm found in and around E.L.'s genitalia. The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that F.H. had engaged in acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute Level 6 felony sexual battery and Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury.

[¶4] At an evidentiary hearing, F.H. offered a different version of events. He stated that in the early morning hours of July 6, E.L. texted him and offered him pills to hang out with her. In her own testimony, E.L. had admitted to using both drugs and alcohol recreationally. But F.H. testified that he did not take the pills. According to F.H., E.L. arrived at his house around 12:40 a.m., and he let her inside. F.H. and E.L. then went down to his basement bedroom. As F.H. described the incident, he briefly left the room to grab a snack, and when he returned, E.L. had taken off her clothes and was sitting on his bed. F.H. described being "very shocked" and that he "was just expecting to hang out." Id. at 151-52. Although F.H. thought they might have sex later, E.L. left soon thereafter, and no intercourse occurred.

[¶5] Before the evidentiary hearing, F.H. sought permission to introduce evidence that when E.L. "has sexual relations with an individual, she is frequently under the influence of alcohol, marijuana or any one of the six (6) different types of [her] prescribed medications." App. Vol. II, p. 107. In an offer of proof, two individuals testified generally about E.L.'s sexual behavior, including that E.L. had traded sex for drugs in the past and lied about her age before having sexual intercourse. The juvenile court excluded this evidence upon the State's objections.

[¶6] After reviewing the evidence presented, the juvenile court found that F.H. had committed the adult equivalent of sexual battery. F.H. received a two-year sentence, suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

[¶7] On appeal, F.H. challenges only the juvenile court's decision to exclude evidence of E.L.'s sexual history. The decision to exclude evidence is within the trial court's sound discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17 28 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015).

I. Sexual History Evidence Was Properly Excluded

[¶8] Indiana Evidence Rule 412, known as the "rape shield rule," provides, in relevant part:

(a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct: (1) evidence offered to prove that a victim or witness engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a victim's or witness's sexual predisposition.

(b) Exceptions.

(1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case: ***

(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant's constitutional rights.

[¶9] The purpose of Rule 412 is to "prevent the victim of a sexual assault from being placed on trial and to remove impediments to reporting sex crimes." Smith v. State, 140 N.E.3d 363, 370 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). "The Rule embodies Indiana's Rape Shield Statute, codified at Indiana Code section 35-37-4-4, which recognizes that 'inquiry into a victim's other sexual activity is sufficiently problematic that it should not be permitted to become the focus of the defense.'" Id. (quoting Williams v. State, 681 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ind. 1997)).

[¶10] From this framework, F.H.'s argument proceeds in two alternative steps. First, he contends that his evidence does not fall under one of Rule 412(a)'s prohibited uses and was thus admissible. But if the evidence was prohibited, F.H. nonetheless maintains that the evidence's exclusion violated his constitutional rights and should have been admitted under Rule 412(b)(1)(C).

A. F.H.'s Evidence Was Prohibited By Rule 412(a)

[¶11] As F.H. describes it, the excluded evidence related to whether E.L. had ever: (1) "lied to her prior sexual partners about her age"; (2) "traded sexual favors for drugs with her prior partners"; and (3) "claimed she had sex with other people." Appellant's Br., pp. 11-12. On its face, this evidence goes to E.L.'s sexual behavior and sexual predisposition and is thus prohibited by Rule 412(a).

[¶12] According to F.H., the evidence was offered not as an improper inquiry into E.L.'s sexual history but rather to prove E.L.'s "motivations as to why she engaged in sex with others." Id. at 12. Even if true these pieces of evidence still fall under "Rule 412's general prohibition of inquiry into the victim's sexual history." Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200. F.H. cites to no authority suggesting that so long as the defendant merely questions the victim's "motivations," any evidence otherwise prohibited by Rule 412 is fair game. Indeed, the opposite is true. See, e.g., id. (excluding evidence "that on prior occasions the victim had committed acts of prostitution in exchange for money or cocaine" under Rule 412); ...