F.V. v. Bd. of Educ.

1

F.V. and M.V., individually and on behalf of B.V., Plaintiffs, v. CHERRY HILL TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:21-CV-18096-KMW-SAK

United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Camden Vicinage

March 28, 2023

Jamie M. Epstein, Esquire

Counsel for Plaintiffs F.V. and M.V., individually and on behalf of B.V.

Eric L. Harrison, Esquire

Methfessel & Werbel

Counsel for Defendant Cherry Hill Township Board of Education

OPINION

KAREN M. WILLIAMS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs F.V. and M.V., on behalf of their minor daughter, B.V., bring this action against Defendant Cherry Hill Township Board of Education (the “Board”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. Specifically, Plaintiffs appeal the June 17, 2021 Final Decision of New Jersey Administrative Law Judge Jacob S. Gertsman (the “ALJ”), which denied Plaintiffs' claims and demands for relief as moot.

Presently before the Court is the Board's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Plaintiffs have not opposed the Board's Motion.^[1] For the reasons set forth below, the Board's Motion is granted, and the ALJ's Final Decision is affirmed.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

The IDEA is a “comprehensive scheme of federal legislation designed to meet the special educational needs of children with disabilities.” M.A. ex rel E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 344 F.3d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 2003). In exchange for federal funding, states pledge to comply with a number of substantive and procedural conditions in providing educational services to qualifying disabled students. See T.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 4 F.4th 179, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2021). In turn, state recipients then apportion federal funds to Local Educational Agencies (“LEAs”), like the Board here, who are in turn responsible for providing educational services under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1412-1414.

i. Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”)

One of the essential concepts of the IDEA is its mandate that qualifying students be provided with a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”). Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 390 (2017) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)). Though the IDEA does not specifically prescribe what a FAPE entails, it does make clear that it consists of both “special education” and “related services.” See Bd. OfEduc. OfHenrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. V. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(26), (29)). The IDEA also contains a “mainstreaming” component, reflecting a strong preference for a qualifying children to be educated in the “least restrictive environment.” L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2006). To this end, the “least restrictive environment” entails one that, “to the greatest extent possible, satisfactorily educates disabled children together with children who are not disabled, in the same school the disabled child would attend if the child were not disabled.” S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Oberti by Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213-14 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]his provision sets forth a ‘strong congressional preference' for integrating children with disabilities in regular classrooms.”).^[2]

ii. Individualized Education Program (“IEP”)

The so-called “centerpiece” of the IDEA is the “individualized education program” (“IEP”), which serves as the “primary vehicle” by which states provide students with a FAPE. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4). “An IEP is a written statement, ‘developed, reviewed, and revised' by [an] ‘IEP Team'-a group of school officials and the parents of the student-that spells out how a school will meet an individual disabled student's educational needs.” Y.B. ex rel. S.B. v. Howell Twp. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.4th 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A), (B)). In addition, an IEP sets forth the student's “present levels of academic achievement, offers measurable annual goals to enable the child to . . . make progress in the general educational curriculum, and describes supplementary aids and services . . . provided to the child to meet those goals.” Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I), (II)(aa), (IV)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (omissions in original).

iii. IDEA Violations

Generally speaking, there are two species of IDEA violations. First, there is a “substantive violation,” which arises when an “IEP's content, such as the educational services, is insufficient to afford the student a FAPE.” S.W. v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., No. 22-11510, 2022 WL 807344, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2022). In contrast, a “procedural violation” occurs “when the school district fails to comply with the processes required by the IDEA.” Id.; see also ASAH v. New Jersey Dep't of Educ., No. 16-3935, 2017 WL 2829648, at *10 n.10 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017) (“A procedural violation generally concerns the process by which the IEP and placement offer was developed and conveyed; on the other hand, a substantive violation arises from a deficiency in the programming being offered.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The potential relief that may be afforded to parents depends on the specific violation they allege has occurred. Parents who allege a substantive violation-such as a denial of a FAPE-may seek compensatory relief in the form of appropriate educational services within the district (“compensatory education”) or tuition reimbursement for an appropriate placement in private school. See C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 66 (3d Cir. 2010). “On the other hand, a plaintiff alleging only that a school district has failed to comply with a procedural requirement of the IDEA, independent of any resulting deprivation of a FAPE, may only seek injunctive relief for prospective compliance.” Id.

iv. Dispute Resolution Procedures

Where a dispute arises concerning a qualifying child's education and services, parents may pursue a number of dispute-resolution procedures, among which include the right to begin an “impartial due process hearing” in accordance with state law. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). In New Jersey, this process entails filing a complaint and request for a due process hearing with the New Jersey Department of Education. See A.C. o/b/o Z.P. v. W. Windsor-Plainsboro Bd. of Educ., No. 21-13016, 2022 WL 17340687, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2022); see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-2.7(c). This process “encourages parents and the local school district to work together to formulate an individualized plan for a child's education, and allows the education agencies to apply their expertise and correct their own mistakes.” Woodruff v. Hamilton Twp. Pub. Sch., 305 Fed.Appx. 833, 837 (3d Cir. 2009). However, if a resolution cannot be reached, the matter is transmitted to the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law (the “NJOAL”) to be adjudicated by way of a “due process hearing.” See Est. of S.B. by & through Bacon v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., No. 17-07158, 2018 WL 3158820, at *2 (D.N.J. June 28, 2018); see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-2.7.

“The decision of the administrative law judge is final, binding on both parties, and to be implemented without undue delay unless stayed . . .” N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-2.7(1). If parents are dissatisfied with the outcome of the due process hearings, they may seek judicial review of an ALJ's decision “by filing an action in a competent state or federal court” Y.B., 4 F.4th at 198 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)).

B. Factual Background and Procedural History

Plaintiffs are the parents of B.V., a minor child currently enrolled as a student in the Cherry Hill School District. (ECF No. 11-7 at 197). B.V., who has Down syndrome, has been identified and deemed eligible for special education and related services pursuant to the IDEA. (Id.).^[3] During the 2019-2020 school year, B.V. attended a “self-contained” pre-school program-an educational setting that only educates children with special needs. (Id. at 198). In addition, B.V. also received certain supplementary services, which included individual speech therapy sessions. (ECF No. 111 at 14). B.V.'s placement and services were prescribed by her 2019-2020 IEP, which had been developed by the Board and approved by B.V.'s parents (the “Pre-School IEP”). (Id.).

However, a dispute ultimately arose between Plaintiffs and the Board as to B.V.'s recommended placement for the subsequent 2020-2021 school year. On March 30, 2020, the Parties convened a meeting in which they sought to review and, if necessary, redevelop B.V.'s IEP in anticipation of her kindergarten year. As with the Pre-School IEP, the final version of the 20212021 IEP proposed to B.V.'s parents (the “Kindergarten IEP”) recommended that B.V. continue her placement in a self-contained classroom during her kindergarten year. (ECF No. 11-1 at 15). Plaintiffs, however, rejected the Board's proposal, wishing instead for B.V. to be placed in an “inclusion” or “general education” setting-one in which special-needs children are educated alongside non-disabled children. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 4.

i. Plaintiffs' First Petition

On May 9, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Request for Mediation with the New Jersey Department of Education (the “NJDOE”) in which they formally rejected the Board's the Kindergarten IEP's proposed placement. (ECF No. 11-1 at 32-39). More specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that B.V.'s placement in a self-contained setting was not the ...