Fabela v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist.

SANDRA A. FABELA, Plaintiff, v. CORPUS CHRISTI INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-CV-387

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

May 21, 2020

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Sandra Fabela, pro se, filed this lawsuit against Corpus Christi Independent School District (CCISD) and CCISD Superintendent Dr. Roland Hernandez. D.E. 1. After retaining counsel, she filed an amended complaint, which dropped her claims against Dr. Hernandez but maintained a variety of workplace discrimination, retaliation, and other claims against CCISD. D.E. 5.

The Court now considers CCISD's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (D.E. 8), as well as Plaintiff's response (D.E. 12) and CCISD's reply (D.E. 14). CCISD's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, as detailed below. D.E. 8. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend her complaint. However, Plaintiff's counsel is cautioned that failure to provide factual pleadings in compliance with the federal pleading standards will result in the claims being dismissed.

BACKGROUND

The Court recounts the allegations of the amended complaint and those contained in two discrimination charges that Plaintiff filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). D.E. 8-1, 8-2. Because the EEOC charges were referenced in the amended complaint, the Court may consider them in evaluating the sufficiency of the pleadings in stating a claim upon which relief may be granted. Collins v. Morgan Stanley DeanWitter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000).

I. Allegations of the First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff is a Hispanic woman over forty years of age, with an unspecified disability. She began teaching for CCISD at an unspecified school in 2010. In August of 2015, teachers were asked to provide their supervisors with a list of items they needed for their classrooms. Plaintiff submitted a written request for a "teacher chair for her disability," but never received it. D.E. 5, p. 2.

At some unspecified time, other teachers were provided easels for their classrooms, but Plaintiff did not receive one. D.E. 5, p. 2. Principal Segovia told Plaintiff that an easel had been ordered but Plaintiff never received it. At another unspecified time, Plaintiff's school received donations to purchase Smart Boards for first- and second-grade teachers. Plaintiff taught kindergarten through second grade at the time, but did not receive a Smart Board. Three years later, she received a "hand-me-down" Smart Board with broken speakers, while other classrooms received Smart TV's. D.E. 5, p. 3.

At yet another unspecified time, CCISD promoted Alesia Astorage, who was younger than forty and not disabled, to lead teacher. Plaintiff, who had more experience and education, was not offered this position. D.E. 5, p. 3.

On or about November 2017, Plaintiff was overseeing students when one student scratched another. D.E. 5, p. 3. Plaintiff was suspended pending an investigation for child abuse and neglect. Without further elaboration, Plaintiff states she was treated as if she scratched the student herself. D.E. 5, p. 3.

Plaintiff later returned to CCISD. When she returned, Principal Segovia directed Plaintiff to physically deliver her lesson plans to an administrator named Mr. Gonzales on a weekly basis, though he had access to the plans online. Plaintiff's classroom was located across campus so she found this to be an inconvenience. D.E. 5, p. 3. Principal Segovia did not require other teachers to do this.

On March 5, 2019, Principal Segovia and Human Resources Director Donna Adams issued Plaintiff a "job-in-jeopardy" letter. D.E. 5, p. 4. Plaintiff claims there was no basis for the letter because these letters are only given to employees who commit serious infractions. D.E. 5, p. 4. But Adams told Plaintiff that she received the letter because they were not able to terminate her. D.E. 5, p. 4. Segovia and Adams failed to deliver the letter by certified mail, as required by CCISD Board Policy. Plaintiff says the letter damaged her reputation and contained a false statement that she had been investigated three years earlier for drugging a student. D.E. 5, p. 4.

The same student who committed the scratching while under Plaintiff's supervision also scratched another student while under the supervision of a male CCISD employee,Coach Aceves. But Coach Aceves was not investigated, suspended, or given a "job-in-jeopardy" letter. D.E. 5, p. 3.

While this letter ostensibly arises from the scratching incident, Plaintiff also claims CCISD used it to retaliate against her for reporting CCISD to "AFT Union officials." D.E. 5, p. 4. Plaintiff does not specify what she reported, when she made the report, what person at CCISD was aware of the report, or when that person gained that knowledge.

Finally, Plaintiff says unspecified persons retaliated against her for seeking medical attention for her disabilities by writing her up and ultimately terminating her. D.E. 5, p. 6. She does not specify when this occurred, what medical attention she sought, or what disabilities she had.

II. Plaintiff's EEOC Discrimination Charges

Plaintiff filed a discrimination charge on September 4, 2018. D.E. 8-1. The charge contains several boxes that claimants can mark to indicate the type of discrimination they experienced. Plaintiff marked the boxes for sex, national origin, age, and disability discrimination. She also marked the box for retaliation and the box indicating CCISD was engaged in a continuing action. She then wrote a narrative that largely recounts the allegations of the amended complaint, though in varying detail. The earliest instance of discrimination reported in the charge occurred on November 17, 2017, and the most recent occurred on September 4, 2018—the same date Plaintiff filed the charge. The charge clarifies that Plaintiff works at Gibson Elementary School.

Plaintiff filed a second discrimination charge on January 2, 2019. D.E. 8-2. In this charge, Plaintiff only marked the boxes for retaliation and continuing action. Plaintiff'snarrative alleges that CCISD retaliated against her because she filed the first charge. These allegations are mostly conclusory, but the most specific claims are that CCISD "inappropriately disclosed [Plaintiff's] EEOC complaint to employees who had no knowledge of [her] job performance" and that "[t]he demeanor of employees who were once friendly towards [her] has changed." D.E. 8-2.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Procedural Requests

The Court addresses two procedural issues raised in Plaintiff's response before turning to the substance of Defendant's motion. First, Plaintiff asks the Court to continue its ruling on the instant motion and permit discovery because "this case is early in its development" and "there is some question about the complexities, scope and nature of the Defendant's violations." D.E. 12, p. 3.

The Court finds that this is not an adequate basis to postpone its ruling on the instant motion. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she cannot provide the factual underpinnings of her allegations without discovery of specific information held only by CCISD. One of the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) and the pleading standards is to spare defendants of fishing expeditions in the name of discovery before demonstrating that the claims are plausible. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007). The request is DENIED.

Second, beyond the two EEOC discrimination charges discussed above, Plaintiff asks the Court to consider five other exhibits that she filed with her response to the instant motion: her original complaint, a right to sue letter from the EEOC, "IntakeNotes," "Incidents of Continued Acts of Discrimination," and a "Recap of Events." D.E. 12-1, 4-7.¹ The Court will not consider the original complaint because the amended complaint does not incorporate it by reference. King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994). And the Court will not consider the remaining documents because the amended complaint does not reference them. See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000).

II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

At first glance, the amended complaint appears to contain ten separately labeled claims. D.E. 5, p. 5-9. Many of these claims, however, conflate several different causes of action. Id. The Court interprets the claims as follows:

(1) Disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA), and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Texas Labor Code § 21.001 et seq. (TCHRA);

(2) Denial of reasonable accommodation under the ADA and TCHRA;

(3) Gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII), and the TCHRA;

(4) National origin discrimination under Title VII and the TCHRA;²

(5) Age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (ADEA), and TCHRA;

(6) Retaliation under the ADA and TCHRA for requesting a "chair for her disability";(7) Retaliation under Title VII for reporting discrimination to the EEOC;

(8) Retaliation under an unspecified law for reporting unspecified acts to the AFT Union;

(9) Retaliation under the TCHRA by "writing Plaintiff up" because she sought medical attention for her disabilities and terminating her;

(10) Hostile work environment under Title VII, the ADA, and TCHRA;

(11) Official oppression under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(12) Conspiracy against rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and

(13) Retaliation under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).

D.E. 5, p. 5-9.

A. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must make "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim must be "plausible on its face," which means that its "factual content" permits the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the...