Faby v. CSX Transp., Inc.

CHRISTOPHER FABY, Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. ADC-19-3337

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

May 14, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant, CSX Transportation, Inc. ("Defendant"), moves this Court to dismiss Counts I and II of Plaintiff Christopher Faby's Complaint for respondeat superior and direct negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (the "Motion to Dismiss") (ECF No. 23). Within his Response, Plaintiff moved to file an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26). After considering the Motions and the responses thereto (ECF Nos. 23, 26, 31), the Court finds no hearing is necessary. See Loc.R. 105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For the reasons stated herein the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Additionally, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to File an Amended Complaint as futile.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the challenged complaint. See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff is an engineer who was employed by Defendant. ECF No. 1 at 2, ¶ 4. Plaintiff was the regular engineer on an assignment running from Sealston, Virginia, to Jessup, Maryland, and back again (the "Route"). Id. at 2, ¶ 7. On April 26, 2018, the regular conductor for the Route was unavailable, and Michael Shoemaker was assigned to be conductor, a role he had performed for the Route several times before. Id. Mr. Shoemaker is a Marine veteran, and he trained as a boxer both while in service and afterward. Id. at 6, ¶ 19. The Route was officially scheduled to begin at 6:00 p.m., but it was customary to begin it at 5:00 p.m. so the train hit optimal traffic patterns. Id. at 3, ¶ 8. On April 26, 2018, Mr. Shoemaker did not arrive to begin the Route at 5:00 p.m., but after Plaintiff texted Mr. Shoemaker several times, Mr. Shoemaker arrived at approximately 5:34 p.m. Id. at 3, ¶ 9.

Once Mr. Shoemaker arrived, he and Plaintiff prepared the train for departure. Id. at 3, ¶ 10. Although preparing the train is the responsibility of the conductor, because Plaintiff regularly worked on the Route, he suggested "a more efficient way to make up the train," which seemed to agitate Mr. Shoemaker. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 10-11. Mr. Shoemaker, however, was no longer agitated during the trip from Virginia to Maryland, and the trip was uneventful. Id. at 3, ¶ 12. Once the train arrived in Maryland, Mr. Shoemaker was responsible for directing the placement of the railroad cars within the applicable clearance points on the tracks and for protecting any shove movements. Id. at 4, ¶ 13. While Mr. Shoemaker was switching the railroad cars, Plaintiff was also relying on him to direct the movement of the train by instructing Plaintiff where to stop the train. Id. at 4, ¶ 14. Generally, Plaintiff would not be able to see the conductor while the conductor was directing the train movements; however, not only was Plaintiff able to see Mr. Shoemaker while he was supposed to be directing the shove movements, he also saw that one of the railroad cars was improperly beyond the clearance point. Id. at 4, ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Shoemaker's improper position and the railroad car's placement beyond the clearance point are "significant violations of railroad rules." Id. at 5, ¶ 15. Plaintiff radioed Mr. Shoemaker "and told him that the situation had to be rectified." Id. at 5, ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges Mr. Shoemaker became upset and agitated Plaintiff "criticized" his job performance. Id.

Once Mr. Shoemaker completed his responsibilities correctly, he got back in the cab of the train to return to Virginia. Id. at 5, ¶ 17. Plaintiff observed that Mr. Shoemaker was still "clearly upset about being told what to do," and Plaintiff told Mr. Shoemaker "no other conductor would have left the railroad cars in the foul beyond the clearance point and that they could both be fired if it was left that way." Id. In response, Mr. Shoemaker did not calm down as he had on the first leg of the Route. Id. at 5, ¶ 18. While Plaintiff was operating the train, Mr. Shoemaker struck Plaintiff in the left eye with his fist without warning; as Plaintiff put his hands over his face, Mr. Shoemaker continued to strike him in the head approximately ten to fifteen more times. Id. at 5-6, ¶ 18. Plaintiff experienced blurry vision and disorientation as a result. Id. Mr. Shoemaker appeared to calm down after striking Plaintiff, and he did not speak to or touch Plaintiff during the rest of the Route. Id. at 6, ¶ 19. Plaintiff did not contact anyone until the train stopped in Sealston, Virginia, at which point Mr. Shoemaker exited the train and Plaintiff contacted the crew caller to request he be marked off work. Id. at 6, ¶ 20.

Plaintiff did not tell anyone employed by Defendant of the incident with Mr. Shoemaker until an unspecified time not more than four days after the event. Id. at 6, ¶ 21; see also ECF No. 26 at 7. Plaintiff attended a previously scheduled cardiac stress test with a physician, after which he contacted his union representative to report the incident. ECF No. 1 at 6, ¶ 21. He became ill after the medical appointment, and he went to the hospital, where he called William Smith, a management representative for Defendant. Id. Mr. Smith met Plaintiff at the hospital after he was released. Id. Plaintiff alleges Mr. Smith asked him if he would refrain from reporting the incident with Mr. Shoemaker, and that Mr. Smith told Plaintiff if he did report the incident Plaintiff would experience "a long dark road." Id. at 7, ¶ 22. Plaintiff insisted on officially reporting the incident and completed the relevant documentation. Id.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed the Complaint against Defendants in this Court. ECF No. 1.¹ On January 13, 2020, Defendants filed their Partial Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 23. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition on January 28, 2020, in which he also moved to file an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 26. On February 19, 2020, Defendant replied and opposed Plaintiff's request to file an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 31. This matter is now fully briefed, and the Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion and the responses thereto.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint not to "resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). A complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. An inference of a mere possibility of misconduct is not sufficient to support a plausible claim. Id. at 679. As stated in Twombly, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." 550 U.S. at 555. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'nakedassertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted). Although when considering a motion to dismiss a court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, this principle does not apply to legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

B. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

In his three-Count Complaint, Plaintiff brings a claim for respondeat superior under FELA in Count I and a claim for direct negligence under FELA in Count II. Defendant argues in its Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff cannot sustain either of his FELA claims. The Court agrees with Defendant and will address each Count in turn.

"FELA provides the exclusive remedy for railroaders who are injured because of an employer's negligence while the employee is working in interstate commerce." Miller v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. GJH-18-2022, 2019 WL 1992105, at *2 (D.Md. May 3, 2019) (first citing Wabash R.R. Co. v. Hayes, 234 U.S. 86, 89 (1914), then citing Dixon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 990 F.2d 1440, 1442 n.2 (4th Cir. 1993)). FELA "does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty. The basis of his liability is his negligence, not the fact that injuries occur." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Miller, 159 Md.App. 123, 133 (2004) (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994)). "A FELA suit can be successfully pursued by an employee only if there is proof of some negligence on the part of the railroad." Id. at 135. The railroad's negligence "must be 'in whole or in part' the cause of the [employee's] injury." Id. (quoting Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653 (1947)). When a FELA action concerns an intentional tort, a plaintiff can prevail "'by showing either that the intentional tort was committed in furtherance of the employer's objectives or that the employer was negligent in hiring, supervising, or failing to fire the employee.'" Higgins v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 318 F.3d 422, 425(2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Lancaster v. Norfold & W. Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 818 (7th Cir. 1985)). "But where one employee assaults another employee for the sole purpose of satisfying his own temper or spite, the employer cannot be held liable for such a wanton act." Sowards v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 580 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).

1. Plaintiff Cannot Sustain His Respondeat Superior Claim Because Mr. Shoemaker Was Not Acting Within the Scope of His Employment.

Defendant first seeks to...