Fairbanks v. Galbraith

545 P.3d 850

2024 WY 36

Emily FAIRBANKS, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.Holly GALBRAITH, Appellee (Defendant).

Holly Galbraith, Appellant (Defendant),

v.Emily Fairbanks, Appellee (Plaintiff).

S-23-0218

S-23-0219

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 29, 2024

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, The Honorable Melissa M. Owens, Judge

Representing Emily Fairbanks: Bret F. King and Spencer B. King, King & King, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Bret King.

Representing Holly Galbraith: Sean W. Scoggin and Blaine F. Burgess, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Scoggin.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ,^* BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] These appeals stem from an automobile accident that occurred in Idaho. Holly Galbraith was driving her vehicle when it crashed, injuring Emily Fairbanks, who was a passenger in the vehicle. Ms. Fairbanks sued Mrs. Galbraith in Wyoming, alleging Mrs. Galbraith was negligent. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion to dismiss, contending the statute of limitations had run before the law- suit was filed. The district court allowed limited discovery on the issue, converted the motion to summary judgment, and denied it. The district court later granted Mrs. Galbraith’s next motion for summary judgment in which she argued that collateral estoppel prevented the relitigation of issues of negligence and damages established in a companion case in Idaho. In appeal No. S-23-0219, Mrs. Galbraith appeals the ruling on the statute of limitations; in appeal No. S-23- 0218, Ms. Fairbanks appeals the ruling on collateral estoppel.

[¶2] We conclude that the statute of limitations had run before Ms. Fairbanks filed her complaint and accordingly reverse the district court’s ruling in appeal No. S-23-0219. We do not reach the merits of appeal No. S- 23-0218.

ISSUES

[¶3] Mrs. Galbraith raises a single issue, which we rephrase:

1. Did the district court properly conclude that Idaho’s statute of limitations was tolled, such that Ms. Fairbanks’ lawsuit was timely?

Ms. Fairbanks raises the following issues, which we also rephrase:

1. Did the district court err when it allowed Mrs. Galbraith to assert collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense?

2. Does Idaho’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages apply to this matter?

Because Mrs. Galbraith’s issue is dispositive, we do not reach the issues raised by Ms. Fairbanks.

FACTS

[¶4] Ms. Fairbanks, a passenger in Mrs. Galbraith’s vehicle, sustained severe injuries in a single car accident that occurred in Idaho when Mrs. Galbraith lost control of the vehicle on a snow-packed road. The vehicle fishtailed, collided with a guardrail, and when the guardrail failed, careened down a 200- foot embankment. Ms. Fairbanks was 13 years old when the accident occurred.

[¶5] Ms. Fairbanks filed two lawsuits. She sued the Idaho Transportation Department in Idaho, and she sued Mrs. Galbraith in Wyoming. Both Ms. Fairbanks and Mrs. Galbraith are residents of Teton County, Wyoming.

A. The Idaho Case

[¶6] In Idaho, Ms. Fairbanks alleged that the Idaho Transportation Department had negligently failed to maintain the guardrail. In June 2022, an Idaho jury awarded Ms. Fairbanks damages in the amount of $1,018, 409.78–$860,000 in noneconomic damages, and $168,409.78 in economic damages. The jury apportioned negligence 60% to the State of Idaho and 40% to Mrs. Galbraith, who was not a party to that case.

B. The Wyoming Case

[¶7] In Wyoming, Ms. Fairbanks claimed Mrs. Galbraith was negligent. Mrs. Galbraith initially filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the Idaho statute of limitations barred Ms. Fairbanks’ lawsuit. The district court converted the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment and after limited discovery, denied the motion. Mrs. Galbraith filed a Petition for Writ of Review, which this Court denied.

[¶8] On July 22, 2019, Mrs. Galbraith filed an answer, listing her affirmative defenses. After several COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 related delays, trial was set for February 27, 2023. On February 8, 2023, Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion to vacate the trial date and on February 13, 2023, a motion for summary judgment. She argued that Ms. Fairbanks was collaterally estopped from relitigating issues of negligence and damages and that Idaho’s statutory noneconomic damage cap applied. After a hearing,’ the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Galbraith.

[¶9] Both parties appeal. Ms. Fairbanks argues that collateral estoppel does not apply, the district court erred in allowing Mrs. Galbraith to assert collateral estoppel late in the case, and the Idaho damage cap does not apply. In cross-appeal, Mrs. Galbraith contends that the district court erred when it concluded that the statute of limitations did not apply. Additional facts relevant to the analysis are discussed below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1–8] [¶10] Both parties are appealing the district court’s summary judgment rulings. '

"We review a district court’s ruling on summary judgment de novo." Wilcox v. Sec. State Bank, 2023 WY 2, ¶ 26, 523 P.3d 277, 284 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Statzer v. Statzer, 2022 WY 117, ¶ 10, 517 P.3d 574, 578-79 (Wyo. 2022)). We give no deference to the district court’s ruling, evaluate the same materials, and apply the same standards as the district court. Id.

"The record is assessed from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give a party opposing summary judgment the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record." Id. (quoting Statzer, ¶ 10, 517 P.3d at 579). A material fact is one that-would establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Id. The burdens of the respective parties in supporting or opposing summary judgment are well established:

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case and showing there is no genuine dispute, as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once that burden is met, the opposing party is obligated to respond with materials beyond the pleadings to show a genuine issue of material fact. When the moving party does not have the ultimate burden ofpersuasion, it establishes a prima facie ease for summary judgment by showing a lack of evidence on an essential element of the opposing party’s claim.

Id. (quoting Statzer, ¶ 11, 517 P.3d at 579). Falkenburg v. Laramie Inv. Co., Inc., 2023 WY 78, ¶¶ 5-6, 533 P.3d 511, 514-15 (Wyo. 2023). "Whether an action is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo." Boutelle v. Boutelle, 2014 WY 147, ¶ 7, 337 P.3d 1148, 1151, (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Inman v. Boykin, 2014 WY 94, ¶ 21, 330 P.3d 275, 281 (Wyo. 2014)).

DISCUSSION

Did the district court properly conclude that Idaho’s statute of limitations was tolled, such that Ms. Fairbanks’ lawsuit was timely?

[9] [¶11] The accident occurred in Idaho and we apply the Idaho statute of limitations. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-117 (LexisNexis 2023) ("If by the laws of the state … where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in this state."); Boutelle, ¶ 12, 337 P.3d at 1152-53 (When an accident and injuries occur in another state, the cause of action accrues in that state and pursuant to Wyoming’s borrowing statute, the statute of limitations to be applied is that of the state where the cause of action accrued.).

[¶12] Idaho has a two-year statute of limitations for "action[s] to recovers damages … for an injury to the person[.]" Idaho Code § 5-219 (2024). Idaho tolls the statute when the complainant is a minor at the time of the occurrence giving rise to the complaint. Idaho Code § 5-230 (tolling statute of limitations for a "period of [not] more than six (6) years on account of minority …"). Additionally, Idaho tolls the statute for periods of time when a defendant is, absent from the state. Idaho Code § 5-229 provides:

If, when the cause, of action accrues against a person, he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term herein limited, after his return to the state, and if, after the cause of action accrues, he departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

Idaho Code § 5-229 (2024) (emphasis added).¹

[¶13] It is undisputed that the two-year statute of limitations was tolled during Ms. Fairbanks’ minority and began to run on her eighteenth birthday, August 14, 2016. See Idaho Code § 32-101 (defining the age of majority to be eighteen years of age). It is also undisputed that Mrs. Galbraith was absent from the State of Wyoming for a total of 86 days between August 14, 2016, and August 14, 2018. Ms. Fairbanks filed this lawsuit on August 22, 2018.

[¶14] Based on its interpretation of Idaho caselaw addressing the tolling of the statute of limitations, the district court ruled that under Idaho Code § 5-229, time was tolled for the days that Mrs. Galbraith was absent from Wyoming. The district court found:

22. This Court is obligated under Tetzlaff² to agree with Plaintiff. Plaintiff has shown that Defendant was out of Idaho [Wyoming] for 86 days during the limitations period and some of those days included international travel. Those facts are not contested. Plaintiff has also provided the competent affidavit of her process server who explains the difficulties of using long- arm jurisdiction to serve a party while travelling out of state or out of the country, due to the lack of information regarding travel plans and lodging details that would be needed for services of process.

[¶15] On appeal, Mrs. Galbraith argues, that the district court improperly determined that the statute of limitations was tolled for the time she was out of the state because she was present when the cause of action accrued, and Ms. Fairbanks failed to establish that she exercised reasonable...