Fairchild Heights Residents Ass'n Inc. v. Fairchild Heights Inc.

131 Conn.App. 567

27 A.3d 467

FAIRCHILD HEIGHTS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC.

v.FAIRCHILD HEIGHTS, INC.

No. 31661.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 17, 2010.Decided Sept. 27, 2011.

Douglas J. Varga, Bridgeport, for the appellant (plaintiff).Colin P. Mahon, with whom was Thomas T. Lonardo, Meriden, for the appellee (defendant).HARPER, LAVINE and MIHALAKOS, Js.LAVINE, J.

The plaintiff, Fairchild Heights Residents Association, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a trial to the court.¹ The defendant, Fairchild Heights, Inc., claims that the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to bringing this action.² We agree that the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and that the trial court otherwise lacked jurisdiction and should have dismissed the case.

The following procedural history sets forth the facts necessary to resolve the question of subject matter jurisdiction and the plaintiff's appeal. The plaintiff ³ commenced this action by serving the defendant with a three count complaint in July, 2006. The complaint contained two counts of negligence per se alleging that the defendant had violated (1) General Statutes § 21–64 et seq. (chapter 412 of the General Statutes) and (2) ordinances of the city of Shelton (ordinances), and one count alleging that the defendant had violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42–110a et seq. After the action was commenced, on September 11, 2006, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the office of the attorney general, regarding the manner in which the defendant operated Fairfield Heights Mobile Home Park (park).⁴ The attorney general's office forwarded the complaint to the department of consumer protection (department), which is responsible for monitoring such complaints pursuant to General Statutes § 21–67. After the department had closed its file on the defendant, the plaintiff amended its complaint to include another count alleging that the manner in which the defendant sought to renew the leases of the park residents in December, 2007, violated chapter 412. The case was tried to the court in May, 2009.

Although the following facts are not relevant to our resolution of the jurisdictional issue, they provide the underlying context. In a memorandum of decision issued on September 24, 2009, the court found, in part, that an agent of the department inspected the park pursuant to the plaintiff's complaint. Thereafter, Gregory F. Carver, department investigator, sent Jeffrey W. Doolan, the defendant's majority stock holder and manager of the park, a letter advising him of several violations of General Statutes § 21–82(a), which sets forth the landlord's responsibilities in operating a mobile home park. The department monitored the defendant's response to this letter and on July 31, 2007, Vicky E. Bullock, a department staff attorney, conducted an informal compliance hearing.⁵ At the hearing, it was determined that, although the defendant had rectified some of the chapter 412 violations, concerns still existed. Further inspections of the park were conducted by Keith Lombardi, a special department investigator, who wrote in his November 28, 2007 report, “[a]ll previous concerns appeared to be addressed.” In a letter dated December 28, 2007, Bullock informed the defendant that the department had determined that the defendant was in compliance with chapter 412 and that it was closing its file. At trial, the plaintiff argued that because department inspections, conducted after it had commenced the action, found violations of § 21–82(a) in the park, it was entitled to declaratory, injunctive and CUTPA relief. The court found in favor of the defendant,⁶ and the plaintiff appealed.

In its brief to this court, the defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and, therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Our limited jurisdiction is governed by General Statutes § 52–263, which provides in relevant part: “Upon the trial of all matters of fact in any cause or action in the Superior Court, whether to the court or jury, or before any judge thereof when the jurisdiction of any action or proceeding is vested in him, if either party is aggrieved by the decision of the court or judge upon any question or questions of law arising in the trial ... he may appeal to the court having jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court or of such judge....” (Emphasis added.) Whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case, however, is a different matter entirely.

“[T]his court has jurisdiction to determine whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case....” Gemmell v. Lee, 42 Conn.App. 682, 684 n. 3, 680 A.2d 346 (1996). Resolution of the trial court's subject matter is determinative of this appeal. Moreover, during our review of the record, we questioned whether the plaintiff had standing to bring a CUTPA claim and ordered, sua sponte, counsel to submit supplemental briefs on that issue.⁷ We conclude that the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and therefore lacked standing to bring a CUTPA action. The trial court, therefore, was without subject matter jurisdiction and the action must be dismissed.

Our Supreme Court has “long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.... Moreover, [i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.... Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it....[A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction.... The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Richardson v. Commissioner of Correction, 298 Conn. 690, 696, 6 A.3d 52 (2010); see also Albuquerque v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 124 Conn.App. 866, 872, 10 A.3d 38 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 924, 11 A.3d 150 (2011). In the absence of standing, the court has no jurisdiction, as “no action in this case ever was commenced, as it was void ab initio.” America's Wholesale Lender v. Silberstein, 87 Conn.App. 485, 489, 866 A.2d 695 (2005).

“[I]t is clear that, under the common law, a trial court has inherent authority to open and modify a judgment it rendered without jurisdiction. Such a judgment is void ab initio and is subject to both direct and collateral attack.... If a court has never acquired jurisdiction over a defendant or the subject matter ... any judgment ultimately entered is void and subject to vacation or collateral attack.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morris v. Irwin, 4 Conn.App. 431, 433, 494 A.2d 626 (1985).

“[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.... It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213–14, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009).

I

We turn first to the question of whether the trial court lacked subject matter over the plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. We conclude that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims for declaratory judgment because the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate standing to bring an action for injunctive relief.

“It is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter.... Furthermore, [b]ecause the exhaustion doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, we must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim.... [W]henever a court discovers that it has no jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the case, without regard to its previous rulings.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 557, 630 A.2d 1304 (1993).

“The doctrine of exhaustion is grounded in a policy of fostering an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a reviewing court will have the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions.... The doctrine of exhaustion furthers the salutary goals of relieving the courts of the burden of deciding questions entrusted to an agency ... in advance of possible judicial review.... In addition, a favorable outcome by the administrative adjudication may render judicial intervention unnecessary.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Breiner v. State Dental Commission, 57 Conn.App. 700, 704–705, 750 A.2d 1111 (2000). “Moreover, resolution of the issues at the administrative level may render judicial review unnecessary. As the United States Supreme Court has noted: A complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may never have to intervene. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Housing Authority v. Papandrea, 222 Conn. 414, 420–21, 610 A.2d 637 (1992). “Whether prior recourse to the agency will be...