Fairchild v. Quinnipiac Univ.

16 F.Supp.3d 89

Germaine FAIRCHILD, Plaintiff

v.QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

No. 3:13cv1877 SRU.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed April 22, 2014.

Lewis H. Chimes, Maria Eugenia Garcia Quintner, Law Office of Lewis Chimes LLC, Stamford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Lawrence Peikes, Wiggin & Dana LLP, Stamford, CT, for Defendant.

Ruling on Motion to Dismiss

STEFAN R. UNDERHILL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Germaine Fairchild (“Fairchild”) brings this lawsuit against her former employer, Quinnipiac University (“Quinnipiac” or “the University”), for violations of the antiretaliation provision of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”), Connecticut's Equal Pay Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–75 et seq. (“CEPA”), and Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–51q. Now before me are Quinnipiac's Motion to Dismiss (doc. # 10), Fairchild's Motion to Defer the Issues Raised in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss until Summary Judgment (doc. # 14), and Fairchild's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (doc. # 15). For the reasons set forth below, Quinnipiac's motion is denied, and both of Fairchild's motions are denied as moot.

I. Background

Quinnipiac is a private university located in Hamden, Connecticut. Compl. ¶ 7 (doc. # 1). Fairchild was the head coach of the women's softball team at Quinnipiac for over a decade, until she was terminated in July 2013. Id. ¶ 10. Fairchild was hired as the full time head coach of women's softball by Quinnipiac's Athletic Director, Jack McDonald, in October 2001. Id. ¶ 11. She entered into a written contract with the University, which was renewed annually until 2013. Id.

During Fairchild's tenure and under her direction, the women's softball team made it to the Northeast Conference tournament seven times and made the finals four times. Id. ¶ 12. Fairchild asserts that she received many positive letters from athletes, parents, assistant coaches, administrators, colleagues, student-athletic trainers and outside observers of Quinnipiac Athletics during her time as the women's softball head coach at the University. Id. ¶ 13. In her 2012 performance review, McDonald rated Fairchild as “high” for a merit increase. Id. ¶ 15.

In April 2009, a group of Quinnipiac female volleyball players and their coach brought a class action lawsuit against Quinnipiac, alleging violations of Title IX. Id. ¶ 17. That case, Biediger, et al. v. Quinnipiac University, No. 3:09cv621 (SRU), was on my docket. On May 22, 2009, I granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining Quinnipiac from: (a) eliminating Quinnipiac's women's varsity intercollegiate volleyball team or any other women's teams or athletic participation opportunities; (b) involuntarily terminating the employment of the coaches of Quinnipiac's women's varsity intercollegiate volleyball team; (c) reducing its financial, material, or other support for the Quinnipiac women's varsity intercollegiate volleyball team or any other women's intercollegiate team; and (d) restricting or denying Quinnipiac's women's varsity intercollegiate volleyball team access to facilities, coaching, training, or competitive opportunities. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F.Supp.2d 277, 298 (D.Conn.2009).

On July 21, 2010, following a bench trial, I found in favor of the plaintiffs on their first claim for relief and issued a declaratory judgment that Quinnipiac violated Title IX and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto by failing to provide equal athletic participation opportunities to its female students. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F.Supp.2d 62, 114 (D.Conn.2010), aff'd, 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir.2012). I also permanently enjoined Quinnipiac from discriminating against its female students on the basis of sex by failing to provide equal athletic participation opportunities. Id. In December 2011, Quinnipiac moved to lift the injunction (doc. # 225) and another trial was held in June 2012. On March 4, 2013, I denied Quinnipiac's motion to lift the injunction (doc. # 305). The parties then entered into a consent decree, which I approved on June 20, 2013 (doc. # 311).

During the course of the Biediger lawsuit, Fairchild was subpoenaed to testify as a witness at the preliminary injunction hearing and at a deposition. Compl. ¶ 19. Fairchild provided credible testimony about the University's roster-management system, which I relied on in granting the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and in the later injunction proceedings. Id. ¶ 20; see also Biediger, 616 F.Supp.2d at 284–88, 297 (“As effectively demonstrated by Fairchild's testimony about the players on her team, those students filling the extra roster spots are not receiving genuine opportunities to participate and the roster count on the EADA report fails to capture the numerical reality.”). Fairchild was terminated on July 11, 2013, exactly three weeks after I approved the consent degree in Biediger. Compl. ¶ 26.

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is designed “merely to assess the legal feasibility of a complaint, not to assay the weight of evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.1984) (quoting Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1980) ).

When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and decide whether it is plausible that the plaintiff has a valid claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1996).

Under Twombly, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). The plausibility standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal obligates the plaintiff to “provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief” through more than “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quotation marks omitted). Plausibility at the pleading stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the claims] is improbable, and ... recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

A. Retaliation Claims

Fairchild asserts that she was terminated in retaliation for providing testimony supportive of the plaintiffs in the Biediger lawsuit, in violation of both Title IX and Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–51q. Fairchild relies on the same facts to support both claims. Quinnipiac argues that Fairchild's speech was not protected under either statute.

Title IX provides, in relevant part: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). “Retaliation against a person because that person has complained of sex discrimination is [a] form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by Title IX's private cause of action.” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005). As a result, “when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because [s]he complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX.” Id. at 174, 125 S.Ct. 1497.

Section 31–51q prohibits an employer from “subject[ing] any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state,” where the employee's activity “does not substantially or materially interfere with the employee's bona fide job performance or the working relationship between the employee and the employer.” “To be protected by the first amendment, the plaintiff's speech must have been on a matter of public concern, and the plaintiff's interest in expressing himself on the particular matter must not have been outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to the employment relationship.” Lopez v. Burris Logistics Co., 952 F.Supp.2d 396, 406–07 (D.Conn.2013) (citing Kennedy v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of New York, Inc., 170 F.Supp.2d 294, 299 (D.Conn.2001) (internal citations omitted)); see also Daley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 249 Conn. 766, 776, 734 A.2d 112 (1999) (“Section 31–51q protects from retaliatory discharge an employee who invokes constitutionally guaranteed free speech rights that, in turn, protect statements that address a matter of public concern.”). Whether a plaintiff's speech involves a matter of public concern is a question of law for the court. E.g., Daley, 249 Conn. at 777, 734 A.2d 112.

“The Supreme Court has defined ‘a matter of public concern’ as one that ‘relat[es] to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.’ ” Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) ). Gender discrimination in employment clearly is a matter of public concern. Konits v. Valley Stream Cent. High Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir.2005) (citing Flamm v. Am. Ass'n...