Faison v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

ALFRED R. FAISON and ELVA J. FAISON Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO BANK N.A., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-11755

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

February 4, 2020

Not for Publication

OPINION

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiffs Alfred R. Faison and Elva J. Faison ("Plaintiffs") sue Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., ("Wells Fargo") and Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC ("Ocwen") (collectively "Defendants") for fraud, violation of federal consumer protection laws, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, harassment, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. D.E. 37. Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss, D.E. 38, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, D.E. 37. The Court reviewed the parties' submissions¹ and decided the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the following reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND²

This matter arises from a foreclosure action involving Wells Fargo and Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs owned the real property located at 234 Lakeview Avenue, Paterson, New Jersey (the "Property"). FAC ¶ 2. In November 2006, Plaintiffs entered into a loan with BNC Mortgage Inc. Id. ¶¶ 15-18. Plaintiffs executed a note secured by a mortgage on the Property. Id.; see also D.E. 38-3, at 2. JP Morgan Chase ("Chase")³ was the servicer at this time. FAC ¶ 20. From 2006 to 2009, Plaintiffs allegedly had no issues with their mortgage payment. Id. ¶ 21. Sometime thereafter, Chase considered Plaintiffs in default for failing to make their required payments, which Plaintiffs dispute. Id. ¶¶ 37-40. In 2009, Plaintiffs entered into a payment plan with Chase. Id. ¶¶ 39-44. Plaintiffs continued their payments under this payment plan until "late to the end of 2012." Id. ¶ 45. Plaintiffs allege that in October or November 2012, Chase "started to reject [Plaintiffs'] payments" and again considered the mortgage in default. Id. ¶ 51. Chase allegedly "ejected Plaintiffs from the loan modification program and considered the mortgage in default and also considered [Plaintiffs] ineligible for [a] loan work-out." Id. ¶ 52. Sometime between 2012 and 2013, Wells Fargo became "assignee of the [n]ote and [m]ortgage," and Ocwen became the servicer. Id. ¶ 54.

In September 2013, Wells Fargo and Ocwen filed a foreclosure action against Plaintiffs in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Passaic County ("Foreclosure Action").Id. ¶ 61; D.E. 38-2, Ex. A. Plaintiffs thereafter removed the Foreclosure Action to federal court on October 31, 2013. FAC ¶ 63. In December 2013, the action was remanded to the Superior Court of New Jersey. Id. ¶ 64. On April 8, 2016, Wells Fargo obtained a final judgment against Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 85; D.E. 38-2, Ex. I. Plaintiffs moved to vacate the final judgment in December 2016, id. ¶ 86, which the state court denied on January 17, 2017, id. ¶ 94.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Complaint in this case on July 18, 2018, as well as sought temporary restraints prohibiting Plaintiffs' eviction. D.E. 1, 2. The Court issued numerous orders relating to Plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraints (denying the motion several times due to the noted deficiencies, including failure to cite legal authority or address the necessary elements of Plaintiffs' causes of action) and converted the motion to one for a preliminary injunction. D.E. 4, 6, 9, 11. The Court thereafter denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. D.E. 21.

Plaintiffs then filed an Amended Complaint, seeking over $35,000,000 in damages. D.E. 37. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege four counts: fraud (Count One), violation of the "Federal Consumer Protection Act" (Count Two), breach of contract and unjust enrichment (Count Three), and harassment and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count Four). FAC ¶¶ 113-143. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. D.E. 38. Plaintiffs filed opposition, D.E. 39, to which Defendants did not reply.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(1) - Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In deciding a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, a court must first determine whether the party presents a facial or factual attackbecause the distinction determines how the pleading is reviewed.⁴ A facial attack "contests the sufficiency of the complaint because of a defect on its face," whereas a factual attack "asserts that the factual underpinnings of the basis for jurisdiction fails to comport with the jurisdictional prerequisites." Elbeco Inc. v. Nat'l Ret. Fund, 128 F. Supp. 3d 849, 854 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Moore v. Angle's List, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 802, 806 (E.D. Pa. 2015)). When a party moves to dismiss prior to answering the complaint, as is the case here, the motion is generally considered a facial attack. Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). For a facial attack, "the Court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true," much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Ed. of Trs. of Trucking Emps of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Caliber Auto Transfer, Inc., No. 09-6447, 2010 WL 2521091, at *8 (D.N.J. June 11, 2010) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006)). The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the Court has jurisdiction. Id. (citing Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) - Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Further, a plaintiff must "allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims." Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir.2016). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the factual and legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, not entitled to a presumption of truth. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court, however, "must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. Even if plausibly pled, however, a complaint will not withstand a motion to dismiss if the facts alleged do not state "a legally cognizable cause of action." Turner v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 14-7148, 2015 WL 12826480, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2015).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "is a 'narrow doctrine' that 'applies only in limited circumstances.'" Rodrigues v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 751 F. App'x 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (quoting Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 169 (3d Cir. 2010). As explained by the Supreme Court, the doctrine "is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Against this backdrop, the Third Circuit has made clear that Rooker-Feldman "does not bar suits that challenge actions or injuries underlying state court decisions - and especially those that predate entry of a state court decision - rather than the decisions themselves." Allen v. DeBello, 861 F.3d 433, 438 (3d Cir. 2017). In other words, "when the source of the injury is the defendant's actions (and not the state court judgments), the federal suit is independent, even if it asks the federal court to deny a legal conclusion reached by the state court." Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3dat 167. As such, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when four requirements are met: "(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 'complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments'; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments." Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284).

Here, Plaintiffs' injuries appear to arise from Defendants' actions underlying the state court judgment, rather than from the state court judgment itself. In other words, Plaintiffs' claims do not appear to "allege injuries arising from the state-court action itself." Rodrigues, 751 F. App'x at 316. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. Fraud (Count One)⁵

Plaintiff brings Count One alleging fraud. A plaintiff must prove the following to establish common-law fraud: "'(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.'" Banco Popular N.Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 172-73 (2005) (quoting Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997)). For allegations sounding in fraud, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) imposes a heightened pleading standard. Specifically, a party alleging fraud "must state with particularity the...