Fallon v. CTSC, LLC

JAMES FALLON, Plaintiff, v. CTSC, LLC, a foreign corporation, Defendant.

Civ. No. 13-00176 MV/ACT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

Dated: September 26, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on defendant CTSC, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint [Doc. 7]. The Court, having considered the motion, briefs, and relevant law, and being otherwise fully informed, finds that the motion to dismiss is well taken in part and will be granted in part.

BACKGROUND

On October 10, 2012, plaintiff James Fallon filed his Complaint for Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Age, Disability, Serious Medical Condition and Retaliation, in the Second Judicial District Court, State of New Mexico. See Notice of Removal, Exh. B. ("Compl."). On February 22, 2013, defendant removed the case to this Court on the ground of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. See id. ¶ 13.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the New Mexico Human Rights Act ("NMHRA"), N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7(A), by (1) discriminating against plaintiff in the terms and conditions of his employment on the basis of age; (2) discriminating against plaintiff in the terms and conditions of his employment on the basis of disability; and (3) retaliating against plaintiff in the terms and conditions of employment. See Compl. ¶¶ 26, 29-31, 35. Thecomplaint contains the following allegations in support of these claims.

Plaintiff began working for defendant in 2007. See id. ¶ 6. In May 2010, plaintiff was given a positive evaluation. See id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff's previous evaluations had been average or above average. See id. In Fall 2010, plaintiff was demoted without any warning or notice. See id. ¶ 9. At the time of his demotion, plaintiff was 63 years old, which was the oldest age of any employee in defendant's Albuquerque office. See id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff was replaced by a younger male, identified in the complaint as Mr. Keefner ("Keefner"), who was in his early forties. See id. ¶ 10.

In November 2010, Keefner began accusing plaintiff of having a body odor problem. See id. ¶ 12. Keefner placed plaintiff on probationary status and threatened to terminate plaintiff over this perceived body odor issue. See id. Plaintiff's coworkers indicted that they did not notice that plaintiff had a body odor problem. See id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff's physician provided plaintiff with medical documentation indicating that plaintiff did not have a body odor issue. See id. Notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiff began bringing extra clothes to work and showering mid-day. See id. ¶ 14. Keefner nonetheless continued to harass plaintiff about body odor by saying Keefner smelled something "rank" whenever plaintiff was present. See id.

Plaintiff reported Keefner's conduct to defendant's human resources department and notified the department that Keefner was subjecting plaintiff to a hostile work environment. See id. ¶ 15. The human resources department informed plaintiff that his claims were unsubstantiated and told plaintiff that he was "paranoid." See id. Keefner continued to harass plaintiff, isolate plaintiff from plaintiff's subordinates, and interfere with plaintiff's duties. See id. ¶ 16.

In April 2011, "Plaintiff was written up for not attending a meeting that was for employees who had signed up for defendant's health insurance plan. Plaintiff came to the meeting[,] butsince Plaintiff did not have [CTSC's] health insurance, Plaintiff left with several other employees." Id. ¶ 17.

As a result of the alleged hostile work environment, plaintiff began suffering from depression and anxiety. See id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff sought medical treatment for his depression. See id. On May 6, 2011, plaintiff requested an accommodation for his depression. See id. ¶ 19.

Less than one month after requesting the accommodation, plaintiff was given a final warning for allegedly failing to follow Keefner's instructions. See id. ¶ 20. Just one week earlier, however, Keefner had told plaintiff that plaintiff was doing a "good job." Id. On June 10, 2011, plaintiff was terminated for allegedly missing a meeting. See id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff denies that he missed any meetings. See id.

Plaintiff timely filed a charge of discrimination with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission. See id. ¶ 5. Prior to filing this lawsuit, plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the New Mexico Human Rights Commission. See id.

STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "The nature of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint." Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). When considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, view those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1097-98 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1148 (2010).

To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact, taken as true, "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A plaintiff must "nudge[ his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

The Supreme Court has identified two principles underlying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard: (1) when legal conclusions are involved in the complaint "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to [those] conclusions," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; and (2) "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss," id. at 679. Thus, mere "labels and conclusions" and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Accordingly, a district court must disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable. See Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012).

The Tenth Circuit has explained that plausibility refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs 'have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Robbins v. Okla., 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); accord Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1191. The plausibility standard is "a middle ground between heightened fact pleading, which is expressly rejected, and allowing complaints that are no more than labels and conclusions . . . , which the Court stated will not do." Robbins, 519 F.3d at1247 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1191. Therefore, while the plausibility standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," it "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. In the context of employment discrimination cases, the Tenth Circuit has suggested that plausibility may require less specific pleadings, "because in [these] cases where the employers are large corporations, the employee may not know who actually fired [him] or for what reason." Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1190; see also Hunt v. Central Consolidated Sch. Dist., No. 11-CV-1144 JB/WDS, 2013 WL 3214928, at *28 (D.N.M. June 12, 2013).

DISCUSSION

In support of its motion to dismiss, defendant contends that plaintiff fails to state claims under the NMHRA for age discrimination, discrimination based upon disability, and retaliation. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.

I. NMHRA Age Discrimination Claim.

The Tenth Circuit has explained that "the elements of each alleged cause of action help to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim" under Rule 12(b)(6). Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA, 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Thus, the Court begins its analysis of defendant's motion to dismiss the age discrimination claim by discussing the elements of a prima facie case. Cf. id. Under the NMHRA, it is unlawful for "an employer, unless based on a bona fide occupational qualification or other statutory prohibition, to refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote or to discriminate in matters of compensation,terms, conditions or privileges of employment against any person otherwise qualified because of . . . age." N. M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7(A). The New Mexico Supreme Court has applied the evidentiary burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to NMHRA employment discrimination claims based upon indirect evidence of discriminatory intent. See Smith v. FDC Corp., 787 P.2d 433, 436 (N.M. 1990). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination by proving that (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected group, which, in the context of an age discrimination claim includes persons over forty years of age; (2) the plaintiff was qualified to continue in his position;...